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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the relationships between the local 
authority and 18 other public authorities providing 
services in the London Borough of Camden. It is based 
on qualitative data collected by interviewing 70 
individuals who were either senior managers or members 
of the authorities studied. The fieldwork was carried 
out between 1985 and 1987.
The study identifies the lack of a well-defined body 
of literature or theory of horizontal inter-govern- 
mental relations at the local level. The research 
design draws upon previous studies in the fields of 
operational research, local government studies, policy 
studies, political theory, organisational studies and 
inter-governmental relations.
The study demonstrates that the provision of public 
services in Camden was highly functionally fragmented. 
There were high levels of interdependence among the 
authorities studied explained by the socioeconomic 
environment of the area and the distribution of powers 
within the local government system. Interdependence 
was complex and multi-dimensional. The extent of 
linkages among public authorities was not great. Ad 
hoc and informal linkages played an important role. 
The patchiness of linkages could be explained by 
organisational and political factors. The local 
authority did not play a central co-ordinating role in 
the network.
Authorities pursued a hierarchy of overlapping goals. 
Inter-authority activity was sustained by a process of 
mutual goal fulfilment. R e l a t i o n s h i p s  between public 
authorities wejre seen to be highly desirable but very 
difficult to undertake. The public authority network
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was widely regarded as ineffective in tackling complex 
public service issues.
A number of wider conclusions are drawn from the 
study. These include the utility of the concepts of a 
public authority network and the process of mutual 
goal fulfilment. The need for revision of theories of 
the interdependence of public authorities and the 
nature of the network linking local authorities and 
other public authorities is demonstrated. The study 
also raises questions about the validity of policy 
makers1 assumptions about the way local and other 
public authorities behave and casts doubt on the 
ability of some local authorities to perform an 
enabling role.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
The subject of this dissertation is intergovernmental 
relationships (IGR) at the local level. It deals with 
horizontal relationships between local authorities 
and other public authorities providing services in 
the same geographical area. The research on which it 
was based was carried out in the London Borough of 
Camden. Camden Council professed considerable concern 
for the general welfare of its citizens and for the 
public services provided within its boundaries? yet 
it experienced great difficulty in developing 
relationships with other public authorities.
The dissertation begins with a discussion of the 
structural factors which give rise to 
intergovernmental relations at the local level in 
Britain. The discussion distinguishes between 
geographic and functional fragmentation. Geographic 
fragmentation has been reduced substantially over the 
last hundred years by various reforms of local 
government. Functional fragmentation, whereby 
responsibility for the provision of public services is 
divided amongst specialised authorities, has increased 
over the same time period. As functional fragmentation 
has increased so has the need for public authorities 
to develop relationships with each other at the local 
level.
Chapter 1 begins by tracing the cyclical pattern of 
growth and decline in functional fragmentation which 
has characterised British local government over the 
last hundred years. Functional fragmentation is shown 
to be currently at a high level. To understand the 
context in which relationships are developed between 
authorities in.a fragmented system, it is necessary to 
examine the social and political factors which give
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rise to functional fragmentation. Multiple factors are 
involved. The constitutional position of local 
authorities together with the pursuit of group 
interests by central government politicians and 
professionals within the public services have led to 
toleration, and at times active encouragement, of high 
levels of functional fragmentation within local 
government.
The discussion in the second half of the chapter 
focuses on co-ordination and the role of local 
authorities within the public authority network. The 
need for integration of a fragmented system of 
government or administration is discussed theoreti­
cally and in relation to examples of complex public 
services. Two models of co-ordination, explicit and 
spontaneous co-ordination are identified. Explicit co- 
ordination has been favoured historically, spontaneous 
co-ordination has been favoured by central government 
since the eighties.
As multi-functional bodies and the focus for 
democratic politics outside Westminster, local 
authorities * expect and are expected to play a key 
role in coordination of public services at the local 
level. The extent to which local authorities can 
perform such a role is limited by structural and 
political factors. Several models of local authority- 
based coordination are discussed including the concept 
of enabling.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on intergovernmental 
relations at the local level. The large literature on 
central-local relations (vertical IGR) is contrasted 
with the patchy work done on intergovernmental 
relations at the local level (horizontal IGR). There 
is no well-defined body of literature or theory on
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horizontal IGR and the survey draws on a wide range of 
disciplines and studies. The discussion begins with 
operations research, the discipline which gave rise to 
the only major empirical study of horizontal IGR in 
Britain (Friend et al. 1974). Next the chapter reviews 
the contribution of local government studies in the 
form of case studies of local politics, prescriptive 
models of local governance and detailed studies of 
particular inter-authority relationships. The first 
part of the chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
contribution of policy studies to the study of 
horizontal IGR. While the concepts of policy 
communities and networks are useful, none of the 
networks identified in the literature (Rhodes, 1988) 
corresponds to the public authority network researched 
here.
The discussion in the second part of the chapter is 
organised around a three level model of theoretical 
explanation. At the broadest level, macro-theories 
about the state and society offer explanations of 
governmental fragmentation and models of integration. 
Pluralism, elite theory, the work of the New Right and 
Marxism are all demonstrated to contain concepts which 
can be used to understand patterns of horizontal IGR.
At the middle-level, theories about interorganisa- 
tional relationships and intergovernmental relations 
offer explanations of the way public authorities 
relate to each other at the local level. Four concepts 
relevant to horizontal IGR which are elucidated by 
middle-level theories are discussed. The first concept 
is the environment which comprises four layers: the 
organisation itself, other organisations in the 
network, the governmental system and the nature of 
society as a whole. The second concept is that of a 
network. Third, the concept of organisational
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interdependence based either on resource dependence or 
distribution of powers. The fourth and final concept 
is that of process, the nature of interorganisational 
behaviour. Exchange theory, games, bargaining and 
partisan mutual adjustment are reviewed.
Chapter 3 describes the way that the research on 
intergovernmental relations in Camden was designed and 
carried out. The model which informed the design of 
the study drew heavily upon an earlier study carried 
out by the author on county-district relations. Like 
the earlier study, the Camden research aimed to map
the relationships between the local authority and
other public authorities serving the same geographical 
area. It also aimed to collect views on inter­
authority working from individuals located in
different parts of the public authority network.
The research was based on interviews with 70
individuals in 12 departments or units of the local 
authority and eighteen other public authorities 
serving the area. Interviews were semi-structured and 
the data collected qualitative.
Chapter 4 describes the environment in which 
intergovernmental relationships developed in Camden. 
It is divided into three parts. First there is a brief 
discussion of the geography of Camden and the 
Borough's social characteristics. Second, there is a 
description of Camden Council highlighting charac­
teristics which previous studies have found to be 
associated with the development of interorganisational 
relationships - structure and culture. A political 
profile of Camden Council is also presented. The third 
part of the chapter describes features of the other 
authorities in.the public authority network in Camden. 
As with the description of Camden Council the review
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of other authorities concentrates upon features 
demonstrated to impact on interorganisational 
relationships namely, task, structure, coterminosity, 
finance and culture. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the typicality of Camden. Camden was 
unique, but every feature of the place, the local 
authority and the other public authorities serving it 
could be found elsewhere in London or other parts of 
the country.
Chapters 5 to 10 present the findings of the survey 
of those involved in the public authority network. 
Chapter 5 examines the pattern of interdependence 
which existed between Camden Council and the other 
public authorities studied. Interdependence was found 
to be complex. Nine different types of interdependence 
based on vertical, horizontal and symbiotic 
relationships between authorities* tasks and goals 
were identified. The relationship between the local 
authority and any other authority was found to be 
multidimensional in many cases. Since different forms 
of interdependence gave rise to different types of 
linkages and fostered different forms of inter­
authority behaviour, conflict and tension arose in 
some relationships. High levels of interdependence 
were identified between Camden Council and other 
public authorities serving the area.
Chapter 6 describes the linkages which existed between 
the local authority and other public authorities in 
Camden. The extent of linkages was far less than the 
extent of interdependence. Linkages between public 
authorities, excluding the local authority, formed a 
loosely joined network. At the level of the authority 
as a whole there were few formal linkages between 
Camden Council .and other public authorities. There was 
limited interlocking of controlling board membership
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and few formal authority-wide liaison structures. 
Formal linkages existed largely at the task level, for 
example through case conferences, joint committees and 
working parties or the designation of lead 
authorities, departments or individuals. Informal 
linkages played an important role. Links generally 
involved officers rather than members of authorities.
Chapter 7 brings together the findings of Chapters 4, 
5 and 6. It examines the socio-economic and 
organisational features of Camden which account for 
the mismatch between the extent of interdependence 
amongst public authorities and the linkages developed 
between them. The overwhelming number of features of 
the socio-economic context examined in Chapter 4 
pointed to high levels of interdependence as described 
in. Chapter 5. The organisational structure of local 
governance and the individual authorities, including 
Camden Council, which were part of the public 
authority network acted strongly to inhibit the 
development of relationships. Organisational features 
explain the pattern of patchy linkages described in 
Chapter 6.
The next three chapters present the research findings 
on the attitudes and perceptions of individuals 
working within the public authority network. Chapter 
8 looks at respondents1 attitudes to interauthority 
working in general and with other types of 
organisations in particular. The great majority of 
respondents found working with other public 
authorities different from working with the private or 
voluntary sectors. Public authorities were seen to 
share a common cultures and experiences and to have 
obligations to each other. When asked specifically 
about. working with other public authorities 
respondents pointed to the importance they attached to
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it on the one hand while highlighting the difficulties 
they encountered in doing it on the other. Members 
were seldom able or willing to overcome the problems 
encountered and left the task to officials. The 
organisational and political factors identified in 
Chapters 4 and 7 were at the heart of the frustrations 
respondents reported. These factors were seen to be 
changing in ways that made co-ordination more 
difficult at a time when the demand for closer 
relationships was increasing.
In Chapter 9 respondents' views about the goals, 
strategies and tactics of inter-authority working are 
presented. A hierarchy of goals of inter-authority 
activity was identified. At the top level were goals 
of improving well-being within the community. Beneath 
this were goals directed at improved services, then 
goals of better service delivery, and at the lowest 
level, goals of creating a more positive climate for 
relationships. Goals were not generally determined 
jointly. Sustained activity depended on a process 
identified as mutual goal fulfilment rather then 
resource exchange as proposed in previous studies. 
Organisations were described as using a variety of 
approaches such as presentation, communications and 
planning to pursue goals. Camden Council was found to 
be pursuing a different and potentially disruptive set 
of goals aimed at changing the governmental system.
Chapter 10 summarises respondent1s views on the 
effectiveness of the public authority network and the 
need for change. Ineffectiveness in tackling issues 
which crossed organisational boundaries was seen to 
characterise the network. Structural and environmental 
factors were identified as causing ineffectiveness, in 
particular structural differences between authorities, 
formal bureaucracy, resource problems and government
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policy. Changes in all these factors as well as a 
greater commitment to co-ordination were seen by 
respondents as desirable.
The conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter
11. The conclusions fall into two parts. The first 
part draws together the themes identified in the 
previous chapters about the role of Camden Council in 
the public authority network and the pattern of 
relationships among public authorities serving Camden. 
The second part suggests more general conclusions 
about intergovernmental relations at the local level 
which can be drawn from the study. First it supports 
a view of local government which is much wider than 
the local authority and suggests the importance of the 
public authority network as an entity within a 
community. Second it supports a view of interdepen­
dence among public authorities which is much more 
varied and complex than previously identified. Third 
it supports a view of inter-authority activity based 
on mutual goal fulfilment rather than exchange. The 
study demonstrates the uniqueness of relationships 
among public authorities based on the presence of 
both elected and non-elected bodies. Relationships 
among public authorities cannot be fully explained by 
either theories of interorganisational behaviour or 
theories of intergovernmental relations. Fifth, the 
cart-wheel model of the local authority within the 
public authority network did not fit Camden, where the 
public authorities formed a distributed network. 
Sixth, the study cast doubt on the validity of 
assumptions made by policy makers, particularly within 
central government, about how the public authority 
network operates. Policy makers assume spontaneous co­
ordination will occur at appropriate levels to ensure 
clients receive an optimum level of service in terms 
of both efficiency and effectiveness. The public
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authority network in Camden did not operate in this 
way. Finally the research cast doubt on the ability 
of some local authorities to perform an enabling role 
in the absence of political and structural change.
THE FRAGMENTATION OF GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS
Horizontal IGR increases in importance as the 
fragmentation of government increases (Stewart, 
1980). Fragmentation along geographical or functional 
lines is a feature of all but the very smallest 
systems of government. Geographical fragmentation is 
based on territory. The nation is divided into 
territorial units for certain purposes of government. 
The process of division may be accompanied by the 
location of elements of democratic control at the 
local level. Local government units may be large or 
small relative to the size of the nation and may 
divide urban and rural communities into separate 
units of government. Geographical fragmentation gives 
rise to multi-service units of government responsible 
for services at the local level. The internal 
structure of such units .may nevertheless be highly 
functionally specialised.
Functional fragmentation refers to the establishment 
of specialised, single-service units of government. 
In order to function effectively they may adopt an 
area structure internally which involves a measure of 
delegation to sub-units serving particular 
localities. Formal democratic control of such 
services, however, remains at national level.
Fragmented systems of government need integrating 
mechanisms to counter the tendency for the different 
units, of government to drift apart. Inter­
governmental relationships are part of the structure
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of integration. Differentiation and disintegration 
arise from, amongst other things, different interest 
groups exerting pressure on different parts of the 
governmental system. Fragmentation may be fostered 
by groups who are able to benefit from division and 
lack of co-ordination. If fragmentation reaches the 
point where it jeopardises the interests of those in 
control, other pressures build up for greater 
integration, and fragmentation is slowed or reversed. 
Over time a cyclical pattern of increasing and 
decreasing fragmentation could be expected to occur. 
It is not easy to measure the degree of fragmentation 
in a governmental system. Geographical fragmentation 
can be measured by population and area. Two broad 
indicators of functional fragmentation may be used. 
One is the number of separately constituted public 
authorities which deliver services to the citizen. 
The second is the number of authorities which are 
involved in complex problems and issues. The two forms 
of fragmentation may vary independently as shown on 
Figure 1.
Functional fragmentation can be observed in many other 
countries despite different constitutional and legal 
arrangements and is recognised as a consistent 
feature of modern Western nations (Dunleavy, 1984). 
In Britain the extent of functional fragmentation of 
government has often gone unrecognised, obscured by 
the large size of local authorities and the lack of a 
regional or provincial tier of government (Stewart, 
1980).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRAGMENTATION AT THE SUBNATIONAL 
LEVEL IN BRITAIN
Subnational government in Britain has evolved through 
alternating periods of fragmentation and consolida-
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Figure 1 Functional and Geographical Fragmentation
HIGH
GEOGRAPHICAL
FRAGMENTATION
LOW GEOGRAPHICAL 
FRAGMENTATION
HIGH FUNCTIONAL 
FRAGMENTATION
Plethora of 
small and 
specialised 
authorities 
e.g.Pre-modern 
svstem
Large local 
authorities and 
many
functionally 
specialised 
authorities e.g. 
Present svstem
LOW FUNCTIONAL 
FRAGMENTATION
Many overall 
local
authorities and 
few specialised 
authorities 
e.g.Earlv modern 
svstem
Large multi­
purpose local 
authorities and 
few specialised 
authorities e.g. 
Redcliffe-Maud 
vision
tion (Vielba, 1986). At the end of the last century 
the highly fragmented system of parishes, counties, 
municipal corporations and special boards was 
drastically restructured (Keith-Lucas, 1980). The 
local authority was established as the prime unit of 
local government and public service provision in a 
locality. In the century over which the "modern" 
system of local government has operated, geographical 
fragmentation has been further reduced. Britain now 
has some of the largest units of local government in 
population terms to be found anywhere in Europe 
(Vielba, 1979) . In the late eighties there was a small 
reversal in this trend with the abolition of the very 
large upper-tier metropolitan authorities.
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Since the nineteenth century, public services have 
expanded consistently in cost, employment and scope 
of action and intervention. Government policy in the 
last few years has slowed the expansion but not 
driven the trend into reverse. It has been observed 
that the number of government organisations has 
declined in Western nations in the post-war period 
(Rose, 1984). However, the reduction in numbers 
caused by privatisation and reduced geographical 
fragmentation has concealed an increase in functional 
fragmentation.
The "loss” of local authority functions has been at 
the heart of increases in functional fragmentation 
(Robson, 1966). Functions have been transferred from 
local authorities to other public bodies, in some 
cases directly to central government but frequently 
to ad hoc agencies, special boards and the nationa­
lised industries.
Losses have occurred through by-passing. Throughout 
the twentieth century local authority responsibilties 
expanded in land-use planning, social services and 
recreation. In other services, housing, education and 
public health, the involvement and workload of local 
authorities increased. Many new initiatives, however, 
by-passed local authorities. The new towns developed 
after the second world war were established under 
separate development agencies, a trend continued 
recently with the setting up of Urban Development 
Corporations. Economic planning at the local level 
was made the responsibility of special bodies, the 
Regional Economic Planning Councils. The boost 
given in recent years to work and training programmes 
for school-leavers and the unemployed became the 
responsibility of a single service board, the Man­
power Services Commission, rather than the local
21
education authority.
Functional fragmentation was also fostered by the 
spread of two-tier local government. The abolition of 
the county boroughs in 1974 removed the only unitary 
local authorities. With the exception of the island 
authorities of Scotland the two-tier system of local 
government was adopted which gave both levels certain 
exclusive service responsibilities. When the Greater 
London Council and the Metropolitan County Councils 
were abolished in 1986 a single tier of local 
government was created in the capital and 
conurbations. However, far from consolidating all the 
existing local authority functions in one authority, 
a major part of the work of the upper tier 
authorities was passed to central government, 
existing specialised public authorities or newly 
created single-service joint boards and committees.
The dispersion of tasks and responsibilities in London 
following abolition is shown on Figure 2. Only a 
proportion of the upper tier*s spending on services 
passed to the boroughs and districts. Bramley (1984) 
estimates that approximately half the budgeted 
expenditure of the GLC was transferred to the 
boroughs. The remainder went largely to non-elected 
bodies and joint boards with only a small proportion 
going to central government. However, the proportion 
of GRE transferred to the boroughs was greater. 
Stewart (1984) notes that in the Metropolitan 
counties, 70% of their expenditure was transferred to 
joint boards, leaving a much smaller transfer to 
local authorities.
Local government historians have seen a cyclical 
pattern in the consolidation and fragmentation of 
service provision at the local level which has taken
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Figure 2 Destination of Main Services After Abolition of the GLC
services transferred to the 
boroughs
services transferred to central 
government
services transferred to joint 
boards
services transferred to other 
authorities
Planning and building control 
Housing
Non-trunk roads 
Recreation and parks 
Refuse disposal*
Trading Standards
Sport
Tourism
Licensing
Support for the arts
Trunk roads Waste regulation 
Fire and civil defence
Support for the arts (Arts 
Council)
Historic buildings 
(Historic Buildings 
and Monuments Commission)
Buses and tubes (London Regional 
Transport)
Education (Inner London 
Education Authority)
Land drainage and flood 
protection (Thames Water)
Note: The dispersal of responsibilities from the GLC was infintely more complex than this table implies. The complexity of the new arrangements
is discussed in Hebbert and Travers (eds) (1988)
Most boroughs have joined neighbouring authorities in waste disposal groups rather than.undertake the function individually.
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place. "Losses” from local authorities have occurred 
throughout the twentieth century, but the pattern 
appears to be one of acceleration through the 1930s, 
massive transfers in the period of reconstruction and 
nationalisation immediately after the second world 
war, and losses associated with reorganisation in the 
1970s and 1980s. The trend is again gathering momentum 
as central government makes further moves to limit the 
role and the expenditure incurred by local 
authorities, and to require the contracting out of 
services. Contemporary urban government has been 
compared with the excessively divided institutional 
structures of the mid-nineteenth century.
(Keith-Lucas and Richards, 1978; Hebbert and Travers, 
1988) .
FRAGMENTATION AS AN ENDURING FEATURE OF BRITISH 
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Lack of constitutional clarity
Writing at the turn of the century Redlich and Hirst 
(1903) concluded that the pattern of local government 
in Britain was not the outcome of any planned 
concept? instead it arose from the haphazard growth 
of earlier institutions. Later scholars have not 
demurred (Keith-Lucas and Richards (1978).
The flexible and unwritten character of the British 
constitution inhibits the emergence of a clear 
ideology of the role and purpose and therefore 
appropriate structure of government. One outcome is 
that it is possible to identify numerous 
idiosyncracies in the local government system such as 
the survival of the Corporation of the City of London 
whose boundaries and structures are the direct 
descendants of. its Medieval predecessors. It is also 
easy for institutions of government to multiply and
24
accumulate within the system without a clear pattern 
for rationalisation.
Governments have found the lack of constititutional 
prescription for the role of local government a 
convenient reason for preserving the status quo and 
contemplating only limited and ad hoc reform of 
subnational government. Robson (1954, p68) quotes a 
speech made by Aneurin Bevan (Minister of Health) in 
1946 - a time when the welfare state was being set up 
and major organisational change was occurring in the 
public sector. Despite promising a greater role for 
local government in the future, he concluded that it 
was not a time to ask wider questions about local 
government saying, "we do not know what context local 
government is going to live in, it does not seem to me 
to be an appropriate time for an enquiry of that 
sort."
Many of those involved in considering reform have 
criticised the failure to consider subnational 
government as a whole. The Royal Commission on Local 
Government in Greater London (1960) included the 
following comment,
"This total effect on local government of all 
these transfers might almost be described as a 
resultant of blind forces... At no time was there 
any opportunity of giving thought to what would 
be the collective effect of all these transfers 
on local government institutions. In instance 
after instance, as we have already noticed, 
critics were told that they must not use this 
particular occasion for the purpose of 
re-organising local government."
(para.686)
In the decade and a half following this enquiry, local 
government outside London, the National Health 
Service, public transport, and the water services
25
were all reorganised with very little reference of 
one to the other.
Ultra Vires
Another feature of British government which has 
attracted attention as an explanation of functional 
fragmentation is the fact that local authorities, 
like other public bodies, are restricted in their 
enterprises by the legal doctrine of ultra vires. 
This doctrine reinforced the laissez-faire attitudes 
of nineteenth century governments by shifting the 
burden of responsibility from what public authorities 
chose to do to what they were required to do. As a 
result it has been suggested that,
”... we evolved a system of local government 
which is remarkably good in certain defined 
spheres of activity, but at the same time 
excessively narrow in scope and unimaginative in 
outlook." (Robson, 1954, p258)
Such narrowness and unimaginativeness often provided 
the justification for establishing agencies outside 
local government to provide public services.
Both the Committee on the Management of Local 
Government (1967) and the Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England (1969) argued against the 
restrictive effect of ultra vires and for equipping 
local authorities with a general competence and 
general spending powers. The Committee suggested that 
British local authorities compared unfavourably with 
their counterparts in Europe in responsiveness and 
initiative:
"An English local authority is accustomed to 
carrying out exactly prescribed duties with its 
own staff ... joint action between authorities is 
not popular. It is often disliked and
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consequently it is not always successful.”
(para 43)
The Committee contrasted this position with America 
and other European countries where not only did local 
authorities enjoy less central regulation but they V,
also had general powers and competences.
"Local authorities both in Europe and North 
America discharge many tasks by co-operation with 
outside agencies and make far freer use of 
voluntary associations." (para 44)
"Perhaps even more important than actual 
extension of power is the different atmosphere in 
which a local authority enjoying several 
competences operates. The members think of the 
citizens' needs as a whole, and regard themselves 
as responsible for local well-being." (para 49)
The legal and psychological restrictiveness of the 
doctrine of ultra vires was seen to lie at the heart 
of the difference. Central government rejected the 
demands for general competence for local authorities 
when they were reorganised outside London in the 
seventies. In recent times there have been few signs 
from the courts or central government of its grip 
being weakened. For example, the Fares Fair case 
against the Greater London Council turned on whether 
or not the local authority had the power to provide 
subsidised as opposed to non-profit making transport 
services. The alleged inappropriatenes of services 
provided by some local authorities under Section 137 
of the Local Government Act (1972) was cited by 
central government as one of the reasons for 
abolishing the Metropolitan and Greater London Council 
(Department of the Environment, 1983).
Lack of an intermediate tier of government
British governments have favoured strong national
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government and a unitary state and resisted the 
development of regional structures which might act as 
a focus for integration at the subnational level. The 
persistence of functional fragmentation has been seen 
as an outcome of the failure to develop intermediate 
regional or provincial organs of government and 
administration:
"If regional councils were established there 
would be a practicable alternative to the 
transfer of functions from local authorities to 
central departments or special bodies. After all, 
the hospitals have been nationalised in order to 
be regionalised.”
(Robson, 1954, p67)
Britain had limited regional administration during the 
second world war in the form of the Regional 
Commissioners. In peace time they were fiercely 
opposed by the local authorities as smacking of 
tutelage.
The Labour Party has been broadly in favour of 
regionalisation but has never brought forward 
comprehensive proposals. The Royal Commission on 
Local Government in England (1969) proposed a system 
of directly elected provincial councils. This 
suggestion found no favour with the government of the 
day. The last attempt to introduce an intermediate 
tier was stalled by the governments failure to 
secure agreement on devolution. Conservatives and 
Unionists have always resisted regionalisation.
Nationalisation
Functional fragmentation can also be understood as 
the organisational by-product, often unintended, of 
the pursuit of other national political objectives. 
For example, in bringing key industries into public
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ownership in the past, governments chose 
nationalisation rather than municipalisation. In the 
early part of the twentieth century socialists such 
as the Webbs were urging the development of municipal 
trading. In The Socialist Commonwealth the Webbs 
advocated local governmental involvement in a wide 
range of industries and services under the control of 
local authorities (Webb and Webb, 1920). Such 
municipal isation, however, never became a platform of 
Labour Party policy. Instead the preferred socialist 
strategy was nationalisation. Hence utilities such as 
gas and electricity were removed from local 
government to nationalised industries. The result at 
the local level was fragmentation as each industry 
separately tackled the problem of developing a 
structure for service delivery.
Privatisation
Fragmentation can also be used as a means of pursuing 
disengagement within the public sector. For example, 
water authorities were removed from local authorities 
in 1974 when the nine regional water authorities were 
set up in England. Privatisation was then rendered 
relatively easy by the separate character of the 
service and its organisation. The decision to pass 
certain services to separate agencies rather than to 
local authorities following the abolition of the GLC 
and the Metropolitan Counties could have been 
designed to leave the privatisation option open for 
the future. Whereas in the past functional 
fragmentation could be seen as a consequence of Labour 
governments' decisions to nationalise and centralise 
for social and political reasons, at the present time 
it can be seen as a consequence of a Conservative 
government's determination to reduce bureaucracy and 
limit collective intervention while simultaneously
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maintaining strong central control.
The scale of modern government
Government is by far the biggest "business" in modern 
Britain; its organisational needs are similar to 
those of a very large company. A number of theories 
about management suggest that any organisation which 
becomes too big will be unresponsive and lose the 
capacity to deal effectively with problems. An 
excessively large organisation is unwieldy, remote 
from those it serves and costly to administer 
(Mintzberg, 1983). To overcome the inevitable loss of 
performance which over-centralisation implies, some 
fragmentation, either geographical or functional, is 
required. In the modern world the latter has generally 
been seen as more appropriate because it fits with 
the application of specialist and professional 
skills.
An ideal allocation of government functions could be 
derived from a consideration of the costs and 
advantages of providing services at different levels 
or through different units of government. Discussions 
of the appropriate allocation of responsibilities 
using such criteria have figured prominently in the 
reports of commissions and enquiries into the 
organisation of local government and other public 
services (Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Greater London, 1960; Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England, 1969). Such bodies have looked 
deeply into the optimum size of units for the 
delivery of particular services, their democratic 
accountability and the inter-relatedness of particular 
services. However, the search for an optimum pattern 
has proved elusive and has seldom proved sufficiently 
convincing to dictate patterns of service delivery
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that run contrary to tradition or powerful vested 
interests.
The role of special agencies
Functional fragmentation has been pursued as a means 
of maintaining the basic efficiency and effectiveness 
of subnational government but avoiding the 
difficulties of local government reform. Functional 
fragmentation has flourished because of a failure to 
tackle geographical fragmentation quickly and 
effectively. Despite the large units of contemporary 
local government, historically local authorities have 
been seen as too small in areaf population and 
financial resources, to be capable of providing 
certain services. Special agencies have been set up
to deliver services in what was thought to be more
efficient and effective ways. The reform of the 
geographical boundaries of local government came too 
late because of the intransigence of vested interests 
(Ashford, 1982).
Setting up a new and specialised agency is often
regarded as the appropriate political response by 
central government to a newly arisen or newly
recognised problem. Such actions have both an 
organisational and a political rationale. 
Organisationally the new agency can make a fresh 
start and concentrate upon the particular issue with 
which it is concerned. Politically the setting up 
of specialised agencies by central government to 
tackle key problems provides visibility and allows 
government to claim any successes for itself 
(Stewart, 1980? Ashford 1984).
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The role of the professions
The professions have had a very strong influence in 
British public administration, giving rise to what 
has been called the dominant functional image 
(Stewart, 1980). Greater importance is attached to 
integration within services than to integration of a 
range of services within a geographical area. The 
dominant role of the professions has grown stronger 
as geographical fragmentation has declined.
Specialisation and professionalisation flourish with 
more autonomy within larger authorities than is 
possible within smaller units. The professions have 
seen their power and influence grow in public 
authorities outside direct political control. The 
professions have openly supported the continuation 
and extension of functional fragmentation. A number 
of groups have argued strongly for the independence 
of their work from political control. Keith-Lucas and 
Richards (1978) note that at various times in the 
sixties the police, social workers, college lecturers, 
planners and transport engineeers, all argued 
strongly in response to governmental enguiries, for 
the independence of their work from local government 
control. These arguments had triumphed two decades 
earlier when the medical profession demanded autonomy 
of the health service from local government as a 
price for entering the NHS.
Central government desire for power and control
Explanations of the continued functional fragmentation 
of local government must take into account the 
influence of central government's desire for control 
of local services. Central government and all the 
leading political parties over the years have used 
the rhetoric of a need for strong local government.
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Strength, however, has largely beeen acceptable only 
in geographical size. The Treasury sees the task of 
controlling public expenditure as easier with fewer, 
larger authorities. Fewer and larger authorities are 
also seen to be more manageable and open to central 
government influence (although the Greater London 
Council proved large and very unmanageable for the 
Thatcher government). Nor has strength in local 
government been tolerated in practice? successive 
governments have weakened local government and 
enhanced central government's power. Limiting the 
role of local government, and functional fragmen­
tation, have both contributed to this process.
Central government fear of local authorities becoming 
strong counter-vailing powers, capable of pursuing 
different public - policy strategies, influenced 
central government to press ahead with abolishing the 
GLC and the Metropolitan Counties. These authorities 
had become bases for wider political opposition 
(Flynn et_al, 1985) . The fear of strong local 
opposition movements has made the consolidation of a 
wider range of responsibilities and power in the 
hands of local authorities unattractive to central 
government. Functional fragmentation allows central 
government to maintain control of services more 
directly. Local authorities are the only directly 
elected units of government outside Westminster. 
Election gives them their own legitimacy and local 
political base of power. Other agencies responsible 
for services are organised in such a way as to be far 
more susceptible to central government intervention. 
The Secretary of State for Health is able to appoint 
and dismiss members of health authorities and 
maintains direct responsibility for the NHS. Most of 
the agencies responsible for services outside local 
authorities are responsive to national rather than
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local preferences. None has the ability to pursue 
direct opposition to central government in the way 
some local authorities have done.
Whv functional fragmentation persists
In summary, historically there seem to have been two 
contrasting attitudes towards fragmentation in 
Britain. A large degree of geographical fragmentation 
has generally been seen as a problem to which 
successive reforms have been directed. As a result, 
the thousands of local government territorial units 
of the past have been reduced to the few hundred 
present principal local authorities. Functional 
fragmentation, on the other hand, has been viewed as 
an imperfect but inevitable feature of local 
administration. In the past reformers of local 
government have often been content to increase 
functional fragmentation in the pursuit of other 
objectives such as nationalisation.
Two features of local government in Britain have 
created the potential for fragmentation to flourish. 
First, the lack of an agreed role for local 
government and, second, the restrictiveness of the 
doctrine of ultra vires. Fragmentation has flourished 
as a result of two characteristics of modern public 
administration. One is the prevalence of very complex 
and diffuse problems which must be broken down in 
some way to become amenable to action. The other is 
the growth dynamic of fragmentation itself: 
administrative change may take the form of waves of 
establishment, fragmentation and consolidation. 
Fragmentation may also become self-sustaining as new 
specialised bodies are created to connect the 
disintegrating, fragments of the governmental system.
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None of these features, however, is sufficient to 
create and sustain functional fragmentation in 
subnational government. For that to happen
fragmentation must be an attractive strategy to those 
in a position to determine the shape and role of the 
governmental system. This proposition can be examined 
at various levels - for the interests of central 
government, for the interests of those employed 
within the public sector, and for broader class 
interests.
Central governments have been the instigators and 
executors of reform of the governmental system. Two 
strands of central governmental strategy are 
discernible. First, fragmentation has been a strategy, 
used by governments of all complexions, to maintain 
control over decentralised decision-making, public 
expenditure and service provision. A fragmented 
system has generally been incapable of throwing up 
powerful countervailing powers which central 
government would fear. Second, fragmentation has 
been seen as an inevitable and worthwhile consequence 
of pursuing other key strategies. Labour governments 
have accepted fragmentation as a part of pursuing 
equality, uniform national standards, planning and 
public ownership. Conservatives accept it currently as 
a means of facilitating privatisation. Governments of 
all colours have avoided radical reform and 
integration and been content to make exhortations and 
limited gestures towards improving co-ordination of 
programmes and services.
Reducing functional fragmentation has never been 
accorded priority in the reform of twentieth century 
local government. The pattern of functional 
fragmentation which has characterised subnational 
government has not been designed but has emerged
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haphazardly as the accumulated result of decisions 
made with reference to other criteria. As a result, 
institutional structures have reinforced professional 
divisions in ways that have riven asunder connected 
parts of the public sector. Functional fragmentation 
has reduced government1scapacity to address
particular problems, a phenomenon >y Hood
structural defects carry a cost which is paid for 
elsewhere within the governmental system or in 
society at large.
Among those employed within the public sector, 
particularly the public services, the professions are 
the focus of organisation. A profession does not 
simply organise its membership; it structures the way 
problems are perceived and services developed. 
Functional fragmentation serves the needs of the 
profession directly. It allows many groups to be 
freed from direct political control and thus to 
dominate the development of a service. Groups such as 
doctors have resisted fiercely the idea of working for 
lgcal authorities. Their example has inspired other 
groups to demand, though not necessarily to acquire, 
a separate existence for the services in which theyare 
most involved.
THE NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION
Fragmentation within a system of government gives rise 
to the need for integration. Self (1977) notes that 
governmental systems which contain a multiplicity of 
agencies reflecting multiple and conflicting 
interests are characterised by conflict and 
competition over services and policies. Conflict has 
costs in the form of wasted resources, incon­
sistencies, delays and deadlock. Fragmentation can
(1976) as multi-organisational sub-optimism Such
inhibit effective action to solve complex and diffuse 
problems and adds to the costs of public services by 
the resources absorbed by co-ordination. Such costs 
and disbenefits may outweigh the advantages of 
specialisation and organisational variety. Where co­
ordination is ineffective the costs fall upon those 
groups most reliant on public services.
As functional fragmentation increases, the greater 
will be the need for processes and mechanisms to 
maintain the coherence of the system of government. 
The need for co-ordination of services was a central 
theme of many of the reports commissioned on 
subnational government in the sixties. The failure to 
recognise the links between services was cited by 
the Royal Commission on Local Government in England 
(1969) as one of the main problems which needed to be 
addressed by reformers of the local government 
system.
"Much of the evidence stressed the links between 
services, with their implications for the 
organisation of local government. Recognition was 
widespread that planning and transportation 
should be administered together; and witnesses 
who dealt with these subjects often considered 
that large-scale development, urban renewal and 
housing (or at least all very large housing 
projects) should also be in the same hands. 
Likewise, evidence from government departments, 
local authority associations, individual 
authorities and professional organisations 
pointed to the importance of the ties joining 
housing, health and welfare, child care and 
education.... In general, the evidence showed 
that there is a wide range of local government 
services which should be seen as a network of 
interwoven activities." (para 145-7)
Co-ordination can be achieved in government in many 
ways. It may be achieved spontaneously by agencies 
anxious to reduce the costs of fragmentation to 
themselves or their clients. Where co-ordination does
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not occur spontaneously, attempts may be made to 
impose it artificially from above. During the sixties 
and seventies conventional wisdom favoured mechanisms 
of explicit co-ordination by governments. In the 
eighties and nineties central government has favoured 
reliance on spontaneity.
The need for co-ordination within the public sector 
has not diminished. The reports on a number of recent 
disasters such as the King's Cross and Bradford fires 
identified failures in co-ordination that led to 
inadequate public safety measures and inadequate 
responses to safety incidents. Two further examples 
of the continuing need for improved cross-authority 
working are community care and urban policy.
The policy of transferring patients from long-stay 
hospital care to accommodation within the community 
has been in place for a long time. Progress towards 
targets for transfer of patients has been slow and 
gaps in service provision have occurred (House of 
Commons Select Social Services Committee, 1985; Audit 
Commission, 1986). The Audit Commission (1985) 
summarised the problems as follows:
"Responsibility for introducing and operating 
community-based services is fragmented between a 
number of different agencies with different 
priorities, styles, structures and budgets who 
must 'request' co-operation from each other. For 
community care to operate these agencies must 
work together. But there are many reasons why 
they do not, including the lack of positive 
incentives, bureaucratic barriers, perceived 
threats to jobs and professional standing, and 
the time required for interminable meetings 
(joint planning alone could easily be occupying 
the equivalent of 30 professional staff full-time 
in a large county)" (p3)
Furthermore, regional health authorities, which have
a powerful planning role, are not matched
38
organisationally in local government. Hence the 
tendency for programmes of hospital closures to run 
faster than programmes building up community 
facilities.
For most of the last quarter of a century, inner-city 
problems have been on the political agenda in Britain. 
Studies of urban poverty have consistently stressed 
its multi-dimensional nature and identified failure to 
co-ordinate services as a key problem (Department of 
the Environment, 1977). The development of co­
ordinating structures has been a common theme of inner 
city policies. Comprehensive Community Programmes 
(CCPs) were designed to tackle urban deprivation 
through comprehensive programme planning. Resources 
were a major problem for the initiative but so too 
were co-ordination and the ability to work across 
agency boundaries (Spencer, 1982).
CCPs were superceded by the concept of partnership 
(Secretary of State for the Environment, 1977). The 
White Paper stated that:
'The urban studies of recent years have shown 
that urban problems cannot be tackled effectively 
on a piecemeal basis. The problems interlock: 
education, for example, is affected by housing 
and by employment. The best results are likely 
to be achieved through a unified approach in
which the different activities and services of 
government are brought together. Concerted
action should have a greater impact. It should 
lead to a more efficient use of resources by 
avoiding duplication or conflicts of effort, and 
it ought to be more in departmental or agency 
terms.1
(para 59)
New measures were announced which were on an area 
basis and involved special efforts of co-ordination 
and joint working which cut across established
practices. The joint machinery of partnership was to
involve both local and central government as well as
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the health authorities, the police and the Manpower 
Services Commission.
Partnerships failed to develop a successful multi­
agency approach to urban problems (White, 1985). More 
ostensibly successful intiatives such as GEAR (Glasgow 
Eastern Area Renewal) had limited success in 
developing cross-authority co-ordination. Booth and 
Money (1982) suggest that GEAR achieved results 
despite rather than because of its co-ordinative 
efforts, and dub it MANGO (a mutually non-effective 
group of organisations) which engages authorities in 
a cosmetic way. The approach to inner cities adopted 
since 1979 has relied less on imposed co-ordination 
and more on voluntary efforts. Studies of the 
Merseyside Task Force suggest that the initiative 
added to the pattern of organisational confusion by 
setting up new agencies rather than bringing existing 
bodies closer together (Morrison, 1987). The House of 
Commons Environment Committee (1983) concluded that,
"The attitudes of those involved in the 
management of urban renewal in Merseyside fall 
far short of the joint working necessary for the 
effective co-ordination of effort." (pxxi)
An explicit attempt to circumvent the problems that 
arise when multiple authorities are responsible for a 
task was the introduction of Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs). The impetus for their
development lay in government frustration with the 
slow progress made by the London Docklands Joint 
Committee which embraced a number of London Boroughs 
and the Greater London Council. Far from generating 
a wide-spectrum approach to urban problems, UDCs have 
been criticised for their narrow focus on land and 
property development and lack of interest in other 
social and economic problems. The structure of UDCs
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and their renunciation of strategic planning have 
further fragmented policy within their geographical 
areas and increased the gaps and contradictions 
between the programmes run by different authorities 
(Brownhill, 1990).
THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
NETWORK
The British system of local government is based on 
local authorities which are directly elected and 
multi-functional. According to writers such as 
Stanyer (1976) they can be viewed as primary units 
of local government. Although local authorities 
discharge a specific set of responsibilities, most see 
themselves as having a general responsibility towards 
the communities they serve (Brooke, 1989). At the 
heart of this perspective is the concept of local 
authorities as a locus of government rather than 
administration. The Royal Commission on Local 
Government in Greater London (1960) distinguished 
local government from local self-government. The 
former involved local administration of central 
government? the latter the "internal regulation of the 
affairs and services of some community such as a 
borough or parish" (Para. 222).
Over the last hundred years local authorities have 
been the only focus of democratic politics outside 
Westminster. The franchise for local authority 
elections was gradually widened from its ratepayer 
base to a universality matching that of national 
elections (Keith-Lucas, 1980). The process was 
completed in (l977j when the role of alderman, an 
indirectly elected member of a local authority was 
abolished. The controlling boards of all other public 
authorities are appointed, generally entirely by
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central government, and are answerable only to 
Parliament through the relevant government Ministry.
The significance of the democratic control of local 
authorities has increased as the nature of local 
politics has changed. The direction of change has 
been towards increasing partisanship and the 
dominance of national political debate in local 
elections. For many years the number of independent 
local councillors fell and the majority of 
councillors are now identified with national
political parties. The Widdicombe Report (Committee 
of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority 
Business, 1986) quotes a figure of 15% of councillors 
elected as independents and a similar proportion of 
local authorities, mostly rural districts, controlled 
by independents. Estimates of the extent to which 
local issues account for voting behaviour at 
elections vary. Miller (1988) estimated that 20% of 
variation in voting bahaviour at local elections could 
be accounted for by local issues.
Partisan politics themselves have been a feature of 
British local authorities since the nineteenth 
century. However, as Gyford (1985) points out, until 
the post-war period local politics, although 
partisan, moved along rather separate paths from 
national politics. These paths converged in the post­
war period. Hence the actions of local authorities 
have become not only clearly political but 
immediately identifiable with either central 
government or national oppositional policy. The 
strengthening of partisan politics at the local level 
can be seen as a swing of the pendulum against the 
growth throughout the twentieth century of pro­
fessional and administrative power in local
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authorities.
The broad thrust of central government actions over 
the twentieth century has been to increase central 
government control over local authorities. Since 1979 
centralisation has accelerated despite a central 
government regime committed to minimising the role of 
government in society. Centralisation has had 
implications for the role of local authorities within 
the public authority network. It has acted to 
suppress local initiative in pursuit of its aim of 
breaking local monopolies and empowering customers. It 
has also concentrated power in the hands of a central 
government sceptical of the need for explicit co­
ordination structures and reliant on spontaneous local 
initiatives. Were central government strongly 
committed to co-ordination, local authorities might 
be mandated to play a key co-ordinating role in their 
localities. Central government is itself
functionally fragmented. The lack of corporateness at 
the centre deters government from seeing local 
authorities as corporate bodies trying to deal with 
complex inter-related problems (Central Policy Review 
Staff, 1977).
The co-ordinating roles assigned to local authorities
Over the last century local authorities have occupied 
different positions within the public authority 
network. From the creation of the modern system of 
local government until immediately before the second 
world war, local authorities, although numerous and 
small seem to have enjoyed relative freedom to act 
and were politically independent of central 
government (Gyford, 1985). Furthermore, whilst not 
responsible for all public services in an area, they 
dominated subnational government.
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After the war it was no longer justifiable to see 
local authorities as synonomous with local government 
despite their greatly increased size and reduced 
numbers. The accelerating loss of functions from 
local authorities and the growing tasks of government 
posed the question of network leadership and the need 
for local authorities to play a co-ordinating role. 
However, while public management theorists focussed 
on the structures and processes needed to integrate 
the increasingly functionally fragmented subnational 
government, other changes were occurring which made 
local authority action problematic. The critical 
change was political. The nationalisation of local 
politics not only changed the public profile of local 
authorities but reinforced the long-established trend 
towards increased central control of local
government. Subnational government more than ever 
mirrored the functional fragmentation of central 
government. While individual local authorities might 
have seen it in their interests to integrate the work 
of other public authorities with their own, they had 
effectively lost the autonomy and independence that 
would allow them to do so.
In the sixties, when local authorities were 
responsible for the provision of more services, it 
was possible for the Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England (1969) to refer to the 
potential of local government to discharge "an 
all-round responsibility for the safety, health and 
well-being, both material and cultural, of people in 
different localities" (Para 27). The Commission 
favoured placing the remaining non-local authority 
health services under local authority control. Beyond 
this recommendation, little attention was paid to how 
local authorities would relate to other public 
authorities.
44
When central government decided to remove both health 
and water services from local authority control in 
the 1970s the role of the local authority within the 
public authority network became a more pressing 
organisational problem. After reorganisation in 1974 
both health and local authorities had a duty laid upon 
them to co-operate. To facilitate co-operation the 
boundaries of area health authorities (the middle 
tier of the health service) and local authorities 
were made co-terminous. Each health authority and its 
related local authority had to establish a statutory 
joint consultative committee. Both authorities were 
given the power to supply each other with goods and 
services and from 1976 onwards cash was made 
available through health budgets for joint projects. 
The Royal Commission on the Health Service (1979) 
reported that arrangements were unsatisfactory and 
responsibilities unclear. Despite this finding, 
elements of the system of linkages between health and 
local authorities such as the area tier of health 
management were „ subsequently dismantled.
The Study Group on Local Authority Management 
Structures (1972) was strongly critical of the 
fragmented departmentalisation which characterised 
the internal management of many local authorities. 
This report recommended that local authorities should 
adopt a more corporate approach to managing their 
affairs. It recommended a parallel approach to 
relationships within the public authority network 
with the initiatives coming from local authorities:
"We have, throughout this report, urged local 
authorities to adopt a corporate approach to the 
management of their affairs. We believe that 
there is in many ways an equal need for what has 
been termed a ’community* approach to the 
problems and needs of areas. We are not, however, 
suggesting that there should be an attempt to 
organise all services or plan all projects
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according to some detailed formal plan? the need 
as we see it is for each authority to be aware 
of and take into account the interaction between 
the plans, policies and functions for which it is 
responsible and those of other authorities ... We 
believe that this concept of 'community1 interest 
must involve not only the new local authorities, 
but also other voluntary and public agencies, 
including particularly the new area health boards 
and regional water authorities."
(para 8.3-4)
The approach recommended by the Study Group was for a 
system of joint committees to be set up to link 
counties and districts but into which health and 
water authorities would also be linked. The Study 
group was very optimistic about the ease with which 
such relationships might be built:
"Because of the contiguity of the boundaries of 
the [area health authorities] with those of local 
government it will be a simple matter 
structurally to involve the area health 
authorities in those services of mutual concern 
both in the day to day operation and in the 
forward planning and joint policy making of local 
authorities, particularly through the district 
joint committees to which we have referred 
earlier." (para 8.19)
District joint committees were never developed into 
the strong co-ordinating mechanisms envisaged. 
Efforts were made to link the newly separated 
services to local authorities through joint 
membership and, in health, through statutory joint 
committees and a small financial allocation for joint 
projects. In general, however, it was left to 
individual authorities to take initiatives as best 
they could within the existing legal, financial and 
political framework.
In the eighties the tide turned against the approach 
promoted by the Study Group. New ideas about ways to 
improve the public sector focussed on breaking up
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large units of government and privatising the 
provision of services. The public good was seen to be 
served by focussing on efficiency and effectiveness 
within individual services.Favoured innovations 
included opting out for schools and health facilities, 
competition, and the purchase rather than the 
provision of services. Relationships between public 
authorities would be purely voluntary in order to 
reduce the bureaucratic constraints on authorities' 
operations.
The concepts of service provision and public sector 
management being promoted at the time when the 
research reported here was undertaken, addressed the 
question of intergovernmental relations at the local 
level in an indirect fashion. There was strong 
emphasis on the need for marketing and the importance 
of the consumer (increasingly designated the customer) 
which focussed attention on the appropriateness of 
service outputs as perceived from outside the 
organisation. This way of looking at services should 
have drawn attention to the problems arising for the 
customer when authorities provided unco-ordinated or 
incompatible services.
Public authorities were being urged to adopt the 
values and practices of the "enterprise culture". The 
idea of enterprise focussed on innovation and 
inventiveness; it implied risk-taking by by-passing 
traditional bureaucratic processes. Such ways of 
working should have encouraged a search for new 
solutions to old problems, such as the need to make 
links across organisational boundaries.
By requiring authorities to put services out to 
competitive tender, central government attempted to 
shift the emphasis within local authorities from the
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management of service-provision to the acquisition of 
services to meet local need. As a purchaser of 
services the local authority would become more skilled 
at working with other organisations and addressing 
problems to which it did not necessarily provide the 
total solution itself.
Other ideas about the provision of public services 
being promoted during the eighties were less 
favourable towards the establishment and development 
of intergovernmental relations at the local level. 
Since the beginning of the decade central government 
had been committed to the reduction of government at 
all levels. Part of the impact of such ideas was the 
reduction of resources available to public 
authorities, which inevitably jeopardised the
financing of non-core activities such as collaborative 
structures. Furthermore it discouraged the
development of new links which by definition 
constituted a growth in governmental activity.
A high value was placed by central government on 
competition. Competition was seen as an essential
discipline which ensured both the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a service-providing organisation. 
Local authorities and other public authorities were 
obliged to introduce competitive tendering and to 
compete for their own services. The financial 
constraints imposed by central government emphasised 
the extent to which public authorities were in 
competition with each other for resources. The 
requirement to think and act competitively in many 
areas did not encourage the collaborative thinking
and action inherent in the development of
intergovernmental 1inks.
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Finally, the emphasis placed by central government on 
cost-reduction and overall reduction of public 
expenditure tended to promote a short-term 
perspective. Authorities were obliged to focus 
attention on balancing the budgets within each year 
against a background of financial uncertainty and 
falling government grant and subsidy. This financial 
regime generally discouraged long-term initiatives 
such as the development of relationships with other 
authorities.
The most recent attempt to describe a co-ordinating 
role for local authorities is the concept of the 
enabling authority (Brooke 1989, Stewart 1990). An 
enabling authority is one whose concern with public 
services is wider than the services it provides 
directly. Brooke (1989) identifies the origins of the 
enabling role in local authorities' historic 
commitment to promoting the broad interests of the 
areas and communities they serve. However, as Stewart 
(1990) points out, the concept of enablement has come 
of age in the nineties as a result of central 
government's commitment to privatisation and the 
ending of local government monopolies by the 
introduction of compulsory competitive tendering. The 
experience of discharging responsibilities 
successfully through contractors is seen as a basis 
upon which to build the pursuit of wider objectives 
through other public and volunteer agencies.
The difference between enabling and corporate 
management at the community-level lies not in the 
objectives of action but in the means employed. The 
aims of community level corporate management were the 
alignment of services provided by different 
authorities to increase both the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service - provision. The aims of
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enablement are similarly to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the public authority network by 
imposing order and pursuing community welfare through 
increased choice (Brooke 1989).
Community-level corporate management focussed upon 
formal committees, planning and consultation. A 
coordinating superstructure was required to align 
authorities and pursue joint objectives. Enabling 
involves local authorities in reassessing their role 
and using existing relationships to exert their 
leadership within the public authority network. The 
role which the protagonists of enabling urge upon 
local authorities is that of , provider of strategic 
management at the community level. The relationships 
which can be exploited strategically include 
membership of wider bodies, contractual and agency 
arrangements, purchasing, grant-giving, and
regulation. (Brooke 1989). Where no such
relationships exist the local authority must resort 
to influence. Stewart (1990) notes that to enable 
successfully a local authority must itself change in 
order to develop structures and equip members and 
officers with the skills needed to work across 
organisational boundaries.
Enabling is seen as a hope for the future of local 
authorities. As central government has acted to 
restrict local government activity, local authorities 
have been looking for new and satisfying roles to 
fill the void left by reduced direct service 
provision. Central government is open to voluntaristic 
local co-ordination which anticipates the criticism 
that central government action has left local 
government hopelessly fragmented and over­
centralised.
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So far the enabling authority is a prescriptive model. 
Both Brooke (1989) and Stewart (1990) point to 
examples of enabling behaviour but cannot identify an 
authority which operates strategically as an enabling 
authority. The research reported here was conceived 
and carried out before the concept of the enabling 
authority was enunciated. Intergovernmental relations 
at the local level are at the heart of the idea of 
enabling. The pattern of IGR within Camden and the 
role of Camden Council in the public authority network 
gives an indication of how near to or how far some 
local authorities may be from the model of an enabling 
authority.
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CHAPTER 2 THE LITERATURE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
There is no well-defined body of literature or theory 
of IGR at the local level. Academics and those 
directly involved in government have for some time 
been interested in IGR in Britain. However, the focus 
of this interest has been largely on vertical, or 
central-local, relations. Vertical IGR is now a 
relatively well researched area with a substantial 
body of academic writing and supporting theory 
(Jones, 1980? Rhodes, 1981; Goldsmith, 1986? Ranson 
et al. 1985) . By comparison, horizontal IGR have
received much less attention.
The predominantly vertical dimension of IGR research 
has been reflected in studies of accountability, 
power and control between levels of government. The 
original impetus to study central/local relations 
arose from political concern about the relationship 
between central government and local authorities 
(Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance, 
1976). The subject has subsequently been widened
to encompass other relationships. Rhodes (1988) 
argues that the relationship between central 
government and sub-central government must include 
relations with nationalised industries, public 
corporations and the local units of government 
departments.
This chapter begins by reviewing studies in operations 
research, local government studies and policy studies 
which included IGR at the local level. In the second 
part of the chapter the three-level model of theory is 
presented and .a range of theories reviewed at the 
macro, meso and micro levels of explanation.
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OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND HORIZONTAL IGR
In the late sixties and early seventies a number of 
influential works on horizontal IGR emerged from the 
Institute for Operational Research (IOR). IOR had 
been set up to remedy the tardy application of 
operational research techniques to public-sector 
problems. Stringer (1967) conceptualised the public 
sector as a 'multi-organisation' in which tasks were 
undertaken by parts of several organisations 
involving multiple decision-takers. The 
multi-organisational perspective was adopted in a 
major study of planning processes in Droitwich 
undertaken by IOR in the late sixties which typified 
studies of this genre.
The Droitwich study was published in 1974 (Friend et 
al) . The authors build their model of horizontal IGR 
on interacting policy systems. A policy system is 
defined as the social context in which decisions are 
taken about a particular class of problems. Decisions 
are taken by actors who may belong to different 
organisations. Actors are inhibited in their decision­
making by policy guidelines and by formal and 
informal relationships between them. Policy systems 
have many of the characteristics of policy networks 
(see below).
In the model developed by Friend et al horizontal IGR 
can be located both within policy systems (since 
actors are drawn from different organisations) and 
between systems. In a decision network, actors within 
a policy system may have the opportunity to seek 
solutions to problems jointly with actors in other 
policy systems.
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By applying this model to the problems of planning 
overspill from the West Midlands conurbation, Friend 
et al reach a number of conclusions about the way the 
public authority network works. Planning involved 
multiple organisations and policy systems. The 
decisions to be taken were too complex to be resolved 
in a single set of moves. Actors therefore engaged in 
a bargaining process aimed at securing a satisfactory 
outcome and preserving maximum freedom of manoeuvre 
in subsequent negotiations. The critical factor in 
the functioning of the network was identified as the 
judgment skills of individuals. Changing issues 
militated against formal structures and emphasised 
organic ones. Limited resources required judgments to 
be made about the approaches made to others and the 
relationships developed. Interaction was seen 
invariably to have mutual benefits for those involved 
and to grow naturally as experience provided actors 
with further networking skills.
Friend et al have been criticised both on theoretical 
and methodological grounds (Martins, 1986). The 
nature of the planning issues involved in Droitwich 
led the authors to over-emphasise the mutual benfits 
of interaction and to place too much weight upon 
informal relationships and the judgment skills of 
individuals as a way of working across organisational 
boundaries. While these criticisms highlight 
weaknesses which limit the validity of the findings 
across the public sector as a whole, the model is 
nonetheless useful in understanding a case such as 
Camden where voluntary and informal relationships 
were common.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES AND HORIZONTAL IGR
Local government studies is not a single discipline.
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Like its parent subject, public administrationy^is 
interdisciplinary, diverse and frequently
atheoretical (Rhodes, 1991). Its focus is often 
pragmatic and institutional. Horizontal IGR has been 
researched by two different groups of scholars under 
the broad heading of local government studies. One 
group belongs to the political science tradition? the 
other uses a public administration and management 
perspective.
The study of local politics was advanced in the
seventies by a number of classic studies of single 
authorities. Hampton (1970) and Newton (1976) both 
examined the politics of a county borough, Sheffield 
in the one case, Birmingham in the other. In Sheffield 
councillors* links with outside organisations were 
almost entirely with their political party or with 
voluntary organisations. In Birmingham the
overwhelming point of contact of voluntary bodies 
with public bodies was with the City Council, either 
its officers or members. County boroughs were 
responsible for a far greater range of services than 
Camden Council is today, and the need for voluntary 
bodies to deal with other public authorities was 
less.
Dearlove (1973) focussed on the way public policy was 
made in one local authority, the Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea. The borough is portrayed as 
an organisation enjoying high levels of autonomy and 
relatively insulated from its electors, ratepayers
and clients. The study looked at which sources of
information and influence councillors paid attention 
to and those they ignored. Among those which members 
excluded were other governmental structures,
including the, GLC, the LBA and central government 
departments. These bodies were thought to lack local
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interests and to pose a threat to local independence. 
They were also dominated by Labour (the borough was 
Conservative) and were on occasions a target for 
political defiance.
Saunders (1979) conceptualised local government as the 
lower-tier local authority. In a study of the London 
Borough of Croydon he identified the GLC and central 
government as part of the external environment in 
which the local authority operated. In particular he 
highlighted the hierarchical nature of their 
relationship with the borough and their role in 
curtailing Croydon*s autonomy.
Relationships with other public bodies are peripheral 
in all these studies. Dearlove offers an explanation 
of this in the exclusion of certain groups and 
organisations by the local authority. Scholars have 
also held a highly local-authority centred view of 
local government which has excluded the relationships 
between the local authority and other public bodies 
from many studies of local politics. External 
relations have been seen as the vertical dimension of j'
government or contacts as with business interests and 
the public and voluntary bodies.
Local government studies has a strong management 
dimension. The report of the Study Group on Local 
Authority Management Structure (1972) coincided with 
widespread interest in the management of local 
authorities. Research centres, such as the Institute 
of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), were the 
source of not only descriptive but also prescriptive 
works on local government management. The source of 
the management models proposed was the private sector.
In the seventies management thinking in local 
government was dominated by the corporate management
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model (Eddison, 1973; Stewart, 1971). This model 
emphasised the importance of structures and processes 
which co-ordinated and steered organisations and 
prevented them from fragmenting along functional 
lines.
Calls for the application of the corporate management 
model not only within local authorities but across 
the public authority network have been described 
above ( see Chapter 1). Studies of local government 
revealed that the adoption of corporate management 
had been less than wholehearted within local 
authorities. Greenwood et al (1980) reported that by 
the late seventies the commitment of local 
authorities to the corporate approach was fading. 
With respect to the wider development of corporate 
management within IGR at the local level, very few of 
the suggestions for formalising inter-authority 
relationships were taken up.
Management research on horizozntal IGR in local 
government has focussed attention largely on 
bilateral relationships and particular kinds of 
linking mechanisms. Studies of bilateral 
relationships have concentrated on contexts where 
formal links are statutorily required between the 
local authority and another public authority.
By far the largest body of writing has been on the 
links between local authorities and health
authorities (Glennerster et al. 1983; Wistow and
Fuller, 1983; Chant et al 1986; Challis et al 1988). 
Wistow, (1988) notes that although a considerable 
amount of collaborative machinery has been set up 
between local authorities and health authorities, and 
allocations of. joint finance spent, a joint approach 
to service provision has not emerged. While no longer
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completely separatist, planning was seen to occur in 
parallel rather than jointly. Areas of problem­
solving success tended to be ad hoc, and joint 
operational activity usually resulted from the 
efforts of particular individuals. The authors 
identified two sets of factors which explained the 
failure of joint arrangements to meet expectations. 
One was structural, for example, the over-reliance on 
formal methods, the instability caused by
reorganisation in the health service and the strength 
of professional interests. The other set were 
environmental, in particular overall resource 
constraints under which both . authorities were 
operating.
A number of studies have been undertaken of particular 
types of linkages between local authorities and other 
public authorities. The trigger for such studies has 
frequently been practitioners * concern about the 
efficacy of arrangements. For example,Elcock (1978) 
reports a study of health authority members and 
points to the distinctive attitudes held by 
councillors who are nominees on health authorities. 
Flynn and Leach (1984) in their study of joint boards 
and joint committees highlight the specific 
conditions under which such linkages are effective, 
noting the tendency for joint boards to become 
autonomous from the authorities they link and joint 
committees to become cumbersome. Leach et al (1987) 
studied the relationships between counties and 
districts. They found high levels of contact between 
the two tiers dominated by officials and informal 
relationships. The amount, type and quality of 
relationships varied greatly from place to place, 
between services and over time.
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The literature on management in local government has 
shed considerable light upon the workings of 
particular forms of linking mechanisms and the 
relationship among particular pairs of authorities. 
Studies have demonstrated the conditions under which 
interauthority relationships develop. Environmental, 
organisational and attitudinal factors have been 
identified which determine the pattern of
relationships. These factors generally match those 
identified by organisational-studies scholars who have 
examined the conditions under which organisations in 
general develop relationships (see Chapter 6).
POLICY STUDIES AND HORIZONTAL IGR
Studies of IGR reveal the complexity of relationships 
involved in particular issues or services. The fabric 
of government has been shown to be structured as 
policy communities and networks formed around 
distinct tasks or issues (Rhodes, 1988). These 
structures include both vertical and horizontal IGR 
as well as relationships with private and voluntary 
bodies.
Rhodes (1988) distinguishes six different types of 
network which can be involved in making public 
policy. None of the types corresponds to the network 
of public authorities serving a single local 
authority. Policy communities are vertically
integrated and exclusive structures involving those 
who share responsibility for particular services. 
Territorial communities are associated with
geographical areas built on strong provincial or 
regional identities. Professional networks,
producer networks and intergovernmental networks 
based, on the .local authority associations share 
little in common with the Camden network. The final
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type is based on Heclo (1978) and the idea of an 
issue network which is loosely structured,
pluralistic and usually has a wide membership. In 
structural terms issue networks are closer to the 
Camden case but based on territory rather than one 
specific issue.
Policy studies reflect these different types of 
network. Rhodes (1988) quotes a large number of 
policy studies cases which demonstrate the operation 
of these network types. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
studies of topics such as community care and inner 
cities have demonstrated the extent to which poor 
horizontal IGR is responsible for policy failure. 
Because of the strong functional divisions within 
British government, policy studies have tended to 
marginalise questions about the relationships between 
policy networks at the local level. There have been 
no attempts to repeat Friend et al (1974) using policy 
studies theory and concepts which have been developed 
since.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY OF HORIZONTAL IGR
Theory has been used to explain patterns of IGR at 
three different levels of analysis (Houlihan, 1988) . 
Such a framework can be applied equally successfully 
to vertical and horizontal IGR. The widest, or macro 
level, is that of social structure and seeks to 
demonstrate how relationships between public 
authorities are shaped and constrained by the 
distribution of power amongst different groups in 
society. At the middle level, explanations of IGR 
are provided by theories of structure and 
organisations. At the third, individual level, IGR 
patterns are .explained by theories of political 
processes and the behaviour of professionals.
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Macro explanations of horizontal IGR
Macro theories offer explanations of horizontal IGR by 
reference to the wider social system. In the course 
of theorising about the organisation of the state, 
macro theories contribute to an understanding of 
horizontal IGR. Most such theories offer an 
explanation of the fragmentation which is commonly 
found in modern liberal democracies. The patterns of 
power in society are shown to determine the degree 
and pattern of fragmentation of the machinery of 
government. Relationships among fragmented units may 
therefore be determined by interests which lie outside 
the organisations themselves, and outside the formal 
machinery of government. Macro theories also offer 
models of the processes by which the fragmented parts 
of the governmental system work together or side by 
side.
Pluralism and horizontal IGR
Pluralist theories give pre-eminence to the multiple 
sources of power in society and its diffusion amongst 
different interest groups and institutions. In a 
pluralist system governments respond to many separate 
demands of a differentiated society through a 
plethora of public bodies (Dahl, 1961). Fragmentation 
of the governmental system is seen as a direct 
reflection of the polyarchical nature of society.
Pluralists view the development of geographical and 
functional fragmentation rather differently.
Geographical fragmentation is viewed positively 
because it creates more accessible governmental 
units through which demands can be expressed. 
Functional fragmentation on the other hand is viewed 
suspiciously. Specialised public authorities are seen
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to be responsive to national pressures, to the 
interests of central government, and to sectional 
interests (Self, 1972).
Neo-pluralists modify the notions of pluralism to take 
account of the dominant role of business interests in 
Western democracies, and dwell on the internal 
processes of administration within modern government. 
All pluralists see advantages in multiple agencies 
defending the multiple interests involved in a complex 
issue or policy area. In this way the network as a 
whole has the ability to control the actions of any 
particular authority within it for the public good. 
Neo-pluralists emphasise the negative aspects of 
fragmentation:
"Modern administration contains and requires a 
bewildering kaleidoscope of specialised experts, 
each claiming and receiving some title to 
professional authority... The multiplication of 
specialised professions supports the 
Balkanisation of public programmes and policies, 
unless the expert contributions are firmly 
harnessed to broader purposes.” (Self, 1972, 
p293).
Pluralists differ about the extent to which 
governments play an active role in society and they 
differ too about the interests to which any such 
action responds. These differences are reflected in 
views about the way public authorities will relate to 
each other. Some pluralists see the state as 
passive, playing no role in developing co­
ordination among public authorities? rather,
co-ordination occurs through group adjustment 
(Miliband, 1969). Other pluralists propose an active 
state which plays a co-ordinating role either through 
formal co-ordinative mechanisms or through a shifting 
population of policy-based structures which reflect 
the issues of the day (Allison, 1971) . Both viewpoints
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would suggest a co-ordinative role for local 
authorities within their localities, although 
theorists differ about the degree to which local 
authorities are able to, or indeed should, impose co­
ordination on the other authorities concerned with 
public services in an area.
According to classical pluralists the fragmented 
system of government is integrated by processes of 
interest group bargaining and negotiation known as 
partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom, 1965). Under 
such a system policy develops in an incremental 
fashion. Neo-pluralists focus on the policy networks 
which develop around particular issues. Within 
communities of interested organisations and groups 
networks develop that support not only bargaining but 
also rational decision making (Rhodes, 1988) . 
Neo-pluralist theories suggest a less central co- 
ordinative role for local authorities within the 
public authority network than classical pluralist 
theories by stressing the importance of the network 
as a whole. Neo-pluralist theories also suggest that 
professional and informal channels of communication 
may be more important in co-ordinating the fragmented 
system than formal co-ordinating mechanisms.
Elite theory and horizontal IGR
Elite theory suggests that the tasks of government are 
in the hands of a small ruling group, the governing 
elite. Concentration of power is viewed positively 
because the ruling group is seen to emerge from those 
uniquely qualified for the task of governing and thus 
acts efficiently and effectively on behalf of the 
masses (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935). Dunleavy and 
0* Leary (1987), note that such theories generally 
contain detailed accounts of the organisation and
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structure of the governmental system including 
fragmentation at the subnational level.
Elite theories of government give prominence to the 
role of officials and to the development of a 
rational government bureaucracy (Weber, 1968). This 
gives rise to a dilemma. On the one hand, the need 
for control and co-ordination implies the 
desirability of a unified and centralised bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, the need to divide complex tasks 
into their component parts and to decentralise 
implies fragmentation and the development of 
partially autonomous units of subnational government 
(Nordlinger, 1981). These opposing forces pull the 
system of government first one way and then the other.
Elite theorists locate governmental power centrally 
but most see the governing elite responding to other 
elites and organised interests within society. In 
elite theory the relationship between the ruling 
group and these non-governmental forces is crucial in 
determining the form which fragmentation takes. Some 
theorists suggest that the pattern of fragmentation of 
the governmental system is a direct reflection of the 
activities and influence of other elites in society. 
They may be the elected politicians who have left 
their mark on the system of government through 
reorganisation and insitutional innovation. They may 
be powerful social or economic elites to which the 
ruling elite responds by organising the state 
apparatus to pursue their particular interests. 
Fragmentation may be a by-product of this process or 
a deliberate strategy to pursue certain economic or 
social objectives.
A particular group of elite theorists have developed 
the idea that the the ruling group and the
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governmental bureaucracy act autonomously and respond 
only minimally to external pressures (Nordlinger, 
1981). According to these theorists the fragmentation 
of the governmental system is fostered by those in 
power for their own ends.
Regardless of who controls the ruling elite, theorists 
have suggested three reasons why fragmentation may 
increase in parallel with centralisation (Dunleavy 
and O'Leary, 1987). One reason is that the 
multiplicity of subnational governmental institutions 
is in itself no indication of decentralisation 
because they are excluded from key national decisions 
and act as an absorbent layer, insulating central 
government from those they govern. Another reason 
which has been advanced is that subnational 
government provides a means by which local and 
sectional elites can be tied into the governmental 
system and mobilised in support of the ruling group. 
A third reason is that through subnational government 
the governing elite can distance itself from 
difficult policy areas and through functional 
fragmentation, insulate areas from popular account.
New right theories and horizontal IGR
Theorists of the New Right focus upon the individual 
citizen and his rights. Such theorists see inherent 
tyranny in all forms of government. They suggest that 
the individual will only be able to exercise his 
rightful control over his existence if the activities 
of governments are minimised and those activities that 
are retained are tempered by forms of government which 
expose them to the equivalent of market forces 
(Scruton, 1981). The prescriptive theories of the New 
Right, have been very influential with recent 
conservative governments.
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However, within their generally critical view of 
governmental machinery, New Right theorists have 
focussed upon the notion of geographical
fragmentation as offering citizens the possibility of 
good government. It is argued that the more numerous 
are the units of local government, the more 
opportunity there is for citizens to exercise an 
effective sanction over local politicians and 
bureaucrats by moving. It is assumed that citizens 
will behave as rational purchasers of local 
government services and move to areas which minimise 
their costs and maximise their returns. Small 
geographical authorities are more likely to be 
homogeneous and to exhibit distinctive 
characteristics. Many citizens do not experience 
total freedom of movement and numerous small 
authorities in a location allow choice to those tied 
to the general location by job or family demands 
(Tiebout, 1956) . New Right theorists do not see any 
virtue in functional fragmentation per se although 
they favour federal or tiered systems of government 
as a way to check the actions of those in power by 
allowing further geographical fragmentation and by 
focussing more sharply the issues upon which voters 
are deciding at any particular election.
Public choice theories which have been strongly 
identified with those of the New Right postulate the 
need for two sorts of local government unit - those 
locally controlled and branches of central government 
services supplying services locally. Such a division 
with central government providing some developmental 
and most of the redistributive services and local 
government providing allocational and some
developmental services is seen to follow from the 
ratioyial pursuit of social welfare benefits 
(Dunleavy, 1984). However, there is nothing in the
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model which suggests that the services controlled by 
central government should be fragmented across a 
number of public authorities. Such fragmentation 
would tend to detract from the economic efficiency 
obtained by an otherwise optimal distribution of 
responsibilities between different levels of 
government by necessitating co-ordinating machinery 
to counter duplication, gaps and conflicts.
Marxist theories and horizontal IGR
The central focus of Marxist theories is upon the 
class structure of society. They assert that class is 
based upon the relationship of groups of individuals 
to the means of production. A dominant class always 
emerges and controls the governmental system 
ultimately in its own interests. In modern Britain the 
dominant class is the capitalist class which owns the 
means of production.
Marxist theories differ in their view of the 
relationship between, the class structure of society 
and the organs of government. Classical Marxism has 
generally viewed the system of government merely as 
an instrument in the hands of the ruling class, shaped 
and used to the benefit of that class. The structure 
of subnational government is seen in this model as a 
reflection of the interests of the capitalist class. 
Local government is not seen to reflect local 
interests but rather to represent at a local level 
the dominance of the national ruling class. Conflict 
may arise between this level of government and the 
state should local insitutions come under the sway of 
working-class interests. Such oppositional forces are 
never, though, able to withstand the power of the 
centre for more than a short period.
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Some Marxist theories see the government in the role 
of arbiter (Poulantzas, 1978). Government is at arm's 
length from the dominant capitalist class but through 
its conscious neutrality always acts to favour the 
long-term interests of that class. Arbiter theories 
recognise the nearly evenly balanced strength of 
different classes in many nations and acknowledge that 
parts of the machinery of government must at any one 
time be under the influence of non-capitalist 
classes. The structure of the system of government, 
including fragmentation, can be used to keep 
potentially radical influences in check. For example 
the reduction of geographical fragmentation in 
Britain could be interpreted as a direct attempt to 
prevent Labour holding power at the local level. 
Labour support is more concentrated geographically 
than Conservative support. Large geographical 
authorities where the urban vote is diluted by 
suburban and rural votes favour the Conservatives. 
The exception has been in the main conurbations where 
there was sufficient concentration of Labour votes to 
dominate the former Metropolitan authorities. These 
were abolished in 1986 by a Conservative government in 
part as a reaction to their strong oppositional 
policies.
Events such as Abolition suggest that the history of 
class struggle may be read into the pattern of 
fragmentation currently displayed in the governmental 
system. Dunleavy (1984) suggests that the local 
government system which emerged during the nineteenth 
century was shaped by the conflicts between fractions 
of capital in the period of mass industrialisation. 
The nature of capitalism changed subsequently so that 
the close connections between local government and 
business were severed. Local authorities remained as
69
institutions which gave the state legitimacy as a 
democratic structure but protected class interests by 
their ineffective structure and organisation. 
Functional fragmentation was positive in that it 
protected the central state from proletarian 
pressures by making it impossible for the working 
class to capture and control the range of 
governmental institutions upon which they depended 
heavily. The governmental system can thus be seen to 
maintain conservatism in the field of public 
services. Obscure patterns of responsibility and 
accountability make it difficult for clients to apply 
effective pressure on the system. The near 
impossibility of organising a sustained strategy 
involving so many different agencies makes it unlikely 
that effective action could be taken to tackle 
problems posed by poverty and disadvantage.
A final variant of the basic Marxist theme is the dual 
state thesis (Saunders, 1979). It suggests that 
governments utilise resources in different types of 
programmes in order to pursue order, capital 
accumulation and legitimacy. Central government is 
concerned primarily with capital accumulation and 
leaves to local government the programmes which 
contribute to order and legitimacy, either directly, 
for example, through the police or indirectly, for 
example, through housing programmes. Furthermore, it 
is suggested that policy-making at the subnational 
level will be fundamentally pluralist with pluralist 
institutions to match. The reason advanced for this 
pattern is the need for government to appear 
responsive and to be seen to accommodate local and 
sectional interests in order to maintain its long-term 
control of the economy at the national level.
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MIDDLE LEVEL EXPLANATIONS OF HORIZONTAL IGR
At the middle level there are two extensive bodies of 
theory which concern relationships among public 
authorities, - interorganisational studies and 
intergovernmental relations. Rhodes (1981) used both 
sets of theories to develop a framework for 
understanding central-local relations in Britain.
Interorganisational studies provide middle-level 
explanations of interorganisational relationships. 
Many use a contingency approach. Among recent 
developments of particular relevance to explaining 
horizontal IGR is structural analysis.
Intergovernmental relations utilise more micro-level 
explanations. The unit of analysis has been the 
individual post-holder and explanations of his/her 
behaviour have encompassed factors including 
attitudes, values, motivations and styles of 
management.
Interorganisational studies
Interorganisational studies grew out of organisational 
studies in the late fifties. Early writers on 
interorganisational relations point to the very large 
amount of sociological study of patterns of behaviour 
within organisations compared to the few studies of 
relations between them (Levine and White, 1961; Litwak 
and Hylton, 1962). Interorganisational analysis 
developed using the same tools of functionalist 
sociological theory which dominated organisational 
studies. It has attracted similar criticism as its 
parent discipline (Sheets, 1981). More recent studies 
have , adopted .game approaches (Crozier and Thoenig, 
1976) or a political economy view of
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interorganisational relationships (Benson, 1975). 
Interorganisational studies have contributed 
significantly to an understanding of the environment 
in which organisations operate, the nature of 
networks, dependency among organisations and 
processes of interorganisational activity.
Structural analysis
Some interorganisational research has been carried out 
on commercial organisations (Assael, 1969). The 
majority of the classic studies have been American and 
have focussed on voluntary social service 
organisations (Levine and White, 1961? Aiken and Hage, 
1968? Hall et al. 1977).
Structural analysis has grown out of main stream 
sociological research as a reaction to reductionism, 
structuralism and determinism. Structural analysis 
focusses on the relationships among social entities 
rather than on the entities themselves. Knoke (1990) 
uses network to compare political behaviour in a 
variety of settings including local governance. The 
contribution of structural analysis is in focussing 
analysis at the level of the network.
Intergovernmental relations
Intergovernmental relations as a topic of study 
developed out of an interest in federal systems 
(Rhodes, 1981). It focusses on the relationships 
between tiers of government, i.e. vertical IGR. 
Earlier studies of institutional, financial and 
constitutional arrangements have been complemented by 
studies of social structures and the processes by 
which policy is made within a complex tiered system 
of government. Many such studies have an application
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only to vertical IGR and are also highly country 
specific. The potential for transferring the insights 
of many studies of federal systems to horizozntal IGR 
at the local level in Britain is therefore limited.
Later studies of intergovernmental relations have 
converged with interorganisational studies. Simeon 
(1972) and Wright (1978) studying intergovernmental 
relationships within Canada and America respectively 
identify the bargaining and negotiation processes 
whereby policy is made and the relationship between 
the centre and the states is handled. Compared to 
many interorganisational studies, intergovernmental 
relations research highlights the political dimension 
of relationships. This aspect makes it a useful tool 
in understanding the operation of relationships 
including those of horizontal IGR.
THE ENVIRONMENT
Environment has figured prominently in explanations of 
organisational structure and activity. Emery and Trist 
(1965) criticised the tendency to view organisations 
as closed sytems. They advocated the model of 
organisations as open systems located within an 
environment with which they interact. A variety of 
criticisms have been levelled against systems theory 
as a basis for studying interorganisational 
relationships (Karpik, 1978). However Rhodes (1981), 
in examining the contribution of interorganisational 
analysis to vertical IGR, demonstrated that it is 
possible to use the concept of an organisation's 
environment to explain the linkages it develops with 
other organisations provided that environment is 
carefully defined.
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Rhodes (1981) used a narrow definition of environment 
in order to focus on a particular relationship, that 
between a central government department and local 
authority. For the purposes of this study a broader
definition has been used which takes account of the
many layers of context in which intergovernmental 
relationships are embedded. The literature on
organisational studies suggests that there are four
contextual layers which contribute to an explanation 
of the presence and development of inter- 
organisational relationships.
The first layer comprises the immediate context within 
which structure is developed and performance occurs. 
It corresponds to the idea of setting defined by Pugh 
et al (1969) as a mixture of organisational variables 
such as size, technology, resources, ownership and 
history. They demonstrated that such variables were 
correlated with structural variables such as task 
specialisation, control of work, and concentration of 
authority. Their contingency approach has been used 
in interorganiational studies to identify similar 
contextual variables which correlate with the 
presence and development of interorganisational 
linkages.
The survey of antecedent conditions affecting 
interorganisational relationships conducted by 
Halpert .(1982) includes a number of factors which are 
an integral part of the organisational setting. These 
factors comprise an organisation's task, structure, 
culture and stability. Responsibility for providing a 
wide range of services, broadly defined statements of 
mission and heterogeneity of staff have all been 
shown to increase the likelihood of an organisation 
developing links with other organisations (Whetten 
and Aldrich (1979). Heterogeneity seems to make
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organisations more aware of other services and more 
able to understand and build links with the agencies 
repsonsible for their delivery.
Organisations which do not have a clearly defined 
structure have been shown to face difficulties in 
developing interorganisational links (Gardiner and 
Snipe, 1970). Structure is necessary to provide the 
administrative support necessary for linkages to be 
effective. While a more defined organisation may be 
better placed to develop relationships, the 
particular form that an organisation's structure 
takes can have a profound effect on linkages. 
Successful interorganisational linkages seem to 
flourish between organisations which are characterised 
by good communications, closeness to their customers
or clients and a strong framework of accountability
*
and responsibility.
Three key indicators of an organisation's likely 
ability to develop and sustain interorganisational 
relationships have been identified: the extent to
which it is centralised, bureaucratised and
professionalised. In centralised organisations power 
is located too far from those who are aware of the 
need and potential for links with other service 
providers at the client level (Akinbode and Clark, 
1976). Bureaucracy inhibits communications within an 
organisation and can make an organisation's response 
to others slow and inappropriate. A degree of 
professionalism in an organisation can contribute to 
the successful development of interorganisational 
linkages; however highly professionalised
organisations may find it difficult to develop 
linkages with authorities whose staff have a different 
professional allegiance and outlook (Wright, 1977).
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Culture as well as structure has been shown to affect 
the development and growth of interorganistional 
linkages. (Aiken and Hage, 1968) found innovativeness 
to be closely correlated with the development of 
organisational linkages. They interpreted this 
relationship to imply that innovativeness created a 
demand for new resources to be obtained by developing 
relationships with other service-providing
organisations. It could alternatively be suggested 
that only those organisations accustomed to 
innovativeness are able to cope with the challenges 
that interorganisational relationships pose.
The stability of the organisational context has been 
identified as an explanatory factor in inter­
organisational studies. Instability can arise from 
high staff turn-over (Widner, 1973) or from high 
rates of structural and policy change within an 
organisation. The effect of frequent change is 
uncertainty for other organisations, a phenomenon 
which interorganisational links seek to reduce.
The second layer comprises other organisations 
operating in the same functional or geographical 
area. This layer was identified by Thompson and McEwan 
(1958) in their study of the definition and pursuit of 
organisational goals. They observed that these 
processes must be undertaken in reaction to the 
actions of other organisations operating in the same 
field. This layer was further defined by Evan (1966) 
in the notion of an organisational set, a group of 
organisations with which a focal organisation 
interacts which affects the way that the central 
organisation behaves. The organisational set concept 
was further developed into the idea of organisational 
networks where the context of an organisation is 
provided by all the other organisations with which it
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interacts directly or indirectly (Laumann and Pappi, 
1976).
Studies have demonstrated that similarity of 
organisational structure facilitates interaction and, 
conversely, dissimilarity inhibits the development of 
interorganisational linkages (Redburn, 1977).
Boundaries influence the development of links. 
Coterminosity implies that organisations serve a 
common public and are operating in a similar 
environment. Coterminous organisations can have not 
only a straightforward one-to-one relationship but 
also a basis of common interest and understanding. 
Where there is lack of coterminosity a multiplicity 
of links may be required to connect organisations 
providing two different services, and further 
structures may be needed to co-ordinate these 
interorganisational links (Hammond, 1976).
Internal structure also affects relationships. Halpert 
(1982) quotes studies demonstrating that differences 
in task, resourcing, priorities, goals, scale, 
culture and operating systems affect the
establishment and development of relationships 
between organisations.
The third contextual layer is much broader and 
includes a wide range of socio-economic and political 
variables. Given the focus within interorganisational 
studies on the role of power and resources, 
examination of this layer of context has focussed 
largely on factors determining the availability and 
distribution of these two variables.
Benson (1975) defines this third aspect of the 
environment as the governmental system and public. 
The study of their influence on the public service
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network and upon the availability of resources and 
distribution of power merges with macro studies of IGR 
described above.
The fourth layer corresponds to the all-encompassing 
notion of environment put forward by Emery and Trist 
(1969). They classified societal environments 
according to their degree of complexity and causal 
interconnectedness and hence uncertainty. As
uncertainty rose, so they predicted would the need for 
interorganisational linkages that could increase 
certainty in the organisation's environment.
Emery and Trist (1965) identified three processes
which led to turbulence: the impact of giant
oligopolies, the role of governments in
institutionalising the interdependence of social and 
economic factors and the role of research and 
development whose sole purpose is to induce change. 
The environment produced by such forces is 
characterised by uncertainty. Organisations operating 
in such environments must find a means of establishing 
stability among other things by developing links with 
other organisations. Terreberry (1968) notes that as 
turbulence increases, externally induced change
increases at the expense of internally produced 
change so that other organisations become an
increasingly important aspect of an organisation's 
environment.
Attempts to measure turbulence and its impact on 
organisations have been fraught with difficulties 
(Tosi et al. 1973). Galaskiewicz and Shatin (1981) 
found no relationship between turbulence defined in 
population terms and the predisposition of leaders of 
social agencies to co-operate. Organisational 
theorists have demonstrated the impact of changing
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patterns of communications on organisational 
structures, for example, by replacing bureaucracies 
and hierarchies with networks (Handy 1989).
A further development by one of the original authors 
of the concept of environmental turbulence has been 
to focus on the nature of task. Trist (1983) 
identifies a class of issues called metaproblems 
which comprise complex sets of inter-related problems 
typical of turbulent environments. They are also 
typical of the problems to which the public sector 
must respond. The key characteristic of such problems 
is not their instability but their complexity and 
scale in relation to organisational capacity. Ackoff
(1974) described the concept of "mess'1. A mess 
involves problems which inter-relate in such a way 
that the solution to one problem creates other 
problems. Because of this tendency the solution to a 
mess cannot normally be found by breaking it down 
into component parts. A mess or metaproblem can be 
tackled only by co-ordinated planning and action based 
on a systems approach. However Trist (1983) notes 
that the conflict and dissent inherent in turbulent 
environments prevent the development of consensus and 
interorganisational domains.
ORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS
Studies of interorganisational relationships have been 
criticised for regarding the links between 
organisations as mere extensions of the organisations 
themselves. The organisational set model (Evan 1966) 
which has dominated interorganisational theory 
diminishes the importance of the linkages themselves 
(Rhodes 1981). By taking the focal organisation and 
the group or .set of organisations with which it 
interacts as the basic unit of analysis, researchers
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have often ignored the independent effect of linkages 
upon organisations (Knoke 1990). The advantage of 
conceptualising the local authority and other public 
authorities as a network is that it focusses 
attention on the linkages between the organisations 
studied.
The concept of a network of social relationships was 
developed by anthropologists and sociologists in the 
course of studying linkages among individuals 
(Mitchell, 1969). The analytical tools which were 
developed in order to study individuals were then 
borrowed and adapted by theorists wishing to explain 
organisational behaviour. Laumann and Pappi (1976) 
successfully applied the concept of a network to both 
individuals and organisations in their study of 
decision-making in a small German town.
There is no fully developed theory of the relationship 
between network variables and the behaviour of orga­
nisations, although some findings have been reported 
suggesting how the relationship may work. Hanf and 
Scharpf (1978) attribute the failure of modern 
governments to perform effectively, efficiently and 
responsively among other things to low network 
density. Christenson and Sachs (1980) demonstrate a 
negative relationship between public perceptions of 
service quality and the number of administrative 
units per capita which is an indicator of network 
size.
INTERDEPENDENCE
The assumption which underlies the great majority of 
writings on organisations is that the natural state of 
organisations is independence. A central question 
which is addressed, by studies of interorganisational
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relationships is the nature of interdependence which 
exists among organisations. The dominant theory which 
has been used to explain the phenomenon of inter­
organisational relationships has been resource 
dependence supporting the notion that the essence of 
interorganisational activity is exchange.
Levine and White (1961) in a study of community health 
organisations identified a number of resources, both 
human and physical, which were essential for such 
organisations to achieve their goals. Since these 
resources were always in limited supply, organisations 
had to take steps to procure them from other agencies 
to fill the deficit available in the external environ­
ment. Hence the need for resources gave rise to 
interaction with other organisations and interde­
pendence among them.
Resource dependence and exchange have remained 
dominant concepts for understanding inter­
organisational interdependence and activity although 
they have been considerably refined and reworked. The 
definition of resources has been widened to include 
intangible elements such as information. Benson
(1975) singled out money and authority as the two 
basic types of resources sought and traded in 
interorganisational networks.
The need for resources is seen to be exacerbated by 
various environmental and organisational factors and 
thus to vary in intensity. Aiken and Hage (1968) 
found a relationship between an organisation^ 
innovativeness and joint programmes. Aldrich (1975) 
also notes that the tendency for organisations to 
specialise in a society where the division of labour 
is strongly ’ developed creates the need for 
relationships among organisations with related tasks.
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Intergovernmental relations posits a different kind of 
interdependence between governmental units. This 
interdependence is based on the distribution of powers 
between levels of government. Wright (1978) suggests 
three models of IGR based on separated, inclusive and 
overlapping patterns of power distribution.
Leach and Moore (1979a identified hierachical and 
functional interdependence where powers are delegated 
or shared. In a study of relationships between 
counties and districts they describe three forms of 
structural inter-relationship: dependence on common 
resources? hierarchical dependency such as agency 
arrangements or delegation of powers? and functional 
interdependency where power is shared. They
distinguish three types of function dependency - 
sequential (where one authority completes a task begun 
by another), pooled (where they both engage in the 
same task) and reciprocal (where tasks are passed back 
and forth between organisations) . White et al (1975) 
also describe a model of interdependence among health 
organisations co-ordinating their goals and activities 
in a rational way in response to knowledge of client 
need. The authors point out that this model is 
largely a prescriptive one promoted by policy makers 
rather than a descriptive model of actual behaviour, 
unless actively promoted by central government or 
other external forces.
Edstrom et al (1984) in a study of linkages between 
Swedish manufacturing companies found that the growth 
of joint developments was encouraged both by a need 
for resources and the need to manage uncertainty in 
the environment. Neither explanation could fully 
account for the emergence of joint working which in 
many cases relied on individual or idiosyncratic 
factors.
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PROCESSES
A number of theories have been advanced about the 
nature of the behaviour within interorganisational 
interaction. Four theories are reviewed briefly 
below: exchange, games, bargaining and negotiating, 
and partisan mutual adjustment. There is overlap 
between the last three but their roots are different.
Levine and White (1961) used exchange theory to 
explain the processes by which organisations obtained 
resources from each other. Exchange was entrenched in 
sociological theory as an explanation of interpersonal ' 
behaviour (Homans, 1958). Individuals expend effort 
in the pursuit of reward in their interaction with 
others. Like much sociological theory developed 
initially to explain individual actions, exchange 
theory was extended to collective behaviour and the 
actions of organisations (Blau, 1964).
Cook (1977) criticises the tendency of some 
interorganisational theorists to view exchange as 
synonymous with interaction. She argues that only 
those voluntary relationships where resources are 
transferred between organisations for mutual benefit 
should be considered exchange.
The transfer of resources to meet organisational needs 
implies the possibility of a market. In theory a 
perfect market could exist for the supply of needed 
resources to an organisation by other organisations.
In practice markets are more likely to be monopolistic 
or oligopolistic. Organisations will therefore 
exhibit market-induced behaviours in attempting to 
secure essential resources.
Cook (1977) also points out that resources and power
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are intimately connected. Any organisation upon which 
others depend for resources is able to wield power. 
A powerful organisation is able to alter the terms of 
trade in its own favour. In doing this it becomes 
dependent on others continuing to accept its terms. 
Two conclusions can be drawn. One, that organisations 
will direct their attention to managing dependence as 
much as to transferring resources. Second, although 
power will not be distributed equally long-term 
stability in the network will generally be achieved.
Benson(1975) takes exchange theory a stage further. 
Organisations seek money and authority. The political 
economy through which they are distributed defines the 
interorganisational network. The political economy 
operates at a fundamental level underpinning everyday 
activity directed towards the performance of tasks. 
Benson suggests that organisational decision-makers 
will pursue goals such as the fulfilment of programme 
requirements? the maintenance of a clear domain of 
high social importance? the maintenance of orderly, 
reliable patterns of resource flow, and the extended 
application and defence of the agency's paradigm. 
Organisations define the power which allows them to 
pursue these goals either from the wider society or by 
their position in the network and their ability to 
meet other organisations' need (i.e. exchange). In 
Benson's model goals are pursued by selecting 
appropriate strategies and tactics from a repertoire 
available to the organisations in question.
Within interorganisational studies a modified form of 
exchange theory is still dominant as a model of 
interorganisational processes. Its value in analysing 
voluntary relationships is to highlight the importance 
of rewards. Relationships are unlikely to prosper 
unless both sides find them rewarding and rewards
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outweigh costs.
An alternative theory of the processes of 
interorganisational relationships is based on the 
notion of games. Crozier and Thoenig (1976) used game 
concepts to explain relationships within French local 
government. They identified a system which was 
fragmented, lacked co-operation and communication, was 
driven by rivalry and conflict and resisted attempts 
a formal co-ordination. The local governmental system 
was neither liberating nor efficient yet it was highly 
stable. The degree of stability in the system led 
them to postulate a substructure of bargaining, 
negotiating and game-playing which allowed individuals 
within the system to pursue their own objectives and 
manage their mutual dependence. The system was held 
together by a number of decision-makers who occupied 
key positions and mediated amongst others in the 
network. It was in the interest of everyone in the 
network to maintain the system because its 
substructural nature allowed individuals to have 
autonomy without public visibility or accountability.
Crozier and Thoenig add further insights on the nature 
of the game-playing process. First, games cannot be 
played independently by a few participants in that 
work. Games are always played collectively. Second, 
an individual is obliged to play several games 
simultaneously. Individuals play the game rationally, 
calculating the probability of gains and losses. 
However, multiple roles and imperfect knowledge imply 
that individuals will act irrationally much of the 
time.
Explanations based on games have not dominated 
intergrganisational studies to the extent that 
exchange theory has done. One of the contributions of
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game-based explanation is to offer a tool which can be 
used to uncover the complex informal relationships 
which exist in a fragmented and formally unco­
ordinated system. The difficulty of the method is 
epistemological: when everyone is simultaneously
playing multiple games how is it possible to derive an 
objective account of what is happening?
The concept of games has also played an important role 
in intergovernmental relations research. Wright
(1978) in a study of IGR in the United States 
identified a model of overlapping relations of great 
complexity and diversity. Bargaining, negotiation and 
exchange were all observed within the system. The 
process tended to run along a number of well-worn 
paths and to follow certain rules. These rules or 
game strategies are learned by officials for use 
generally or in particular situations. Parts of the 
process are also ritualised into games by the 
officials and politicians who play them. The success 
with which such games are played is seen to be related 
to a player's structural position and personal skills.
Simeon (1972) in his study ofK IGR in Canada 
identifies a process of goal-directed behaviour by 
officials and politicians which encompasses bargaining 
and negotiation. He likens the process to
international relations where there is conflict 
between the parties on many issues but agreement on 
certain overall goals, the need of compromise and co­
operation and the means by which disputes are handled. 
The goals adopted by participants in the IGR process 
are shaped by environmental factors (socio-economic 
and structural)? the institutional and cultural 
framework? and the demands and problems facing the 
system and thQ personal aspirations, style and role 
conceptions of those involved. In operating the
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system decision-makers must adopt strategies and 
tactics which allow them to negotiate on several 
fronts simultaneously. To act in this way
participants must make calculations about the 
behaviour of others. The complexity of the system in 
which they operate requires participants to simplify 
their calculations and assumptions. Simplification is 
achieved by making explicit rules and norms for 
behaviour in IGR, by taking certain goals as fixed and 
by concentrating on change at the margins. Simeon 
rejects the simple rules of operation identified by 
IGR studies of budgetary games such as Wright (1978), 
as inappropriate in a highly complex policy-based 
relationship among governmental units.
As IGR studies have moved from a constitutional and 
legal focus to one concerned with behaviour, they have 
identified in detail the political processes involved 
in relationships. The dominant processes in models 
of IGR are bargaining and negotiation undertaken by 
powerful individuals who pursue a mixture of personal 
and organisational goals. The pursuit of such goals 
can lead both to interaction and a lack of interaction 
between authorities. Unlike exchange theory, theories 
of interaction based on games, negotiation and 
bargaining suggest that lack of activity is as 
meaningful as activity.
Bargaining and negotiation are amongst the strategies 
which Lindblom (1965) identifies as partisan mutual 
adjustment. He constructs a model of decision making 
in which individual decision-makers pursue their own 
goals in the absence of centrally imposed co­
ordination. Each decision-maker must adjust to others 
with whom he is interdependent. He may either adapt 
to the actions of others or attempt to force others to 
adapt to him. The process of adjustment is rational
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and provides an efficient means of co-ordinating the 
actions of disparate decision-makers.
Conclusion
A wide range of empirical and theoretical works has 
been reviewed. There is no defined body of theory on 
horizontal IGR. It is necessary, therefore, to seek 
explanations of the relationships between public 
authorities, from a variety of disciplines.
In common with similar phenomena such as vertical IGR, 
explanations are available at three different levels. 
Among macro-theories of political phenomena aspects of 
pluralistic, elite and marxist theory are useful in 
understanding why the structures of governance are 
fragmented yet remain coherent. New-right theories 
help understand current central government attitudes 
towards the pattern of local public-service provision. 
Middle-level theories of interorganisational studies 
provide explanations of the nature of interdependence, 
the networks that exist among inter-related 
organisations and the processes which occur in 
intergovernmental relations. .They also provide 
explanations of the role of the environment in shaping 
organisational and interorganisational behaviour. 
Intergovernmental theories and theories based on games 
provide explanations of the behaviour of decision­
makers in relation to other authorities.
As with theories at the macro-level, there are a 
number of competing perspectives at the middle and 
micro levels. Previous studies have demonstrated the 
need for a synthesis of competing theories in 
understanding public service organisations which 
differ from both commercial organisations and pure 
government bodies (Knoke, 1990).
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CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND METHODS USED IN THE
STUDY
THE MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS USED IN 
DESIGNING THE STUDY
The starting point for this thesis was an earlier 
study financed by the ESRC on the relationships 
between counties and districts in urban areas of 
England undertaken by the researcher and various 
colleagues (Stewart et al. 1984; Leach et al, 1987). 
The main aim of that study was to explain variations 
in the quality of inter-tier relationships, in 
particular the incidence of conflict between counties 
and districts. It used a model which incorporated a 
set of factors derived from previous research in 
organisation studies (see Figure 3). Leach and Moore
(1979) had developed a framework for explaining inter­
authority relationships the land-use planning. The 
model used in the county-district relations study 
drew extensively on this earlier work. The latter 
framework is discussed in Hinings et al (1982). In 
the county-district study the classification of 
patterns of interdependence between authorities drew 
on the work of Thompson (1967), Williamson (1975) and 
Hall et al (1977). The game approach of Crozier and 
Thoenig (1976) and the political economy approach of 
Benson (1975) influenced the view taken of the use of 
strategies in intergovernmental relations. Young 
(1976) was a key source of ideas about officers' and 
members' values.
The work on county-district relationships was based on 
extensive semi-structured interviews with politicians 
and officials in thirteen authorities in London, the 
West Midlands and Lancashire. The conclusions of the 
study were that the model explained much of the
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variation in quality observed in relationships between 
tiers of local government. Some modifications of the 
orginal model were needed, however, to increase its 
explanatory power. Figure 4 shows the redrawn model 
incorporating organisational and contextual factors 
ommitted from the original model.
The revised model developed in the work on 
county-district relationships was adopted in the 
research reported here on relationships between local 
authorities and other public authorities. Many 
respondents in the earlier study had described the 
other tier of local government as just another public 
authority they had to deal with and drew parallels and 
comparisons between relating to the upper or lower 
tier of local government and relating to the health 
authority or the water authority. In the model, 
relationships are determined by the interplay of 
professional and political attitudes and the 
opportunities and obligations which are set by the 
context in which they operate. This context comprises 
the constitutional and organisational structure of 
the authorities themselves, the issues and tasks 
emanating from particular communities, and the wider 
social, economic and political environment.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The size of the research team involved in the earlier 
research made it possible to look at ten different 
pairs of relationships across the full range of local 
government activity in three different parts of the 
country. The team had also been able to draw on the 
data collected in two national surveys of 
county-district relations to broaden the data base. 
Apart, from siz.e there were other differences between 
the two studies. The main interest in the
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FIGURE 4: Revised model of the Determinants of the
Quality of Countv-District Relationships
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county-district study had been in the extent to which 
obligatory relationships about tasks for which 
repsonsibility was divided betweeen the tiers were 
co-operative or conflictual. In the wider network 
there are few instances where responsibility for a 
particular service is split between authorities and 
few instances where the establishment of 
relationships is obligatory.
The approach taken, therefore^in the research reported 
here, was to use the model developed to explain the 
quality of county/district relationships as a 
framework with which to explore relationships between 
local authorities and other public authorities. The 
methodology employed in the Camden study was a 
function of the implications of the design chosen and 
the limits imposed by the capacity of a lone 
researcher. The study was centred on the public 
authority network in a particular geographical area. 
It was a qualitative study based on semi-structured 
interviews with a wide range of decision makers.
THE SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH LOCATION
The area chosen for research was the London Borough 
of Camden. Camden fulfilled a number of pragmatic and 
design requirements. It was within easy access of the 
researcher's home and workplace. Good contacts 
existed between the researcher's workplace and both 
the local authority and other key public authorities 
relevant to the study, which facilitated access.
It was felt important to select an area with higher 
rather than lower levels of interdependence within the 
public-authority network. Interdependence is the basis 
upon which relationships develop. It was assumed that 
the greater the levels of interdependence in the
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network the more likely it was that intergovernmental 
relations would be a topic of concern to decision­
makers. Respondents working in a highly interdependent 
network would be able to articulate views that shed 
light on the factors that shape the local authority's 
role in that network.
A number of features of the Camden area suggested that 
interdependence there would be relatively high. 
First,it was an inner London borough where the 
education service was provided by a separate 
authority, the Inner London Education Authority. Many 
relationships which elsewhere would be 
intra-authority, for example between education and 
leisure services, in Camden were inter-authority. 
Second, parts of the Borough were characterised by 
high levels of social need and intractable social 
problems of poverty, deprivation and unsocial 
behaviour beyond the scope of any one authority's 
actions. Third, Camden was a completely urbanised 
area within the dense urbanisation of the inner part 
of the conurbation. Public authorities operate in 
close proximity to each other and compete for land 
and labour and other resources. Levine and White 
(1961) argued that welfare organisations were obliged 
to enter forms of exchange in order to satisfy from 
each other their demands for resources and clients. 
Benson (1975) developed this notion further into the 
concept of a political economy operating between 
public authorities in which two scarce resources, 
money and autonomy, are traded.
Other features of Camden suggested it was an area 
where interdependence was likely to be an issue of 
concern to public-sector decision makers. The Borough 
was a Left-dominated authority characterised by 
high-spending and a set of radical policies aimed at
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major social change. Such an authority might have 
been expected to take a greater than normal interest 
in the work of other public authorities and to be 
externally oriented. On the other hand it was 
recognised that the political complexion of the local 
authority might be a barrier to other public 
authorities wishing to develop relationships with the 
local council.
Second, resource scarcity may predispose organisations 
to collaborate. The notion of resource dependency 
which underpins much writing on inter-organisational 
networks suggests that both scarcity of material 
resources and desire for growth in a period of 
static resources can generate interaction. However, 
since the price of securing material resources from 
other organisations is an undesired loss of autonomy, 
authorities may be expected to compete fiercely for 
extra funding or squabble among themselves for 
existing resources. Gamm et al (1984) summarise the 
impact of falling resources on interorganisational 
structures. They suggest that joint approaches in 
adverse conditions are only possible where there is 
a history of prior positive linkages. Aiken and Hage 
(1968) have pointed out that inter-authority 
relationships carry costs for the participating 
authorities and are feasible only for organisations 
with spare capacity. Although Camden Council had a 
high rate base and a tradition of high spending it 
had also been under severe resource pressure from 
grant penalties and rate-capping. Other local public 
authorities, such as Bloomsbury Health Authority, had 
been under similar financial pressure.
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THE SELECTION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES FOR INCLUSION IN 
THE STUDY
The main focus of the research was on the role of the 
local authority within the public authority network 
rather than on the network as a whole. An 
"organisational set" approach was therefore adopted 
to selecting authorities for inclusion in the study. 
The concept of an organisational set was developed by 
Evan (1966) from sociological concepts of role 
applied to organisations using a systems-analysis 
perspective. The local authority was designated as 
the focal organisation and the source of identifying 
the relevant organisational set. Initial contact was 
with the Chief Executive's department through which an 
approach was made to 12 departments and sections of 
the council. The list of departments and sections 
is shown in Figure 5. A positive response was 
eventually received from all departments approached.
FIGURE 5 Departments and sections of Camden Borough 
Council included in the Study
DEPARTMENTS
Baths and Recreation
Chief Executive's
Engineering
Finance
Housing
Libraries and Arts 
Planning and Communications 
Social Services 
Works
DEPARTMENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Architecture and Surveying 
Building
Environmental Health
SPECIAL UNITS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Civil Rights Unit 
Economic Development Unit 
Welfare Rights Unit
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Interviewees were invited to list the public 
authorities to which the work of their department 
related, regardless of whether interaction existed. 
These lists were then combined to create a set of 
public authorities which might be included in the 
study. Voluntary bodies and private-sector
organisations were excluded where they were 
mentioned. For example a number of respondents 
referred to the Citizens' Advice Bureau as a public 
authority. British Telecom, despite its recent 
privatisation, was also referred to as a public 
authority.
A large number of public authorities was mentioned 
including nationalised industries, single-purpose 
authorities such as health authorities, London 
Regional Transport and the police, QUANGOS and 
government departments. The list was too long and 
criteria had to be developed to select those 
authorities to be included in the study.
The first criterion used was that authorities had to 
operate within the London Borough of Camden. On this 
basis adjacent boroughs and other local authorities 
were excluded. Second, authorities whose relationship 
with the local authority was based on supervision 
rather than direct provision of services in a common 
geographical area were excluded. On this basis 
Government departments were excluded with the 
exception of the benefit side of the DHSS which has 
a network of local offices providing basic services 
to the public. Other organisations which did not 
provide a direct service to the public were also 
excluded. Under this criterion the local authority 
associations and some of the voluntary joint 
arrangements which succeeded the GLC were excluded. 
This reduction left a list comprising service-
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providing public authorities operating within the 
geographical area of Camden.
The list was still very long. The next criterion to be 
applied was that similar organisations existed 
elsewhere. Under this criterion the British Museum 
was exluded as an organisation unique to that 
geographical area. The significance of the 
interdependence with the local authority was also 
considered. For example, the Countryside Commission 
which has very limited interdependence with the 
London Borough of Camden was excluded. The sample 
thus became focussed on service-providing authorities, 
similar to those that might be found in other parts of 
the country, which not only operated within the 
Camden area but had significant interdependence with 
the local authority.
THE POSITION OF THE GLC
When the research began in the autumn of 1985 the 
Greater London Council was still in existence. 
However, the authority was in the process of winding 
down in anticipation of its abolition on March 31st 
1986. Contact was made with the authority but it did 
not prove possible to undertake any systematic 
interviewing of officers or members during this 
period. This loss was not to prove unduly serious 
for the study as the researcher was able to draw on 
a set of interviews conducted relatively recently at 
the GLC as part of the earlier study of two-tier 
relationships in local government. These interviews 
had been carried out in a wide range of departments 
of the Greater London Council, Tower Hamlets, Brent, 
Barnet and Harrow. The author did all the interviews 
personally in Brent and Barnet, and approxminately 
half the interviews in Harrow and the Greater London
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Council. The main deficiency in these interviews was 
that they focussed on county-district relationships 
and did not look at relationships between the GLC and 
other public authorities.
The question then arose of which, if any, of the 
successor bodies should be included in the study. Two 
sorts of successsor bodies existed in London. The 
first may be termed the official bodies, proposed in 
the legislation. The second comprised unofficial, 
voluntary arrangements, primarily supported by groups 
of Labour Boroughs which attempted to preserve a 
number of roles developed by the GLC that central 
government did not recognise as legitimate (see 
Hebbert and Travers, 1988). The latter successor 
bodies were excluded. A distinction can also be made 
between joint boards which are freestanding bodies 
nominated by a number of local authorities and joint 
committees which are appendages of the authorities 
involved (Flynn and Leach, 1984). The former have 
been regarded as public authorities and included in 
the study? the latter have been regarded as 
co-ordinative mechanisms and extensions of the local 
authority.
The abolition of the GLC did not constitute a clean 
change in the public authority network. When the GLC 
ceased to exist many of its functions remained to be 
allocated and were lodged temporarily with the London 
Residuary Body. Some of the successor bodies proved 
difficult to establish. Instability in those parts of 
the network affected by the abolition of the GLC may 
have had an impact on the accuracy of some of the 
descriptions of linkages reported below, but it also 
introduced a dynamic variable into the study to be 
examined in its own right.
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GAINING ACCESS TO THE SELECTED AUTHORITIES
The list of public authorities finally included in the 
study is shown in Figure 6.
Gaining access to the selected authorities proved to 
be relatively easy. Interviews were eventually 
arranged in all but three authorities. The reasons 
for failure varied: North Thames Gas, in its
pre-privatisation phase replied that, "It is not the 
policy of British Gas North Thames to supply 
information for the type of research you request. In 
particular we do not answer questions which in any
FIGURE 6 Organisations included in the Study
Arts Council*
Bloomsbury Health Authority 
British Rail 
British Waterways Board 
Camden Council
Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee 
Crown Estate
Department of Health and Social Security (Benefits 
Section)
Hampstead Health Authority 
Inner London Education Authority 
Inner London Probation Service*
London Ambulance Service
London Electricity Board
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
London Regional Transport
London Residuary Body
Manpower Services Commission
Metropolitan Police
North Thames Gas*
Sports Council 
Thames Water
Westminster City Council**
Organisations declining to take part in the study
included to check possible bias in selecting a 
single local authority. Not included in the 
report.
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way relate to politics.” The Inner London 
Probabation Service sent a pro-forma requesting 
details of the research for internal vetting but never 
gave permission for interviews. Finally, Greater 
London Arts never responded to repeated attempts to 
make contact.
THE SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS
The study looked at the problems and opportunities of 
interauthority collaboration through the eyes of 
senior management. They were not necessarily the 
operating level but were chosen as the place where 
strategic and policy decisions would be taken 
affecting the ability of those at the operating level 
to develop constructive relationships.
In the local authority approaches were made to chief 
officers and their deputies, certain departmental and 
sectional heads, and elected members. Advice was 
sought from the Chief Executive's Department on the 
most appropriate persons to approach, and the Chief 
Executive, in agreement with the Leader of the 
Council, gave the research the council's backing. 
There was no evidence that access to' the authority 
was in any way constrained.
With the other public authorities an initial approach 
was generally made to the chief executive or the most 
senior regional or area manager responsible for the 
Camden area. Organisations frequently passed requests 
down to the appropriate level. The letter sent to 
public authorities indicated that interviews in the 
local authority had been at chief officer and member 
level, thus suggesting the sort of level that would 
be appropriate. The larger organisations generally 
suggested a number of people who should be contacted;
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occasionally they offered to set up the interviews. 
Again there was no evidence that access to the 
organisations was anywhere being restricted although 
it was obvious that some discussions were franker 
than others.
The numbers of persons interviewed in each 
organisation varied. The research was not designed to 
compare organisations but rather to examine attitudes 
and behaviour across the network of organisations 
with which the local authority interacted. The 
intention was to include a senior manager from each 
main division of a public authority' which might 
interact with the local authority and, where 
appropriate, other senior general managers and 
authority/board members. The list of persons 
interviewed, 73 in all, is to be found in Appendix 1.
Among officers of the local authority and other public 
authorities the response to requests for interviews 
was very high. Among elected and appointed members of 
authorities the response was not so good. Some 
refused outright, others never agreed appointments, 
and some, having made appointments, failed to turn 
up. Several leading councillors in Camden failed to 
keep appointments on more than one occasion without 
apology. Elected members are busy people but during 
the period of the study many of the councillors in 
Camden were unusually pressed. There were local 
elections in May 1986? the council was very active in 
opposing the abolition of the GLC and then in 
developing voluntary arrangements with other Labour 
Boroughs to continue various GLC roles? the council 
was in conflict with central government over its 
finances and had fallen foul of grant penalties and 
rate-qapping? .many of its services such as housing 
were under pressure and the council had adopted a
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package of radical commitments to equal
opportunities, decentralisation and socialist
policies? the authority had attracted considerable 
media attention for its supposed radicalism, alleged 
poor management and defiance of central government 
policies. Camden had its share of "scandals" such as 
the report on elderly peoples' homes undertaken as 
a response to health-service pressure which produced 
headlines in the local press and professional 
journals on the low levels of service that had been 
discovered. Finally, political activity from inside 
the majority party and supporting groups in the 
community posed a continuing threat to the 
established leadership. Members therefore had little 
time to spare for interviews and were at times 
embarrassed at their failings when their rhetoric had 
promised much.
THE INTERVIEWS
The study was based on semi-structured interviews. 
The interviews took the form of discussions on a 
pre-set list of topics primarily derived from the 
model described above. The main headings were as 
follows:
a. closeness of relationships with other 
authorities
b. inter-authority linkages
c. roles of officers and members in interaction
d. attitudes to interaction
e. gains sought from relationships with other 
authorities
f. means by which gains are pursued
g. relationships with other types of 
organisations
h. effectiveness of the public authority 
network
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i. changes in the public authority network 
j. changes desired in the network
Examples of the interview schedules used in discussion 
with officers and members are to be found in Appendix 
2.
When potential respondents were contacted they were 
sent a sheet outlining the research study, a copy of 
which is to be found in Appendix 3. Respondents 
were also asked if they would like to have in advance 
a list of the topics which the researcher wished to 
raise. Most respondents welcomed this ,list. They were 
able to give some thought to the issues raised before 
the discussions and also to obtain relevevant 
documents and data where they considered it 
appropriate. It also gave respondents the chance to 
query the assumptions behind the questions and to add 
items which they felt were relevant to the 
understanding of intergovernmental relations at the 
local level.
The majority of interviews lasted for between an hour 
and an hour and a half. A few were shorter; a few 
were substantially longer. Most discussions took 
place with individual respondents although in a few 
cases colleagues were interviewed together. Most 
respondents elected to work through the topics on the 
questionnaire more or less in order. Respondents were, 
however, encouraged to explore ideas as they emerged 
which often anticipated later topics as well as 
introducing new ones. Sometimes an important concept 
or idea emerged in an interview which was 
incorporated into subsequent discussions with other 
respondents. Partly as a result of this practice the 
emphasis of . interviews altered as the research 
progressed. Earlier interviews focussed more on
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discovering the mechanics of interaction while later 
interviews involved checking such descriptions, 
allowing a greater amount of time for discussing 
potentially explanatory concepts.
Comprehensive notes were taken during the interviews. 
Respondents were assured that the discussions were 
confidential. The decision was taken not to 
tape-record interviews. It was felt that respondents 
would be inhibited from expressing frank opinions by 
the use of a recorder. Recordings also pose the 
problem of transcription adding a costly intermediate 
stage to data collection. The notes from interviews 
were either rewritten, if they were difficult to 
read, or tidied and annotated in their original form. 
Some respondents asked to be sent copies of the notes 
taken to check them for accuracy, which was duly done. 
It was felt that to ask all respondents to check 
notes would have been desirable but an unwarranted 
imposition on their time. Almost everyone offered to 
give further help and assistance in answering 
specific queries which had not been covered, and a 
number of such offers were taken up.
The period over which the interviews were conducted
It was intended to complete the interviews as quickly 
as possible to reduce the variation from changing 
circumstance and events. They took place over a 
period of just less than eighteen months. The first 
interview was on 4th November 1985 and the last on 
7th April 1987. During this period the environment in 
which local councils and other public authorities were 
working was unstable and turbulent. There was also 
important organisational change in the network. Of 
particular significance were the abolition of the 
GLC, and the privatisation of British Gas.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The method of analysis chosen was in keeping with the 
notion of an exploratory and open-ended study. The 
essence of the method employed was to let the data 
speak for themselves. This approach is used in 
qualitative research which seeks to, "make the story 
readable without interpreting or changing the meaning 
of the subject's words" (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975, p 
122). However, unlike the classic qualitative study 
the prime object of research was not the individual 
and his autobiography. It was concerned with a 
particular aspect of respondents' views and experience 
and explicitly sought their opinion on issues which 
might not have emerged spontaneously. On the other 
hand the interviews allowed respondents considerable 
room to introduce new topics and ideas within the 
overall context of intergovernmental and inter- 
organisational arrangements.
The analysis of the data involved scanning them in 
three different ways. First, using the primary 
headings from the interview schedule, the interviews 
from each organisation were scanned to build up a 
picture for the organisation as a whole. Second, the 
interviews were scanned heading by heading to build 
up a picture for each factor across the range of 
authorities studied. Finally the full set of 
interviews was scanned for statements from
respondents about intergovernmental relations. These 
statements were used to generate new headings and to 
expand those used in the interviews.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
A common criticism made of the case study method is 
that it is not possible to generalise. Critics have
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argued that the conclusions drawn from a single 
instance may as easily emphasise what is unique about 
the subject studied as what is common to other 
instances (Bennett, 1986; Sommer and Sommer, 1980). 
Others, however, have argued that generalisations can 
be made by logical inference from cases that have 
been analysed with appropriate theoretical
frameworks. Logical inference about the relationships 
between variables does not depend upon 
representativeness of the sample studied but upon 
identifying a plausible process which can link the 
variables concerned (Mitchell, 1983). The requirement 
for logical inference in analysing data applies 
equally to sample and case study data. Thus while the 
case researcher may study a unique set of events 
analysis shifts the researcher's focus to processes 
which are widely distributed. For example, aspects of 
Camden's politics at the time of the research were 
both unusual and extreme. However, the political 
processes and behaviour associated with the local 
authority, elected members, and the local party 
apparatus could have been observed almost anywhere.
Eckstein (1970) suggests that cases can be used in a 
variety of ways both to develop and test theory. He 
identifies five different ways in which a case may 
relate to theory. The way that the research on 
Camden has been used comes closest to Eckstein's idea 
of a disciplined-configurative study which seeks 
primarily to describe. The nature of such studies is 
that:
"The chain of enquiry in disciplined- 
conf igurative studies runs from comparatively 
tested theory to case interpretations and thence, 
perhaps, via ad hoc additions, newly discovered 
puzzles, and systematised prudence, to new 
candidate theories. Case study is thus tied to 
theoretical inquiry - but only partially, where 
theories apply or can be envisioned; passively,
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in the main, as a receptacle for putting theories 
to work? and fortuitously as a catalytic element 
in the unfolding of theoretical knowledge." 
(Eckstein, 1970, p 100).
The Camden study used the theoretical framework 
developed in the county-district study and the body 
of theory on inter-organisational and inter- 
govenmental relations upon which it drew in a new 
environment with the expectation of adding to and 
refining those theories. By using logical rather than 
statistical inference to analyse the data the 
inherent limitations of the case-study method were 
implicitly recognised.
Users of the case method have pointed to the 
importance of identifying the context in which the 
case is located in order to ascertain the extent to 
which parallels may be drawn with other cases. Many 
contextual variables were incorporated in the 
research design because of the very open nature of the 
system being studied. In addition respondents were 
asked to compare Camden with any other local 
authorities with which they had relationships. 
Because of the complex web of boundaries that 
criss-cross boroughs such as Camden, many public 
authorities were in a position to offer this 
comparison. Some said that relationships with Camden 
were different, primarily because of the complexion 
of Camden's politics; others said that Camden was 
just another local authority or organisation that they 
had to deal with. A further check was undertaken 
through a small group of interviews conducted in 
Westminster, an adjacent authority with politics well 
to the right of centre. These interviews did not 
suggest that the conclusions emerging from the main 
body of interviews were in anyway distorted.
Two further issues arise about the robustness of the
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research design and methods. The first, which was 
apparent in the earlier county-district study, 
concerns the assumption of purposiveness in the 
behaviour of those involved in interauthority 
relationships. The research model assumes that actors 
recognise the context in which they are operating, 
consider the choices open to them and consciously 
choose particular lines of action. In 
intergovernmental relations at the local level the 
choice is frequently to do nothing. Inactivity could 
be interpreted as a form of non-decision making 
deliberately calculated to preserve the status quo and 
the autonomy of individual authorities (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970). It could also be interpreted as the 
outcome of overwork, unclear strategic purpose, lack 
of imagination and apathy.
The second point concerns the reliance of the study 
upon interview data. The study did not attempt to 
observe directly the workings of relationships 
between the local authority and other public 
authorities either by sitting in on meetings or by 
tracing the history of particular mechanisms or 
issues. Such complementary methods were employed in 
the county-district research. Almost without 
exception the results of applying these complementary 
methods were to amplify rather than contradict the 
results of the interviews. Inevitably respondents' in 
different authorities and in different positions in 
the same authority hold different opinions about the 
nature and interpretation of events. Given the nature 
of the Camden research and the status of the 
researcher, however, there is no reason to think that 
respondents would set out deliberately to deceive. 
The researcher presented herself as a lecturer in 
public sector management carrying out academic 
research which might be published but would not name
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respondents nor, without prior permission, 
authorities. Respondents might have wished to present 
a different version of events to a researcher working 
for central government or another organisation with 
a direct interest in the public authority network or 
if respondents' views were to have been attributed in 
publications.
Except for simple errors of fact through 
misremembering or lack of familiarity, respondents 
final statements on an issue were taken at face value 
and the different viewpoints these implied were noted 
and studied. It was seen as a matter of significance 
where a respondent was particularly ill-informed about 
issues or processes relating to his or her sphere of 
reponsibility. No importance however was attached to 
minor omissions which might be observed in the 
knowledge of any busy executive.
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CHAPTER 4 THE CONTEXT IN WHICH INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS WERE DEVELOPED
The aim of this chapter is to describe the background 
against which the intergovernmental relationships 
studied were developed. This description assists the 
reader to appreciate the character of the place and 
the organisations involved and to allow judgments to 
be made about the typicality and uniqueness of the 
setting in which the research was carried out. The 
description highlights features of the public 
authority network and of the communities it served 
which explain the pattern of intergovernmental 
relationships observed.
CAMDEN - THE PLACE
Urban Geography
Camden was an Inner London Borough situated on the 
northside of the river Thames (see Figure 7) . Its 
area was just under 22 square kilometres, small by 
London standards: all but seven Boroughs were larger. 
The largest, Bromley, was seven times larger. The 
average for an Inner London Borough, excluding the 
City of London, was, however, much less at 30 square 
kilometres. Camden extended further in a north-south 
direction than it did east-west. As a result it 
included parts of both the central business district 
and the outer suburban ring (Walker and Land, 1983).
Most of the built-up area of Camden was developed by 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Remaining 
sites, with the exception of the public open spaces 
of Regent*s Park and the land surrounding Hampstead 
Heath, were mostly infilled with development during 
the twentieth century. In the eighteenth century
113
8
R
£
V
r
FIGURE 7: MAP OF CAMDEN
KQv-ns*
TOVA/A/
t o v j m
n.cwo
ThCO^LD5_RO*P
I
MiUS
B M N B T .  —  *
• »
wesrAi/Aysre^
tSu^CfTOfs/
CflOSi/
/
nv/ £ *
C/TY o *  
OfiJtoofsj
TunmES
1 14
there was open land between the urban area south of 
the present Euston Road, and villages such as Camden 
Town and Kentish Town. Hampstead and Highgate were 
independent settlements well away from London itself. 
The coalescence of these separate settlements did not 
result in a single dominant centre. The varying 
geography and social history of these settlements 
had, however, contributed to a modern Borough of 
contrasts and distinctive neighbourhoods (Gray, 1987; 
Tindall, 1977? Thompson,1974).
Current estimates of the distribution of land-uses 
showed that just over 20% of land in Camden was in 
industrial use. The greater part of this land was in 
service use with manufacturing industry a small and 
declining percentage. The balance of services was also 
changing with shops declining and offices increasing. 
More than a quarter of the land in industrial use was 
occupied by railways and other transport-related 
uses. Railway use had been declining but was still an 
unusually important category of land-use. One third 
of the Borough was used for housing; most of the 
remainder was either open space or roads.
The Euston Road divided the Borough into two 
contrasting areas. To the south was concentrated 80% 
of the Borough's office space, considerable
concentrations of retailing and smaller 
concentrations of manufacturing. To the north of the 
Euston Road was to be found 90% of the domestic 
floorspace in the Borough and almost all Camden's 
public open space, the latter concentrated in the far 
north of the Borough. Shopping and commercial uses 
were concentrated round three centres, Camden 
Town/Kentish Town, Swiss Cottage and West 
Hampstead/Kilburn. Hampstead was a smaller, largely 
retail, centre. Residential areas varied greatly in
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density. In the far north of the Borough densities 
were less than 50 persons per hectare, with more than 
three times this level found around Kentish Town and 
Gospel Oak and the Eastern side of the Edgware Road.
Land prices in Camden were high and the Borough had 
experienced considerable pressure for development. 
The age and changing demand for non-domestic land had 
also created change in the Borough. Many major land 
of holders were public authorities such as British 
Rail and the National Health Service, both of whose 
requirements had been changing. What was said to be 
the biggest redevelopment project in London was 
currently being submitted for redundant railway land 
around King's Cross.
The Borough of Camden bordered five other local 
authorities. Many of the other public authorities had 
boundaries which extended into these neighbouring 
authorities and beyond. Although Camden's boundaries 
cut arbitrarily across neighbourhoods and commercial 
centres, the overall character of the neighbouring 
boroughs provided sharp contrasts with Camden. To 
the south were Westminster and the City of London, 
both of which were within the central business 
district, and contained high concentrations of 
commercial and public services. To the north was 
Barnet, a large and prosperous outer suburban Borough 
dominated by residential development with a number of 
local retail and commercial centres. To the East was 
Islington, a densely populated Inner London Borough 
with features of land use and economic development 
similar to Camden. To the West was Brent, a large 
suburban Borough, with significant areas of housing 
and social stress in the south, as well as racial 
tension.
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Population
The estimated resident population of Camden in 1987 
was 184,900 which put Camden on the small side for a 
London Borough. The average size of London Boroughs, 
excluding the City of London, was about 212,000. It 
was, however, closer to the average of 199,200 for an 
Inner London Borough. The long-term trend in 
Camden's population had been one of decline which had 
been almost continuous since the beginning of the 
century when the population was more than double its 
present level. However, from 1983 onwards the 
population increased each year so that by 1987 the 
resident population of the Borough was 3.2% greater 
than it had been in 1981.
The main reason for the growth in Camden's population 
was net migration, which was counter to the trend of 
net migration loss for London as a whole. Compared 
with other growth boroughs, Camden had a very low 
level of natural increase.
Camden's age structure had some unusual features for 
a London Borough. A higher percentage of Camden's 
population, both male and female, was in the (20-40 
years) age group than for Greater London as a whole. 
The opposite pattern applied to the 5-20 years age 
bands. Two thirds of the population was of working 
age. Within this group there was a noticeable bulge 
in the younger age bands, that is those aged under 
30, with the biggest bulge in the 20 to 25 years 
group: 13% of Camden's population fell in this band 
compared with 9% of the population of Greater London. 
It was estimated that fewer than half of the young 
adults in this age group worked; the remainder were 
students or unemployed.
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One in six of Camden"s residents was over retirement 
age. In line with national trends, a majority of this 
group were female and many formed single-person 
households. In size the retired group was falling, 
but this decline masked increasing numbers of the very 
elderly who made a heavy demand on public authorities 
for support services. At the other end of the age 
scale Camden had fewer children and teenagers than a 
typical London Borough. In part this skewness was 
because of the nature of the young adult population 
who were not looking to establish families and 
because of the tendency for families to move out of 
Camden once children were born. Two features of the 
population in this age-group were significant for 
local services. One is that there was a substantial 
and increasing number of single-parent families? 
second that the fertility of Camden women had 
increased resulting in an appreciable increase in 
under-fives.
Camden had a substantial population drawn from 
minority ethnic groups. At the 1981 census one in ten 
households was headed by someone from the New 
Commonwealth or Pakistan. Maternity statistics for 
1985 show that 45% of the births in Camden were to 
women born outside the United Kingdom. The main 
origins of these women were Ireland and Bangladesh.
None of these population figures fully reflected two 
other groups which had a significant impact on local 
services. First, there was a very high turnover 
amongst young adults within which there were groups of 
highly mobile and transient individuals and the 
homeless. Second, the daytime population of Camden 
was two thirds as much again as the resident 
populjation, reflecting the large numbers of commuters 
drawn into the Borough. Furthermore, on average 5000
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visitors stayed in the Borough each night. The figure 
of 184,900 as the population to be served grossly 
underestimated the demand for public services in 
Camden.
Employment
Employment in Camden was on a scale far greater than 
could be supported by the local population. In 1981 
there were jobs for 213,000 employees, more than the 
total population of the Borough. Fewer than a fifth 
of these jobs were in production and construction. 
More than a half were in business and personal 
services, the remainder in office-based services. In 
line with regional and national trends, there had 
been a marked tendency for manufacturing employment 
to decline and service-employment to increase.
The largest employers in Camden were almost entirely 
in the public sector. They included London 
University, the Post Office, Camden Council, British 
Rail, the National Health Service, the Inner London 
-Education Authority and Government Departments. In 
contrast the private sector included large numbers of 
small businesses and small employment locations of 
larger businesses.
Camden had an economically active population of about 
90,000, over 70% of those in the 16-60/65 age group. 
The workforce was growing through in-migration and 
increasing rates of female participation.
Unemployment, measured by benefit claims, was around 
14% in the mid-80s, though estimated by Camden Council 
to be nearer 17%. The overall figure concealed 
differences between neighbourhoods. In the worst 
area,, King's Cross, male unemployment in mid-1987 was 
36%. The overall trend in unemployment had been
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downwards, mirroring regional and national trends. The 
numbers of long term unemployed had, however, been 
rising.
About half of Camden*s residents in work were employed 
within the Borough. Fewer than one job in five in 
Camden was filled by a Camden resident and the trend 
had been downwards. The public sector employed 
higher proportions of local residents than the 
private sector. Local residents made up less than 5% 
of the workforce in offices situated in the central 
business district.
Three quarters of Camden residents in employment were 
in non-manual jobs. About a half of them were in 
management and professional jobs: the other half was 
split evenly between clerical and service jobs, such 
as cleaning, sales and catering. Camden was a 
relatively high-pay area. Earnings for both manual 
and non-manual employees were significantly above the 
national average and up to 5% greater than the 
average for Greater London (Walker, 1987).
Social Characteristics
Camden scored above the national average on most 
indicators of urban deprivation (Audit Commission, 
1985). In relation to housing, Camden had problems 
of overcrowding and lack of amenities. The 1981 
census showed nearly 6% of households living at a 
density of more than one person per room. Nearly 12% 
of households lacked exclusive use of a bath and 
indoor toilet. Camden had a significant homeless 
problem. At the end of 1986 there were 1800 homeless 
families for whom Camden had a statutory respon­
sibility. The pumber of homeless families exceeded the 
number of vacant properties within the local authority
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housing stock, and it was growing. In addition there 
were a large number of homeless people in the Borough 
for whom Camden did not have a statutory respon­
sibility, for example, because of connections with 
other localities.
Social stress was evident in the Borough. Nearly 7% 
of households consisted of a single-parent family. Of 
even greater significance were the very large number, 
nearing one in six of all households, which contained 
a pensioner living alone. Other indicators of social 
and economic stress were the presence of significant 
numbers of families drawn from ethnic minorities, and 
the level of unemployment.
Some of Camden's social problems stemed from its 
metropolitan location. The main railway termini which 
brought so many of the commuters into the Brough also 
brought people, often young, who had left home to 
seek a new life in London. Vice was a problem in the 
south east of the Borough, around King's Cross, a 
centre for both prostitution and drugs.
Camden also had a different aspect. Parts of the 
Borough were unquestionably affluent. Some areas, 
such as Hampstead, had had a long tradition of high 
social status; others were newly gentrified, such as 
parts of Camden Town. Residents of these areas had 
high expectations of the services they were offered 
and at times were fiercely protectionist of their 
neighbourhoods.
"Hampstead is 48% social classes 1 and 2 and has
82 resident M.P's. There is a very high
proportion of very demanding articulate people."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority’.)
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CAMDEN - THE LOCAL AUTHORITY
Organisational History
Camden Council came into being in 1965 when local 
government in London was reorganised. Camden was 
formed by the amalgamation of three of the Metro­
politan Boroughs (Wistrich, 1972), Hampstead, 
St.Pancras and Holborn. These authorities dated back 
to the London Government Act of 1899 which 
established the London County Council and the Metro­
politan Boroughs. Although the three Boroughs had 
differed greatly, two decades after their demise 
their separate organisational and political identities 
had been subsumed by the new Borough ofCamden. Not 
one person referred to the pre-Camden system when 
discussing intergovernmental relationships.
In the intervening years since its establishment, a 
number of changes in the local government system have 
affected Camden. In 1974, when local government 
outside London was reorganised, responsibility for 
community health services was transferred to the 
newly established health authorities and local 
authority water responsibilities were transferred to 
the regional water authorities. Older staff in the 
local authority and the health and water authorities 
had experience of the transferred functions as local 
authority services.
The eighties was a period of flux in the public sector 
with reorganisation occurring within almost every 
policy. Some of these changes directly affected the 
local authority. Camden, like other London Boroughs, 
received new powers and responsibilties in planning, 
highways and recreation when the Greater London 
Council was dismantled in 1986. Other GLC
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responsibilties were distributed elsewhere in the 
public-authority network. Camden, along with a number 
of other, mostly Labour, Boroughs formed new 
interauthority groupings to take on various 
discretionary activities which the GLC had pursued. 
Camden played a lead role both in establishing and 
running these interauthority groupings, and was an 
active member of the Association of London Authorities 
which represented Labour Boroughs.
Organisational Structure
Camden Council was by any measure a large organi­
sation. In 1985/6 it had a revenue budget of over 323 
million pounds and a capital budget of nearly 68 
million pounds. It had the equivalent of 7,783 
full-time staff and employed 8,223 people (London 
Borough of Camden, 1986).
The operations of the local authority were carried out 
by departments which were answerable to a system of 
committees of the Council. The departmental 
structure is shown on Figure 8. Departments varied 
in size: the largest, Social Services, was eighty 
times greater in staffing than the smallest, 
engineers. The dominance of Social Services was such 
that one in three Camden employees worked for the 
department. Another important feature of the overall 
structure was the large size of the Chief Executive's 
department.
Almost one in eight Camden employees worked in the 
Chief Executive's department. The size of the 
department reflected the inclusion within it of all 
central management and support services except 
finance. It also reflected the location of a number 
of special policy units - race, women, police,
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Figure 8; DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CAMDEN COUNCIL
DEPARTMENT % TOTAL EMPLOYEES
(1984)*
Architecture and Surveying 3
Baths and Recreation 2
Building 8
Engineers . 5
Chief Executive 14
Environmental Health and Consumer Services 2
Finance 4
Housing 12
Libraries and Arts 5
Planning and Communications 2
Social Services 32
Works 16
♦Source = London Borough of Camden (1984) Figures 
rounded.
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economic development, decentralisation and co­
ordination. However, sheer size of department is not 
necessarily reflective of power or influence. Camden 
was universally described as an authority with a weak 
centre where power was located at the departmental 
level.
”No strong centre is possible in Camden.”
(Chair, Women*s Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
"There is no ethos that says the Chief 
Executive's Department should be taking a lead.”
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
The Chief Officers' Board was an advisory and 
consultative body with no real power. Lack of power 
in turn gave rise to a lack of coordination between 
different departments which at times pursued policies 
at odds with each pther and with the council' s overall 
priorities. Camden was seen to lack corporate identity 
because of the strength of departmentalism and to 
lack clear overall objectives.
"Camden needs more coordination in its approach 
and needs to be more sure of its aims."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
The Committee structure of Camden is shown on Figure 
9. Two striking features of the structure are 
evident. First (not visible in the figure) is the 
number - over one hundred - of committees and other 
member groups, such as sub-committees, panels, 
working parties, liaison groups and steering 
committees. Second is the structural mismatch between 
the committee structure and the departmental
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FIGURE 9 COMMITTEE STRUCTURE OF CAMDEN COUNCIL
COMMITTEE X Total 
revenue 
Budget 
1985/86
Main subcommittees Departments reporting to Committee Main areas of responsibility
Building, Works and Service 13.0 Building
works
Chief Executive (part) 
Environmental Health (part)
Highway maintenance. Markets, Cleansing, 
Street Lighting, Conveniences, 
Cemeteries, Mortuary, Coroners 
Court,Civil Defence, Catering, Vehicle 
Maintenance
Employment 1.0 " Chief Executive (part) 
Environmental Health (part)
Economics Development 
Health and Safety, Pollution, Food 
Safety, Post Control, Infectious 
di seases
Housing Development 
Housing Management
42.0 Private sector sub-committee Housing Environmental Health 
(part)
Chief Executive (part), 
Architecture and Surveying (part)
House building. Housing maintenance and 
management, Housing Benefit, Mortgages
Leisure 6.0 • Baths and Recreation, Libraries 
and Arts
Libraries, Arts, Play centres, Parks, 
Allotments, Swimming Pools, Sports 
FaciIities.
Planning and Communications
2.0 Development Control Planning and Communications Local land use planning. Building 
control, traffic management and parking 
safety
Race and Community Relations 0.2 - Chief Executive (part) Race relations, monitoring of services 
for ethnic minorities
12
6
Committee X total 
revenue 
Budget 
1985/6
Main sub-committees Departments Reporting to committee Main areas of 
responsibility
Social Services 12.0 Health Social Services Residential Care, Field 
Social Work, Non­
resident ial centres and 
facilities
staff and management 12.0 Architecture and surverying (part) 
Finance, Chief Executive (part)
Personnel,
accommodation, office 
services, equipment, 
computing, legal 
services, committee 
services
Womens 0.3 - Chief Executive (part) Women, monitoring of 
services for women
Policy and Resources 11.0 Policy advisory police, 
grants, Kilbum sub-c, Kings 
cross sub-c, Camden sub-c
Chief Executive (part). Planning 
and Communications, Finance
Policy and Finance, 
Police monitoring, civic 
services. Registration, 
Redevlopment, 
Decentralisation, Grants 
to voluntary Bodies, 
Public Relations,
Trading Standards
Source: London Borough Camden 1984; London Borough of Camden 1986.
structure. The most straightforward relationship was 
in Social Services. In some politically high profile 
areas full Council committees related to the work of 
individual sections of the Council, for example the 
Women*s Committee and the Women's Unit. Other 
committees were responsible for the work of part or 
all of several departments.
Camden, in common with a number of other 
Labour-controlled London Boroughs, had committed 
itself in its 1982 manifesto to a policy of 
decentralisation. Fourteen neighbourhood units had 
been designated to which a range of services were to 
be decentralised. However, the proposals had run into 
considerable difficulties and at the time of the 
research little was in place. Area committees existed 
for three parts of the Borough, Camden Town, King's 
Cross and Kilburn. Formally, the area committees were 
sub-committees of the Planning and Communications 
Committee. The Camden Town and King's Cross schemes 
were primarily concerned with planning matters? the 
Kilburn scheme covered all council services. 
Designated officers supported the area committees' 
work.
Cultural Characteristics
The Borough Council's culture reflected characteris­
tics common to most local authorities and other 
features particular to Camden. Several respondents 
referred to "the Camden culture”.
"Camden has its own culture which has not changed
despite changes of political leadership."
(Chair, Women's Committee London Borough of
Camden)
"There is a Camden Culture."
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(Director of Recreation, London Borough of
Camden)
While there was little agreement about the nature of 
the culture there was a widespread belief that Camden 
displayed a distinctive set of cultural 
characteristics which affected the behaviour of those 
who were part of the organisation.
Camden, like all local authorities contained large 
numbers of employees who belonged to professional or 
quasi-professional groups. Respondents made various 
references to the ways in which professional 
allegiances affected the actions of council 
officers. These references stressed two things. One 
was the common bond of understanding and respect 
between members of the same profession, regardless of 
organisational boundaries.
"There is a relationship of trust. For example 
the district surveyors do not bother to check 
calculations because they know Camden? but this 
can be worrying for Camden if they were to get 
things wrong."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
The other was the restrictive view of roles and the 
actions appropriate to them which was fostered among 
each profession.
"Housing and Social Services workers are very 
busy and reluctant to become involved in welfare 
rights issues, but attention to clients' income 
in the short term can prevent longer term 
problems such as rent arrears or family 
difficulties. Our role is to persuade others 
that welfare rights considerations are an 
integral part of their work."
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(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
Camden)
The members of particular professions were 
concentrated in particular departments, for example 
social workers in social services, planners in the 
planning department. The weakness or absence of 
corporate structures and the ensuing strength of 
departmental ones helped to reinforce the strength of 
professionalism within Camden.
Local authorities are without exception bureaucratic 
structures. Bureaucracy in Camden was visible in the 
hierarchical structure of the organisation, in the 
division of tasks into specialised components 
assigned to specific grades of employee and in the 
prevalence of formal procedures.
The role of bureaucracy in defining the culture of 
Camden was complex. Bureaucracy was seen by many to 
contribute to a kind of malaise through the creation 
of delay and reactive management.
"Bureaucratic factors get in the way."
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Decison making takes longer because of the 
committees* cycle. Contracts are slow and a 
longer time has to be allowed for finalising 
schemes."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
Debate was muzzled.
"Camden doesn't encourage taking risks through 
openness and frank discussions."
(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)
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"Nearly everything at Camden has to be done at 
arms length because of the bureaucracy."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
The impact of bureaucratic processes on the 
implementation of Council policy had been placed high 
on the political agenda. As a result much of the 
Council's creative energy had been turned inwards.
"Camden has seen a run of socialist policies such 
as equal opportunities which have forced 
managers to look back at the organisation rather 
than at what they are doing in service terms."
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The Women's Unit can only tackle limited issues 
- it has little time to tackle issues involving 
outside agencies"
(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
However, while some were working to reduce 
bureaucracy, others were working to strengthen it. 
The commitment to decentralise was intended to 
de-bureaucratise Camden by reducing the scale, 
specialisation and centralisation of its operations.
"The aim of decentralisation is sensitising 
bureaucracy to needs of the community which 
might engender wider thinking."
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
Other initiatives taken in pursuit of policies such as 
equal opportunities or police monitoring were 
simultaneously strengthening bureaucratic processes.
"The achievement has been a local authority-run 
hostel financed by the health authority but with 
health authority people on the interview panels
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for staff. To do this the health authority 
staff had to take Camden's course for internal 
interviewers. The whole process took three 
years."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"The police unit want to clear all contact and 
for contact to be in writing."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
Camden had very little of the managerial culture that 
is associated with large formal hierarchies. Power 
was distributed among departments in such a way that 
a great deal of time had to be spent negotiating and 
putting together deals with other managers in order 
to make progress.
"In Camden you do not manage in the accepted 
sense of the word. Camden is very democratic in 
its operation. Trying to get 5-600 people 
involved in a service to agree on something is 
impossible. Where staff are spread across 
departments this entails interaction and 
negotiation as they do not all have the same 
objectives."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
Power was split between the officers, the members and 
the unions. Members and unions were bound together 
politically and would make strategic alliances 
against officers for the benefit of either or both.
"Unions are very strong though strength varies 
between departments according to the presence of 
activists. Alliances are forged between unions 
and members against officers."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
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Workerism was recognisable in some services:
"The home help service is very good but very 
political. The workers are in control in Camden. 
There is workerism. NUPE is in control."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Camden had for many years been known as a "money-bags" 
council.
"Camden thinks of itself as a money-bags council. 
If Camden thought something worth doing it would 
put money into it. Camden doesn't seek to gain
things specifically. It can make generous grand 
gestures."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
Staffing and expenditure levels were amongst the 
highest for local authorities serving similar areas. 
Service expenditure in 1984/5 was 467.4 pounds per 
head compared with an average for a group of similar 
authorities of 338.9 per head. In 1984 there were 
39.44 full-time staff per 1000 population in Camden 
compared with 28.87 for the group of similar
authorities (Audit Commission 1985). In particular 
Camden spent very heavily on social services, housing 
benefit administration, libraries and the provision 
of discretionary services. A high level of subsidy 
was provided from the rate fund to the Housing 
Revenue Account and to other trading services.
However, this ability to spend had not always been
coupled with a concern for efficiency and
effectiveness.
"Camden's solution to problems is to throw money 
at them. There is an overkill of provision and 
many services are seriously overmanned."
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(Director of Recreation, London Borough of
Camden)
"For eight years Camden has lost money and 
achieved nearly nothing. Little has been done 
since 1978. Camden has presided over an 
ageing/decaying housing stock and spent more 
time providing excuses for not meeting housing 
need.”
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
The culture in Camden placed little emphasis on 
performance. Some described the culture of Camden as 
"jungle-like" in which employees were encouraged to 
put their own interests before their commitment to 
their job.
"Many officers put self before people. It is 
part of the Camden culture. The system 
militates against anyone being dedicated to 
their work."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
Rate-capping, which was introduced in the financial 
year 1985/6, changed the environment in which Camden 
operated. Financial restraint and lack of resources 
were uppermost in the minds of every local authority 
respondent. However it had not at the time of the 
study changed the prevailing culture of the 
organisation. The imposition of rate limits was very 
recent and many officials saw restraint on rates and 
expenditure as inappropriate and even illegitimate. 
The initial impact of rate-capping had been to 
reinforce the inward-looking nature of the
organisation.
"Financial restraint and rate-capping requires 
local authorities to look inward at what they 
are doing."
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(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of
Camden)
It had reinforced the position of the departments as 
the locus of operational activities and the point
where resources were expended rather than
strengthening the centre where more strategic 
decisions might have been taken.
"Wider problems are always neglected because of
the pressures of day-to-day work, in part
resulting from the financial situation."
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
Political Profile
Camden had been Labour controlled since 1971. The 
1982 local elections produced a council of 33 Labour 
members and 26 Conservatives. In 1986 Labour 
strengthened its majority, gaining a total of 44 
seats with the Conservatives holding 13 seats and the 
Liberals taking 2.
The political tone of Camden owed a great deal to the 
impact of younger and more radical Labour councillors 
who came to power in Camden, as elsewhere, in the 
elections of the late 70s and early 80s. As a group 
they came from backgrounds and held views which were 
in sharp contrast to those of the older, more 
established Labour councillors they replaced.
The "new" Labour councillors included more women - 
nearly half the Labour group was female. Fewer of 
them than their predecessors had working-class 
backgrounds and more were graduates and
professionals., A sizeable minority was not in 
employment and around half a dozen Labour councillors
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were full-time. In addition several more were 
dependent to a greater or less extent on members' 
allowances for income. Their attitudes and values had 
much in common with what has been labelled the "new 
urban Left" (Gyford, 1985).
"Local authorities have changed: there are new 
kinds of politicians."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden)
As councillors they expected to be far more actively 
involved in Council affairs than had their 
predecessors. This expectation stemmed from the 
belief that everything must be viewed as political. 
They distrusted senior officials to implement their 
policies and wanted not only to become involved in 
administration but to work directly with officials, 
regardless of their position in the organisation.
An all-e^ompassing definition of what was political 
gave rise to a new set of policy interests. Camden's 
concerns were widened to include matters such as 
nuclear weapons, Northern Ireland, policing,
employment, race relations and womens' issues. Two 
things followed: one was the adoption of a campaigning 
stance towards central government, public authorities 
and other organisations whose policies on issues on 
Camden's new agenda did not meet with the Labour 
Group's approval.
"Local authorities have begun to take up as 
campaign issues those wider issues which relate 
to the community at large and impinge on Camden 
services."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden)
Campaigning led to outright conflict, particularly 
with central government. The second outcome was the 
demand for ever greater political scrutiny of what 
was happening inside the council because of the 
political requirement for the Council to conform to 
newly-defined standards, particularly for equal 
opportunities. Politics pervaded the whole authority 
and contributed to the distinctive culture discussed 
above.
The prevailing approach espoused by the new labour 
councillors was interventionist. The outcome of this 
approach was seen not only in high spending on all 
programmes but also in the making of large amounts of 
Council policy, much of which could not be 
satisfactorily implemented.
"Camden makes endless policy. An enormous effort 
is required to carry it through in its fullest 
detail which is often not understood. Members 
should be concerned about implementation."
(Chair, Womens' Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
"It is very difficult to get members interested 
in a strategic policy agenda - they react to 
issues of the moment."
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
The combination of radicalism, interventionism and 
involvement created pressures on Labour councillors 
and soured and polarised relationships with the 
Conservative minority. The agenda the Labour Group 
had set for itself made huge demands on members' time 
as exemplified by the large number of member bodies 
which had been created. It contained inherent 
contradictions and difficulties which carried high 
political risks.
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"Should a socialist council be assisting 
capitalism? Rate payers' money is being invested 
in firms but what control do they have?"
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
The radicalism of the policies compared with the 
Council's limited powers and resources led to outcomes 
often falling short of objectives. Failure to fulfil 
aims gave rise to disillusion by individual members 
and local management committees.
"Camden is a white male-dominated council. It 
pays much lip-service to women's issues but is 
less enthusiastic about practical support"
(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
"When the present administration came in, the 
manifesto set out employment as a priority - it 
is now being picked out as a priority again 
because it is near election time. In between, 
the authority hasn't really known what to do 
because the issue is so wide and deep. Part of 
the breakdown in communication with other 
agencies is because members really don't know 
what to do."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
The radical stance of the Council took it to the 
limits of legality, and its opposition to central 
government spending controls had brought the threat of 
personal surcharges. Such pressures led to high 
turnover among councillors with many members 
including eight Labour councillors standing down at 
the 1986 election.
Relationships between the two main political parties 
were strained and difficult. Both groups were 
strongly partisan and had moved further apart over 
policy. Publicly relationships were characterised by
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slanging matches between leaders and senior members. 
The chair of the Women*s Committee described the 
Conservative members of the committee as "stupid and 
vicious." Away from the public the majority Labour 
Group generally ignored the minority group and showed 
no interest in joint management of Council business. 
This approach led to further dissatisfaction and 
complaint by Conservative members.
The Labour Group maintained firm control of the 
political decision-making machinery in Camden. Group 
meetings could include not only councillors but also 
trade union and ward representatives. The
Conservatives were represented on all the Council's 
committees but were by definition excluded from the 
supreme policy making body, the Labour Group. 
Committees normally followed lines set by the Labour 
Group. Officials did not play a significant role in 
committee meetings.
Both Labour and Conservative leaders were relatively 
new. The Council leader was an influential member of 
the Labour Group but did not have ultimate 
decision-making authority. His style of leadership 
had, therefore, to be open and consultative within his 
own party. The Labour leader had to cope with deep 
divisions among councillors over the party's policies 
and management of Camden. On occasions such divisions 
burst into the public arena.
In February 1987 the local press published details of 
a report from a Labour councillor to his general 
management committee which included the following 
comments,
"The council's spending has increased by a third 
in real terms since 1982 - does anyone really 
believe that services have been improved by a 
third? Is it not the overwhelming view that
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things have actually got worse?" 
(Ham and High, 13.2.87)
He not only quest ionned the efficiency and 
effectiveness of council services but also the 
radical policy concerns of the council,
"... as Councillors we find ourselves embroiled 
in all sorts of political arguments about 
subjects which are really tangential about Sinn 
Fein, the Lesbian/Gay Committee, travellers, the 
police, etc."
(The Chronicle 13.2.87)
Camden consciously courted a high public profile. It 
engaged in widespread consultation and interaction 
with community groups, and co-opted members of client 
and interest groups onto a number of council 
committees. Such close links were seen to have both 
service and political advantages. On the one hand 
voluntary organisations were seen as a cheap and 
effective means of service delivery.
"There is a clear policy to work with the 
voluntary sector."
(Assistant Director Social Services, London 
Borough of Camden)
"There is a growing sense of collaboration with 
the voluntary sector."
(Member, London Borough of Camden)
"Camden is very upfront on consultation and 
discussing issues with people."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
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On the other hand Camden was concerned to raise 
consciousness within the community and thereby build 
long-term support for council policies.
"The Police unit is a consciousness-raising 
unit."
(Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Camden wants to push for a better social 
security system, Camden is trying to get 
different claimant groups to support the 
campaign to give it more force."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
Media attention was high compared with the low levels 
of interest in local government which characterised
the regional and national media. Much of the wider 
attention focused on Camden*s disputes with Central 
Government and its more innovative Left-wing policies. 
Camden was often portrayed as an example of a "Loony 
Left" local authority. However, unlike other similarly 
portrayed authorities, Camden*s leaders were virtually 
unknown outside the locality.
Camden aspired to play a wider role in London's 
politics. As an authority it had long been active in 
the London Boroughs Association and had played a 
major role in inter-borough housing schemes. After 
abolition of the GLC, Camden not only continued this 
role but also volunteered its services to many of the 
unofficial successor bodies which Labour local 
authorities promoted such as London Boroughs Nuclear 
Policy Committee and London Boroughs Disability Unit. 
However, while the authority played a prominent role 
in the administration of such wider local government
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bodies, it held few influential posts within them 
(Hebbert and Travers, 1988).
THE OTHER AUTHORITIES SERVING CAMDEN
The sixteen authorities were characterised by 
variety. Even the two health authorities differed from 
each other significantly over internal structure, 
culture and service priorities. Attention below, 
however, is focused on the similarities and 
differences between the local authority and the other 
public authorities in the network. Although, as 
discussed later in the thesis, there was a feeling of 
common experience and interest among all the 
organisations in the study by virtue of their 
location in the public sector, structural
differences dominated the comparison between the local 
authority and the other public authorities serving 
Camden.
Tasks
The local authority was a multi-service organisation. 
In contrast, almost all the authorities in the study 
were focused on the delivery of a single service 
(see Figure 10). The two exceptions were the London 
Residuary Body and the DHSS. The former had been 
established to wind up the affairs of a previous 
multi-service authority, the Greater London Council, 
while the latter was a large central government 
conglomerate department subsequently split into its 
constituent functional parts. The dominance of a 
single-service perspective which characterised the 
other authorities in the network contrasted with the 
broad multi-service and community-focused viewpoint 
of the local authority.
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FIGURE 10 SINGLE AMD MULTI-SERVICE AUTHORITIES. PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES
SINGLE-SERVICE AUTHORITIES MULT I-SERVICE AUTHORITIES
Bloomsbury Health Authority Health Care DHSS Personal Social Services
British Rail Public Transport Social Security
British Waterways Board Navigation Health
Camden and Islington FPC Health Care
Hampstead Health Authority Health Care London Aspects of Housing,
Inner London Education Authority Education Residuary Transport, Leisure, Technical and Management
London Ambulance Service Medical Transport Body Services operated by former Greater London Council
London Electricity Board Electricity Supply
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority Protection Housing, Highways, Personal Social Services, Land
London Regional Transport Public Transport Use Planning, Public Health, Leisure and
Manpower Services Commission Labour Supply Recreation, Libraries
Metropolitan Police Protection Camden
Thames Water Water Supply Counci I
Sports Council Sport
14
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There were connections between the services provided 
by the local authority and the other public 
authorities in the network. All the authorities in 
the study were engaged in either community and 
welfare services or the provision of basic 
infrastructure. However, each organisation operated 
largely in its own distinct set of activities of 
provision. Task specialisation was associated with 
the location of specialised staff and particular 
professions in particular authorities.
Scale
Although the Borough of Camden was a large 
organisation, in comparison with most of the other 
public authorities providing services in the area it 
was in many respects relatively small. Figure 11. 
compares the total population served by the local 
authority and the other public authorities in the 
study. At the organisational level only two 
authorities served a smaller population. The picture 
does not change if Camden's daytime population is 
added in. Nor does the picture change substantially 
if areal divisions are compared with the local 
authority rather than whole organisations.
Furthermore, for this comparison to be fair the figure 
used for the local authority should be that of the 
average population of the decentralised area 
structure that was being implemented. This figure 
was just over 13,000 people, smaller than the areal 
divisions used by any other authority. Camden ranked 
similarly in geographical area. The creation of 
overall sub-units within the local authority gave rise 
to logistical problems for much larger public 
authorities which had to multiply their liaison 
structures.
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FIGURE 11
TOTAL POPULATION SERVED BY AUTHORITIES
1 Hampstead 
Health Authority
111,800
2 Bloomsbury 
Health Authority
129,700
3 Camden Borough 
Council
184,900
4 Camden & Islington 
Family Practitioner 
Committee
350,000
5 Inner London 
Education Authority
2,318,000
6 London Electricity 3,757,500
7 London Ambulance 
Service
6,770,275
London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority
6,770,275
London Regional 
Transport
6,770,275
London Residuary 
Borough
6,770,275
8 Metropolitan Police 7,111,500
9 Thames Water 11,500,000
10 British Rail 55,100,000
British Waterways 
Board
55,100,000
Department of Health 
& Social Security
55,100,000
Manpower Services 
Commission
55,100,000
• Sports Council 55,100,000
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"Westminster has two social services areas 
relating to Bloomsbury; Camden has five. For 
example, three areas have case conferences at 
4.00 today."
(Unit General Manager (Elderly), Bloomsbury 
Health Authority)
Over expenditure the pattern is somewhat different. 
Figure 12 shows the local authority fourth from the 
bottom when organisations are ranked by their total 
budgets/turnover. However, if organisations are 
ranked by the element of their budget/turnover spent 
in Camden, the local authority is clearly at the top 
of the table (see Figure 13).
Structure
Apart from the local authority, the Inner London 
Education Authority was the only organisation in the 
study whose controlling body was directly elected. 
Until Abolition the ILEA was a special committee of 
the Greater London Council. Its membership consisted 
of the GLC members for the ILEA area plus one member 
nominated by each Borough in the area. The first 
direct elections to ILEA were held in 1986.
The other public authorities fell into four 
categories as shown on Figure 14. Two authorities had 
no separate controlling body but were directly 
responsible to government ministers. The largest 
category of authorities had the structure more or 
less of nationalised industries controlled by an 
independent board appointed by central government and 
responsible through a particular minister to 
Parliament. For the third category of authorities, 
including the health authorities, various interested 
groups were able to nominate members of the 
controlling boards. The fourth category contains only
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FIGURE 12
TOTAL BUDGET/TURNOVER OF AUTHORITIES 1985/86
1 Sports Council £3. 7m
2 Camden and Islington 
Family Practitioner
£27.8m
3 London Ambulance £48m **
4 Hampstead Health 
Authority
£60m
5 British Waterways £60.5m
6 Bloomsbury Health 
Authority
£122.8m
7 London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority
£171.2m
8 London Borough 
of Camden
£391m
9 Thames Water £514m
10 London Residuary Body £692m
11 Metropolitan Police £8 71m
12 London Electricity Board £927m
13 Inner London Education 
Authority
£1176m
14 London Regional Transport £1301m
15 Manpower Services 
Commission
£3087m
16 British Rail £3114m
17 Department of Health 
and Social Security
£42,932m *
* Total Social Security Budget
** This is a broad estimate based on contemporary
figures because in moving offices detailed 
figures for previous years have been lost.
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FIGURE 13
BUDGET/TURNOVER RELATED TO CAMDEN 1985/6
1 Sports Council £0.13m
2 British Waterways Board £0.2m
3 London Ambulance Service £1.3m ***
4 London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority
£4.7m
5 Thames Water £8.2m
6 British Rail £9.2m
7 Manpower Services 
Commission
£10.7m
8 Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee
£14.7m
9 London Residuary Body £18.9m
10 Metropolitan Police £22.6m
11 London Regional Transport £35.5m
12 London Electricity £45.6m
13 Hampstead Health Authority £60m
14 Bloomsbury Health Authority £69m
15 Inner London Education 
Authority
£93m
16 Department of Health 
and Social Security
£152m
17 London Borough of Camden £391m
NOTES
Calculation = total budget______  x pop. of Camden
total pop. served
* Calc on S.E. Budget because of uneven investment 
across the country as a whole.
** Social Security Budget
*** Estimate. See footnote on FIGURE 12
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FIGURE 14 MEANS OF CONTROL OF PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES IN THE STUDY
Direct Accountability to Parliament Via Minister
DHSS
Metropolitan Police
Board aDDointed bv central aovernment
London Regional Transport
London Residuary Body
Thames Water
Sports Council
British Rail
British Waterways Board
London Electricity Board
Board ADDointed bv central aovernment with 
nominations from kev interest arouos
Manpower Service Commission 
Bloomsbury Health Authority 
Hampstead Health Authority 
Camden and Islington FPC 
London Ambulance Service*
Board comorisina of elected members of 
constituent local authorities
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
Directlv elected
Camden Council
Inner London Education Authority
one authority whose controlling board comprised 
members of the local authorities within the area which 
it served.
Where organisations were controlled by appointed 
boards these bodies in general played a much less 
active role on a day-to-day basis than the members of 
Camden Council, although examples of extreme centrali­
sation were to be found elsewhere. The Director of 
Planning at London Regional Transport in a seminar 
with the Greater London Group at the London School of 
Economics in February 1988 quoted an example of a 
decision to use an alternative supplier for bus parts 
during a strike in the automotive industry during 
the 1970s having to go right up to the Board of London 
Transport.
Less involvement was because of the disparity in size 
between the boards and the organisations they 
controlled. Most non-executive board members had 
other extensive commitments and expected executive 
board members and senior management to dominate 
affairs in a way that contrasted with the inter­
ventionist political role of Camden members. As a 
result elected members in Camden felt they had no 
opposite numbers in the other public authorities with 
whom they could do business.
"Members can feel very lost in unfamiliar
inter-authority scenarios."
(Member, London Borough of Camden)
The internal structure of the other organisations was 
very varied. All had functional divisions although 
the extent to which these divisions were separate and 
independently accountable varied. At one end of the 
spectrum London Regional Transport had established
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four separate businesses which were wholly owned 
subsidiaries focused on different services: 
underground trains, buses, engineering and London 
Transport International, a consultancy business. Area 
structures were established within the businesses for 
marketing and operational reasons. A very different 
structure was to be found in the Metropolitan Police 
which had established a hierarchy of multi-functional 
geographical areas and divisions complemented by a 
range of specialised central functions.
The degree to which power and decision-making were 
centralised within the other public authorities in 
the study varied. Very little discretion was 
delegated downwards in the DHSS over benefits (Flynn 
et_al).
"The Euston office reacts to policy rather than 
creating it. Policy is a central concern. 
Officially much delegation has occurred in the 
last two years. Euston now has a budget for the 
building. There is an allocation of staff and 
grades but the local office does its own 
recruiting.. But rates of benefit are centrally 
fixed. The Social Security Act made rates less 
discretionary."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
British Rail was also seen as highly centralised and 
bureaucratic despite its geographically based 
operating divisions.
"Some statutory agencies have a measure of 
decentralisation, for example areas. British 
Rail however still works from the centre and 
there is a problem getting a response. For 
example, Camden has written to the Chairman of 
British Rail asking for cash towards a footpath 
project where a child was killed crossing the 
railway. It has been impossible to get a 
response after three months.
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
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While such centralisation was a source of frustration 
for the local authority, Camden Council in turn 
appeared centralised to other organisations. Officers 
in the health authorities felt that they had more 
discretion over services and greater budget freedom 
than their opposite numbers in the local authority.
"Chief and senior health authority officers have 
more discretion to commit resources than their 
counterparts in Social Services. Even at the 
Assistant Director level in Social Services 
managers cannot commit resources. The health 
authority is able therefore to go much faster on 
proposals and has to slow down when dealing with 
local authorities.”
(Divisional General Manager, (Local and Community 
Services), Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Trends in centralisation and decentralisation were 
seen to be going in different directions in the local 
authority and other public authorities.
"There is a problem with the increasing 
decentralisation of local authority work which 
contrasts with recent centralisation in the LEB 
where the previous ten divisions have been 
centralised into five areas and there has also 
been physical centralisation of locations. It is 
felt to be difficult to get a central answer from 
a decentralised local authority and felt also 
that each of the neighbourhood offices will 
gradually begin to behave differently and have 
different policies."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
An important difference between the local authority 
and all the other authorities in the study except 
ILEA was the means by which the organisation was made 
accountable to the public. Two different patterns 
were identified. One was for accountability to be 
seen to flow upwards through central government to the 
electorate at large. The other was for accountability 
to be seen to flow outwards through the nominees on 
controlling boards to interest groups, or through
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local authority representatives, to communities. A 
sizeable group of authorities complemented these 
processes by consultative committees which were 
intended to provide a forum for interested groups and 
consumers to express opinions to the organisation 
about its services and policies.
Coterminositv
The boundary of the local authority in Camden was set 
by the London Government Act of 1963. The origins of 
the boundary were, however, much older. The 
principle behind the reorganisation which took place 
in the mid-60s was to regroup existing local 
authorities. The boundaries of the existing 
Metropolitan Boroughs had been delimited by the 
London Government Act of 1899 and in the majority of 
cases followed parish and district boundaries (Royal 
Commission on Local Government in Greater London, 
1960).
The civil parishes had developed from the
ecclesiastical parishes of considerable antiquity 
such as the parish of St Pancras which became part of 
Camden and defined the north eastern boundary of the 
modern local authority.
The use of historical boundaries, reflecting the 
socio-economic and religious geography of London in 
the nineteenth century and before, had created a 
local authority area which cut across modern
geographical features. The boundary of Camden cut
across the two main open spaces in the vicinity and 
divided local shopping centres which had grown up on 
either side of main roads. In the northern part of 
the Borough the boundary was generally recognisable 
and ran mostly along main roads. In the south, the 
boundary with Westminster ran along back streets
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through Bloomsbury, Covent Garden and Holborn. Where 
the boundary separated Camden from the ancient City 
of London the boundary ceased to run along roads. 
Instead it criss-crossed streets and even bi-sected 
public buildings, (see Figure 15).
The geographical definition of the Borough of Camden 
neither reflected the spatial patterns of
contemporary life nor encompassed a distinct 
community. This fact in itself might have made it an 
unattractive territory for other service-providing 
authorities to adopt. Its origins, though, meant that 
it was well established as a boundary. Compared with 
the local authority, the boundaries of the other
public authorities in Camden had been defined more 
recently.
The geographical organisation of the authorities in 
the study is summarised in Figure 16. Local 
authority boundaries were used widely in the 
definition of areal units by other public 
authorities. However, the nature and extent of their 
influence depended upon their convenience for
operational matters.
For example when, in 1980, the area level was removed 
from the National Health Service, the DHSS selected 
two priorities for determining district boundaries - 
links with local authorities and support for clinical 
teaching (Circular 80/8, 1980). In London neither
criterion proved satisfactory. Borough boundaries did 
not approximate to the catchment areas of health 
facilities. Second, the major teaching hospitals were 
concentrated in inner London, sometimes straddling 
borough boundaries.
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FIGURE 15 CAMDEN * S BOUNDARY WITH THE CITY OF LONDON
E* '‘VgtNOSinGH. * *
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A: The Southern boundary
B: Detail of the eastern end of the southern boundary
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FIGURE 16 GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN CAMDEN
ORGANISATION MAIN AREAL DIVISIONS SERVING CAMDEN BASIS OF BOUNDARY
Bloomsbury Health 
Authority
- Pre-1982 health districts, partially defined by Borough 
boundaries
British Rail SECTOR LEVEL:London and South East Sector
REGIONAL LEVEL: London Midland Region; Eastern Region
Rail network and location of terminal
British Waterways Board AREA LEVEL: London Area Canal network and river systems
Camden and Islington 
Family Practitioner 
Committee
- Local Authority boundaries
Department of Health and 
Social Security
REGIONAL LEVEL: London North: London South County boundaries and postal districts
Hampstead Health 
Authority
- Pre-1982 health district defined by local authority boundary
Inner London Education 
Authority
DIVISIONAL LEVEL: Camden and Westminster Local authority boundaries
London Ambulance Service DIVISIONAL LEVEL: North West Division Regional Health Authority boundaries and Hospital catchment 
areas
London Electriciity Board DIVISIONAL LEVEL: Northern Division Local Authority boundaries
London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority
AREA LEVEL: North Area Local Authority boundaries
London Regional Transport BUSES: DISTRICT LEVEL Abbey District Location of garages and bus network
London Residuary Body Bounday of Greater London Council
Manpower Services 
Commission
AREA LEVEL: London North Area Local Authority boundaries
Metropolitan Police AREA LEVEL: Number 7 Area
DIVISIONAL LEVEL: Holbom; Kentish Town; Camden
Local Authority boundaries and location of police station
Thames Water DIVISIONAL LEVEL:*
* Within water supply, sewerage parts of the authority
Locational of plant and water/sewerage network. Residual 
influence of former Metropolitan Water Board boundary
Sports Council REGIONAL LEVEL:
Greater London and South East RegionLocal Authority boundaries
Local Authority boundaries
The boundaries of the public authorities studied fell 
into two categories. On the one hand there were a 
group of authorities whose boundaries were defined by 
criteria unrelated to the Borough boundary. British 
Rail and London Regional Transport used area 
structures relevant for their transport network and 
facilities. Thames Water and British Waterways
Board used boundaries relevant to drainage and water 
networks. The DHSS Benefit service used postcodes to 
organise areal divisions.
The second group of authorities operated areas based 
on the local authority map of London. The majority 
defined areal divisions as groups of Boroughs 
modified here and there by operational considerations. 
The number of Boroughs comprising an areal division 
varied enormously. On the other hand, health 
authority units were of similar size to or smaller 
than the local authority. Operational boundaries had 
therefore to be drawn within the local authorities 
served by a health authority. Similarly, the
Metropolitan Police defined intra-Borough boundaries 
for their smallest areal unit, the division.
The result of the boundary drawing exercises by the 
individual authorities was that the public authority 
network in Camden displayed an almost complete lack 
of coterminosity. The boundaries of every public 
authority differed from every other and from the 
local authority.
Finance
The local authority had three sources of income - 
central government grant, rates and charges. The 
other, public authorities in the study fell into three 
groups over income. The first group, like the local
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authority, raised income locally through a precept or 
levy. In each case the levy accounted, as with the 
local authority, for only a part of their income, the 
remainder coming in varying proportions from central 
government grant and charges. A second group of
authorities relied upon central government grant for
their prime source of income, supplemented only by 
any charges made for services. The third group
operated as publicly owned businesses and relied 
principally on charges, modified by various degrees of 
public subsidy from central government.
However financed, all the authorities in the study 
were subject to financial controls imposed by central 
government. The strictest controls were over grants 
and rates, allowing central government to cash-1imit 
authorities. Although concerned with the prices
charged for publicly provided services, the government 
was not averse from seeing rises. The increase of 
financial freedom enjoyed in this way, however, was 
limited by the simultaneous reduction of public 
subsidies.
At the time of the research, and for a number of years 
previously, resources in relation to demand (both the 
demand for services and the costs of service 
provision) had been declining. This situation had 
arisen from a combination of economic recession and 
central government policy. The latter arose from the 
view that public expenditure was unproductive and a 
wasteful way of providing goods and services.
Many authorities in the study received financial aid 
from central government departments whose budgets 
were falling. Figure 17 shows the pattern of public 
expenditure in. real terms from 1978/9 to 1988/9. The 
study was carried out when public expenditure was
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FIGURE 17: GOVERNMENT PLANNING TOTALS IN CASH AND REAL TERMS 
Source; Treasury (1986) P5
117.4
Cash R eal term s (1984-85 base year
12 3.6 |121. .■> |
113.3
jC b ill io n
92.6
1978-79 1979-811 1980-81 1981-82 1982-8.1 1981-84 1984-85 1 1985-86 1984.-87 . 1987-88 1988-89
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falling in real terms after a period of slow but 
continuous growth. During the two years following the 
study expenditure levelled out but did not regain 
1984/5 levels.
Figure 18 analyses breaks this picture down by 
department. It shows the pattern of expenditure for 
the years immediately before the study and proposals 
for the forthcoming three years as they stood when 
the study began. Those authorities whose budgets had 
suffered the least were the Manpower Services 
Commission, the Metropolitan Police and those 
authorities funded by the DHSS. For the plan period 
the first two authorities could no longer expect 
unusually favourable treatment. Authorities dependent 
on the DHSS were able to plan for small increases. 
However, the position of the health authorities in 
the study was much less optimistic because RAWP(l) 
formulas transferred funds from London to other parts 
of the country and within London from central areas 
such as Bloomsbury to less well-provided areas.
Authorities found that resources were being squeezed 
not only through falling grant and subsidy but also 
through tightening controls on revenue raising. 
Trading authorities were encouraged to raise prices 
subject only to political acceptability. Government 
policy to reduce taxation levels implied a different
(1) The Resources Allocation Working Party (RAWP) was 
set up by the DHSS in 1975. The Working Party 
developed formulae for allocating capital and 
revenue expenditure to regions in order to 
balance resources with needs. Under RAWP regions 
with the most generous ratio of resources to need 
progressively lost resources to poorer areas. 
Regions were required to apply similar principles 
in allocating resources between districts.
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FIGURE 18 PUBLIC SPENDING IN REAL TERMS BY SELECTED GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
Source: Treasury (1986) p13
1983-1984
outturn
1984-1985
outturn
1985-1986
estimated
outturn
1986-
1987
plans
1987-1988
plans
1988-1989
plans
Difference
1983/4
1985/6
Difference
1986/7
1988/9
Energy (1) 1.2 2.6 1.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
Employment (2) 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.4 +0.2 -
Transport (3) 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.1 -0.1 -0.3
DOE - Housing (4) 3.2 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 -0.6 -
DOE - Other Environmenal 
Services (5)
3.9 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.1 3.0 -0.1 -0.3
Home Office (6) 4.7 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.9 +0.4 -0.2
Education and Science 
<7>
14.0 14.0 13.8 13.0 12.7 12.4 -0.2 -0.6
Arts and Libraries (8) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 - -0.1
DHSS - Health and 
Personal Social Services 
(9)
15.4 15.8 15.9 16.2 16.2 16.4 +0.5 +0.2
DHSS - Social Security 
(10)
36.7 38.1 39.3 39.1 39.1 39.2 +2.4 ♦0.1
Relationship between departments and authorities
(1) London Electricity Board
(2) Manpower Services Commission
(3) British Rail; British Waterways Board; London Regional Transport.
(4) Camden Council
(5) London Residuary Body; Thames Water; Sports Council; London Education Authority
(6) Metropolitan Police
(7) Inner London Education Authority
(8) Camden Council
(9) Bloomsbury Health Authority; Camden and Islington FPC; Hampstead Health Authority; London Ambulance Service
(10) DHSS Benefits Section
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attitude to rates. To compensate for falling grant 
many local authorities such as Camden and the Inner 
London Education Authority through the GLC had raised 
rates substantially. Rises were countered in the 
early eighties by the imposition of grant penalties 
by central government. Where authorities did not 
reduce their expenditure, further rate increases 
occurred. Camden Council, the Inner London Education 
Authority and the London Fire and Civil Defence 
Authority had all lost their entire block grant 
through penalties. When central government moved to 
limit rates further by introducing capping, all three 
authorities had their rates limited in the first two 
years of the system's operation (the period during 
which the study was carried out). Central government 
tightened controls on borrowing and realisation of 
assets in a move simultaneously to squeeze capital 
spending.
Culture
The local authority in Camden had a strong and 
well-developed political culture. Three other 
authorities in the study were controlled directly by 
politicians. At the DHSS, Ministers were very far 
removed from the level of the organisation providing 
services in Camden. The Inner London Education 
Authority and the London Fire and Civil Defence 
Authority were both controlled by locally elected 
politicians. Both had recently undergone major 
structural changes and subsequent upheavals in their 
political development. The LFCDA had changed from the 
settled political environment of a generally low 
profile committee of the greater London Council to a 
finely balanced joint board whose members were keen to 
pursue their gwn territorial interests. ILEA had 
changed from an indirectly elected authority to a
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directly elected one. The end to necessary dual 
membership had brought a number of new politicians. 
The new authority was heavily dominated by Labour 
members, many of whom were radical, active and 
interventionist. Direct elections to ILEA also
brought in a new type of member such as the parent 
governor whose involvement in education policy 
preceded an allegiance to party. They were held 
together by a moderate and experienced leader who had 
been a senior politician in Camden.
The local authority service-delivery organisation was 
dominated by a bureaucratic professional culture. 
This culture was to be found in all the public 
authorities serving Camden. Two other different 
cultures were to be found in certain organisations. 
One was a quasi-military culture based on structures 
of command and discipline.
"The London Fire Brigade is a uniformed and
disciplined service."
(Asst-Chief Fire Officer, London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority
"The police have little experience of committees 
because of the command structure with its
military origins. For example, it is difficult 
to have a management team because of 
consciousness of rank."
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
This culture was to be found in the authorities with 
uniformed services, the Metropolitan Police, LFCDA 
and the London Ambulance Service. It was also said to 
characterise the operational side of British rail.
"Railways have a reactionary culture, almost 
military, because of the nature of the 
task. All parts of the system, including 
human ones, must perform reliably. The
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culture involves much discipline and little 
imagination. Railways are a strange 
environment which produces a particular 
culture similar to military culture all 
over the world."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
The other culture found in some authorities was a 
commercial/business culture akin to that of private 
enterprise. Such a culture looked upon the activities 
in which the authority was engaged as a business 
which served people as customers rather than clients 
or citizens. To achieve its goals it was more open to 
the techniques of commercial management and the 
disciplines of profit-generation. This culture was 
being actively fostered in many authorities,
particularly those dependent on charges for their 
income. It was most prevalent in the authority with 
the longest history as a quasi-business, the LEB. In 
many of the established bureaucracies such as LRT and 
Thames Water, while the idea of a business and 
enterprise culture was widely canvassed, it had not 
taken root throughout the organisation.
THE TYPICALITY OF CAMDEN
Every local authority area is unique geographically, 
politically and administratively. The uniqueness 
lies not in any particular characteristic but in a 
specific combination of features each of which can be 
found elsewhere in a different context. Camden was 
recognisably different from other London Boroughs but 
when analysed along different dimensions could be 
seen to have counterparts not only in London but in 
other parts of the country.
Camden had sectors which belonged geographically to
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the central business district, the inner and the 
outer suburban ring of London. The central business 
district was reflected in high land prices, high 
rateable value and extensive in-commuting. The inner 
suburban ring was reflected in above-average levels of 
deprivation, social problems, a large transient 
population and high levels of homelessness. The 
small but contrasting areas of outer suburban 
residential housing completed the heterogeneity of 
Camden*s geography.
The administrative history of the local authority 
Camden reflected its position as an Inner London 
Borough, formed in 1965. The identities of its 
constituent boroughs had merged into an organisation 
which many claimed had a distinctive "Camden 
culture". The distinctiveness of such a culture was 
difficult to pin down and often seemed to be a 
reaction to particularly distinctive, though not 
unique, features of the organisation by those working 
within it.
Structurally the authority could be labelled 
"pre-Bains" (Gyford, et al 1984). It had strong 
professionl departments, a weak administrative centre, 
and a proliferation of political decision-making 
bodies. Politically Camden reflected the priorities 
of the Left in local politics (Gyford et al 1985) . 
During the period of the research Camden was aligned 
with a group of London Labour Boroughs dominated by 
radical-left councillors who were committed to a 
platform of radical socialist policies. They were 
committed to a campaigning and confrontational style 
of politics which politicised a wide range of issues 
and polarised political attitudes. Within the council 
workerism was seen to characterise many service areas.
165
"There is an excessive concern with preserving 
j obs rather than a concern with services."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Similar politics were to be found in other Boroughs 
but Camden had differed in its superior ability to 
fund its radical programme on the back of its very 
high rate-base. Camden was not alone, however, among 
London Boroughs or high-spending urban authorities to 
face financial restraint through rate-capping.
The network of other authorities which provided 
services in Camden differed only marginally from the 
network serving adjacent Boroughs. The reason for 
this similarity was the much larger geographical 
areas covered by most of the authorities serving 
Camden. The two organisations which were wholly 
contained within Camden's boundary were the two 
district health authorities. Each was built round a 
distinctive set of facilities and had an individual 
approach to organisation but was no more unusual in 
its profile than neighbouring health authorities. 
These conclusions were supported by respondents who 
commented on the differences between Camden Council 
and other local authorities with which they were 
familiar. Socio-economic, political and adminis­
trative variables were cited as accounting for the 
differences between and within groups of local 
authorities.
"Boroughs are in rings. Inner (often Labour 
Boroughs) are more interested in rail transport 
than the outer Boroughs."
(London Regional Planning Manager, British Rail)
"Linkages at officer and member level may be 
easier depending on the politics of the 
authority. For example, relations with
Wandsworth are difficult because of a history of 
animosity"
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(Finance Officer, Camden & Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
Such differences demanded a specially tailored 
approach to intergovernmental relations to be 
developed with each local authority.
"The two local authorities with whom Bloomsbury 
works are different and Bloomsbury must develop 
different strategies and operational plans to 
match. Bloomsbury wants a comparable style 
across its area."
(Divisional General Manager,(Local and Community 
Services), Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Camden was not seen as any different, although its 
character was recognisably distinctive.
"Camden is not peculiar or deviant.”
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"Similar relationships to those with Camden are 
found elsewhere... Relationships with
Conservative authorities take a similar form.”
(Assistant Education Officer (Further and Higher 
Education) Inner London Education Authority)
"Camden is not unique. One is not conscious that 
any London Borough is particularly skilful at 
being assertive.”
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Local authorities are structurally similar and 
appear to be much of a muchness. There is no 
real division among authorities: politics makes 
no real difference.”
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
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CHAPTER 5
INTERDEPENDENCE
The public authority network in Camden included a wide 
variety of organisations. The forms which inter­
dependence between them took were equally varied. 
These forms overlapped so that the interdependence 
between the local authority and a particular 
authority was generally multi-dimensional. Such 
overlapping meant that the overall pattern of 
interdependence between Camden Council and the public 
service network in the borough was complex.
Three basic forms of structural interdependence were 
observed in Camden. They are discussed below under 
the headings of functional, task environment and goal 
environment interdependence. These categories
corresponded broadly to Pennings (1980) threefold 
classification of vertical, symbiotic and horizontal 
interdependence.
FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE
Vertical interdependence exists among organisations 
located in adjacent stages of production or service. 
In Camden two types of relationship between the local 
authority and other public authorities were observed 
which were broadly similar to Pennings' vertical 
category. One set of relationships arose from the 
distribution of powers and responsibilities among the 
public authorities studied. In some cases powers were 
given in a monopoly fashion to one authority; in 
other cases they were shared between the local 
authority and another authority or given to both in 
parallel. The second set of relationships arose from 
the supply of goods and services among public
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authorities necessary for the execution of their own 
particular responsibilties.
Completing Each Other's Tasks
The predominant pattern of public service provision in 
Camden was for individual organisations to be given 
a set of distinct, though often related, powers and 
responsibilities. Shared powers and responsibilties 
were unusual. In the period immediately before the 
research the pattern had been rather different. 
Shared powers had characterised the relationship 
between Camden Council and the former Greater London 
Council (Flynn et al. 1985). Land-use planning had 
involved reciprocal relations in which the upper tier 
had made the development plan and the lower tier 
constructed local plans within this framework. 
Planning applications were passed from one authority 
to the other in the course of approval. Waste 
collection had involved sequential relations with the 
upper tier disposing of the waste collected by the 
local tier. The two authorities also had parallel 
powers for housing and leisure services.
Functional interdependence which involved authorities 
completing each other's tasks was to be found in 
Camden. However, it was a relatively unusual form of 
interdependence. One example was the responsibility 
for providing housing benefit which was shared 
between the DHSS and Camden Council. Responsibilities 
were exercised sequentially: the DHSS assessed
clients' eligibility and issued authority to Camden 
Council to pay the benefit until further notice.
Where there is an obligation to transfer a task 
between authorities part way through its completion, 
each party seeks not only an unproblematic transfer
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but also a transfer which implies minimal disruption 
to the practices and procedures of each authority. 
Standardisation is important as a means of handling 
interdependence so that benefits are maximised and 
costs minimised to the organisations involved 
(Thompson, 1967). The flow of housing benefit tasks 
was described in interviews as simple and
standardised and had been developed as such by the 
local authority which put a high priority on a 
satisfactory relationship.
"Elsewhere it is a problematic relationship. 
However Camden's housing department is 'bang 
up-to-date' in its housing benefit section and 
puts pressure on Euston to speed up 
authorisations."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
"There was a difficult time on housing benefit. 
When the government passed this on they washed 
their hands of it. The transfer was planned 
inadequately which produced enormous problems 
for Camden. Camden has organised to cope well, 
though this has had costs in Camden"
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
Another more unusual example of authorities completing 
each other's tasks was the voluntary development of 
reciprocal relationships as over disposal of clinical 
waste. The disposal of such waste in ordinary 
dustbins by doctors had been identified as a problem 
by the Camden and Islington Family Practitioner 
Committee. While no one authority had the powers to 
solve the problem, a solution had been found by the 
health authority, providing bags and bins that were 
distributed by the local authority which then 
collected the waste and passed it back to the health 
authority for incineration. The service was financed 
by the Family Practitioner Committee which deducted
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the cost from payments made by the local authority 
towards doctors1 premises.
The Supply of Goods and Services
The local authority and other public authorities 
produced services which could be consumed by both 
individuals and organisations. Some of these services 
were traded, that is, purchased by consumers, on the 
basis of their preferences and ability to pay; others 
were non-traded, paid for by taxation or levy and 
available on the basis not only of preference but 
recognised need. Customer-supplier relationships were 
strongest where the supply of traded goods and 
services was involved.
Some of the public authorities in the Camden study 
such as London Regional Transport, British Railways 
and London Electricity Board operated within the 
traded public sector. The local authority operated in 
both the traded and non-traded sectors but was not a 
large supplier of services on a commercial basis to 
any of the other authorities in the network. Camden 
Council was a significant purchaser of goods and
services, though electricity was the only major item
purchased from trading public authorities.
The former GLC had a supplies department which 
undertook bulk purchasing of goods on behalf of
Boroughs. With the demise of the GLC ILEA took over
this function since most of the purchasing related to 
school equipment. The other main service supplied 
through this system was social services which 
purchased equipment and supplies for residential 
accommodation. The role of the supplies service was 
to negotiate .discounts and act as a wholesaler. 
Boroughs were under no obligation to use the service
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which was thus in competition with other direct and 
indirect suppliers. Some trading authorities, such 
as the transport operators, had no significant 
supplier relationships with the local authority.
Pennings (1980) identifies three features of 
commercial transactions which determine the direction 
and degree of interdependence that develops between 
customer and supplier. These features are the volume 
of business in relation to the total business of 
each organisation; the substitutability of the item 
traded; and its criticality to the business of the 
customer. Interdependence is also affected by market 
conditions, particularly where oligopolies and 
monopolies restrict the customers* or the suppliers' 
market.
In electricity supply the London Electricity Board had 
a monopoly. Electricity was essential to the local 
authority's operations, and the cost of the service 
was considerable. As a customer Camden Council was 
not particularly large compared with big industrial 
users. The only weapon it could employ was to delay 
payment of its bills as long as possible - a strategy 
deplored by London Electricity Board which retaliated 
by threatening to cut off supplies.
"The relationship is not as good as it might 
be. Disconnection is a threat. It takes 
Camden time to process payments for bills 
because of the need for checking. The LEB 
wants fast payments therefore the
relationship is soured and prickly."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
"One of the main things that the LEB would like 
is for the local authority to pay its bills 
promptly.. Payment is often delayed because of 
bureaucracy and threats have been made to cut off 
town halls including Camden for late payment of
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bills.”
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
In the supply of electrical services the market was 
different. The local authority had a considerable 
need for such services but the London Electricity 
Board was only one of many organisations which could 
have supplied the service. LEB for its part, however, 
considered the local authority to be a particularly 
desirable customer and was concerned to cultivate its 
custom.
"The LEB wants business in the form of electrical 
sub-contracting from Camden and other local 
authorities. Local authorities are seen as 
good, dependable customers."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
LEB used informal and social contacts fostered by the 
local manager.
"The LEB periodically holds social evenings to 
which both members and officers of the local 
authority are invited. It is part of my job to 
promote smooth relationships... This means 
encouraging a lot of contact at the ground level 
with the local authority staff, not just contact 
at the level of Chief Officer."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
It is frequently suggested that organisations seek to 
manage their interdependence with other organisations 
in ways which optimise their power and resources 
(Benson, 1975) . A supplier would want not only to 
retain his important customers but also to understand 
their pattern of demand; the customer would want to be 
assured of his suppliers and to anticipate changes in 
the market. With monopoly supplies the need for
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management of the relationship is felt largely by the 
customer. The reverse is true where several suppliers 
compete for a single customer.
Pennings (1980), in his study of interlocking 
directorates, suggests that a high degree of vertical 
interdependence among organisations gives rise to 
concrete links between them. The nearer to a monopoly 
the more links are established. The sensitivity of 
commercial organisations to costs and prices, however, 
may be greater than that of a local authority. If so, 
the local authority's need to manage its dependence 
as a customer on certain monopoly suppliers would 
tend to diminish.
"Chief Executives do not seem to be interested in 
making their organisations more customer 
responsive. Local authorities are not 
commercially responsible and therefore are not 
required to sell themselves to the people they 
deal with."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
Interdependence based on the supply of traded goods 
and services had been of diminishing importance as a 
feature of the public authority network, as 
privatisation reduced the traded sector. Gas and 
telecommunications had both been privatised but would 
have once been part of the public authority network at 
the local level. Both electricity and water were due 
for privatisation before the end of the decade. 
Neither the increasing use of charges nor the 
requirement to contract out services had increased 
the traded public sector. In general public 
authorities had not been able to compete for each 
other's business as a result of tendering 
arrangements. . However, there was a trend towards 
splitting public authorities into 'businesses' which
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traded with each other, sometimes in competition with 
the private sector. For example, London Regional
Transport had been split into a number of such 
businesses such as LRT Bus Engineering, LT Builders 
and LT Caterers which charged each other for services 
in competition with private companies.
Interdependence based on trading relationships 
co-existed with other types of interdependence
between the local authority and trading public
authorities, and nowhere formed the sole basis of
interdependence between Camden and another public 
authority in the network.
The non-traded services produced by the local 
authority and other public authorities could be 
consumed by organisations as well as individuals. The 
provision and consumption of non-traded services was 
widespread in the public authority network. Public 
authorities depended upon each other to provide public 
services which allowed them to deploy human capital 
in efficient ways (O'Connor, 1973). They required a 
healthy, educated well-housed and orderly workforce 
to deliver their own services. They also depended 
upon other public authorities for the physical 
infrastructure appropriate to modern service 
provision, such as transport.
As well as participating in the provision and 
consumption of collective services, the local 
authority and other public authorities supplied each 
other with specific non-traded services. Camden 
Council provided refuse collection services to public 
authority premises. The Manpower Services Commission 
advertised local authority job vacancies. The London 
Fire and Civil Defence Authority provided fire 
services at local authority buildings. Thames Water
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provided water supply and sewerage to council 
premises.
Non-traded services were not provided free but gave 
rise to a complex pattern of financial flows based on 
rates and special payments. Some authorities, for 
example the Inner London Education Authority, paid 
rates on the normal basis. Where the Crown occupied 
property, for example a hospital, a payment was made 
through the health authority on the basis of a 
valuation made by the Treasury Valuer. A special 
formula was used to calculate payments in the form of 
rates by statutory undertakings. Some authorities 
made a mixture of payments: for example London
Regional Transport paid rates on properties on 
non-operational land and special payments for those on 
operational land. The local authority paid itself 
rates on its property and paid its share of precepts 
and levies to bodies such as the Metropolitan Police, 
Thames Water and London Regional Transport.
Unlike the traded public sector, where a price was set 
for the supply of specific services, in the 
non-traded sector there was no direct relationship 
between services supplied and payment made. Payment 
occurred regardless of whether services were consumed 
or how much was consumed. It was difficult to value 
individually the benefits of collective consumption. 
Rates and special payments were regarded as taxes or 
enforced donations and gave rise to a different view 
of interdependence from that engendered by the supply 
of traded goods and services.
With rates public authorities were in the same 
position as private companies. They saw themselves as 
compelled to pay charges over which they exerted no 
control through the electoral system and felt that
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they subsidised a range of public services from which 
they did not perceive themselves as deriving direct 
benefits.
None of the public authorities in the network took a 
public position about the level of rates and special 
payments. However, some were prepared to argue about 
the calculation of payments and the application of 
de-rating. For example the London Electricity Board 
which paid rates of over 3.5 million pounds to Camden 
in 1985/6 was actively pursuing this strategy.
"There is an argument between the LEB and local 
authorities about rates which is reflected more 
widely than the LEB area concerning how much 
should be de-rated."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board) 
Hierarchical Relationships
Hierarchical relationships, in which one authority can 
instruct another to act on its behalf without 
redress, are relatively rare in British subnational 
government. However, such relationships existed 
between several public authorities and the local 
authority in Camden over income collection. Camden 
Council was obliged to collect levies made by the 
Metropolitian Police and London Regional Transport 
alongside the Council's own rates and the rate set by 
the Greater London Council. After Abolition the 
council also collected the precepts of the Inner 
London Education Authority, the London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority and the London Residuary Body. 
In addition "minor" precepts were collected on behlf 
of such authorities as the London Planning Advisory 
Committee and the North London Waste Authority.
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Figure 19 shows that the sums involved were 
substantial compared to the rate set by Camden. The 
rates and levies of other authorities have an impact 
on the rate-setting of the local authority (Leach et 
al. 1987) It is, therefore, in the interests of the 
subordinate authority in a hierarchical relationship 
to establish good communications with the superior 
authority so that the latter is made aware of its 
impact on the former. As a high-spending authority 
believing in the implicit worth of public 
expenditure, Camden, in theory, should have been less 
sensitive than other local authorities to the level 
of precepts it was required to collect. This 
insensitivity appeared to be broadly the case with 
the exception of the precept set by the Metropolitan 
Police. Camden Council was generally suspicious of 
police activities and questioned the level and nature 
of police expenditure. It was reluctant to collect the 
precept. The Police had attempted to allay the fears 
of Camden and other boroughs by holding an annual 
consultation meeting about the precept between the 
Receiver of the Metropolitan Police (the chief 
financial officer) and the local authority
associations in the Metropolitan Police area.
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FIGURE 19 Rates. Precepts. Levies and Charges 
1985/6
Camden Council 92.02
Inner London Education Authority 77.25
Greater London Council 34.25
Metropolitan Police 13.21
London Regional Transport 10.80
TOTAL 227.53
Non Camden rates, precepts, levies and charges as a % 
of total charges 60%
1986/7
Camden Council 113.00
Inner London Education Authority 77.25
Metropolitan Police 14.83
London Regional Transport 9.79
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority 7.70
Thames Water Authority 2.05
North London Waste Authority 1.41
London Residuary Body 1.09
London Boroughs Grant Scheme 0.61
Lee Valley Regional Park Authority 0.10
London Waste Regulatory Authority 0.07
Joint Planning Advisory Committee 0.02
TOTAL 227.92
Non-Camden rates, levies, precepts and charges as 
a % of total charges 50%
SOURCE: London Borough of Camden, 1986a
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Agency
An agency arrangement is where one authority is able 
to subcontract the provision of certain services to 
another. The contracting authority retains control 
of the level and type of service provided and of 
costs. The contracting authority does not normally 
have a choice over which public authority can act as 
its agent. In some cases it may be able to choose 
whether or not to enter an agency arrangement; in 
others it may be required to grant an agency if it is 
requested. The authority acting as agent has the 
choice whether or not to agree to a contract and may 
have significiant influence over the terms of the 
agency. Agency arrangements involving local
authorities are only possible where they are 
specifically permitted by legislation.
Camden Council acted as agent for a number of public 
authorities, mainly in the provision of engineering 
and construction services. The principal agency 
agreements were with the Greater London Council for 
works on Metropolitan roads and with Thames Water for 
work on the sewerage system. After Abolition 
metropolitan roads were either made the responsi­
bility of the Boroughs or designated trunk roads and 
looked after by the Department of Transport. Camden, 
like other Boroughs, was able to carry out agency 
work for the DoT.
The local authority, as agent, provided a "total 
service" for minor capital works and maintenance. 
Camden proposed schemes, provided the necessary 
design and costing and, if agreed by the principal, 
carried out the proposals. Camden also had an 
agreement with British Waterways Board to provide
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supervision and maintenance along the Regents Canal 
in return for public access.
The attraction of agency arrangements for the two 
parties was different. The agent was able to use the 
agreement as a means of supporting engineering and 
works departments which might otherwise be
unacceptably small. It was also able to ensure that 
locally needed works were done. For the principal the 
attraction was the ability to draw on local expertise 
and, in some cases, to dispense with the need to 
maintain certain departments.
Relationships in an agency are particularly sensitive 
at two points. First is at the point where an agency 
agreement is drawn up and the general terms and scope 
of the agreeement are crucial for both parties. 
Second is at the point where decisions have to be 
made about the proposals put forward by the agent. At 
both points each party is constrained to negotiate 
the best possible deal from its own point of view. 
The principal is normally dealing with a multiplicity 
of agents and considerable dissatisfaction can arise 
from the allocation of available cash between the 
different agents.
The arrangements between the GLC and Camden were 
long-standing and generally unproblematic, although 
they involved considerable levels of administrative 
duplication. Sewerage agencies in London were 
frequently regarded as problematic, but the 
arrangements with Thames Water were deemed 
satisfactory by both sides.
"Thames says Camden is the best agent because
they don't go back to them for anything."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of
Camden)
182
The scale of agency work was limited by Camden's 
overall budget but very significant for the work of 
certain committees and departments. The size of the 
various agency agreements is shown in Figure 20.
FIGURE 20 Agency Agreements in Camden
Authority Value of reimbursable
work carried out by 
Camden Council
Greater London Council 2,433,012
Thames Water 594,035
TOTAL 3,027,047
Regulating Each Others' Activities
Regulation is one of the basic functions which 
governments perform (Fry, 1969; Baker, 1972). Powers 
to regulate are delegated to local authorities and 
other public authorities by Parliament. These powers 
can be applied both to the activities of the general 
public and to other organisations. Regulation is 
carried out through inspection, certification and 
permission-seeking procedures. Regulations are 
ultimately enforceable through the legal system.
Some of the authorities in the study area were 
involved in regulatory activity which affected other 
public authorities. The extent and significance of 
these activities varied, however, between
authorities. The Metropolitan Police as enforcers of 
law and order were constantly involved in regulatory 
activity. Other authorities played a more limited 
regulatory role. For example, Thames Water was
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responsible for enforcing regulations on effluent, and 
the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority dealt 
with fire regulations, both of which could have 
affected the activities of the local authority and 
other public authorities. Much of this regulatory 
activity went on "unseen”, becoming visible only when 
there was a change in regulations or in enforcement 
procedures.
The local authority had a more varied regulatory role 
than any other public authority. The main areas of 
regulation were environmental health, building 
standards and land use. Land use regulation by the 
local authority gave rise to extensive interaction 
between Camden Council and other public authorities. 
The intensity of such interaction was increased by 
the high price of land in the area.
The nature of the regulatory role affects the 
relationships which develop between regulator and 
regulated. Authorities involved in regulation in the 
common interest are likely to adopt hierarchical and 
bureaucratic forms of management and to adopt an 
authoritative style towards their clientele (Webb, 
1971). Such a style reflects the quasi-legal nature of 
the regulatory role and the importance accorded in 
government and public administration to maintaining 
fair and universal standards. Relationships between 
regulator and regulated would be expected to be 
routine, formal and standardised.
This model fitted some interauthority regulatory 
activity such as fire regulations and environmental 
health regulation, however, it did not fit land use 
planning. Baker (1972) offers a different view of the 
regulatory role. While agreeing that regulation is a 
"circumscribed, routinised activity", he notes that it
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can be highly discretionary. It, too, needs to 
involve consent:
"When a Governments sphere of activity is 
extended very widely unless it is a very strong 
dictatorship, much of the regulation has in 
effect to be done by agreement and compromise, 
often with a multiplicity of interests... This 
second conciliating or compromising function of 
Government can never be completely distinguished 
from the first, that of regulating." (p89)
Whereas the enforcement of regulations on something 
such as building standards was handled almost 
exclusively by officers and was very routine, land- 
use planning was a highly politicised activity. In 
order to carry out its role as land-use planning 
authority, Camden had to balance a variety of 
interests including those of residents, employers, 
employees and other public authorities. It also 
tended to a be a sporadic activity triggered by 
individual planning applications. A number of 
applications were being made by other public 
authorities for substantial developments which were 
not routine or standardised. A particular example of 
interdependence-based or regulation which involved 
delicate balancing of interests related to the 
development of New End Hospital.
Camden adjoined the central business district and 
commercial heart of London and contained areas of 
very favoured residential property. Public
authorities were under pressure to divest themselves 
of surplus land and property at their maximum 
commercial value to relieve financial constraints. 
These pressures existed over New End, an extremely 
valuable site between Hampstead Heath and the main 
centre of Hampstead. Hampstead Health Authority 
proposed to close the hospital, which was used for
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elderly patients, and sell the site for commercial 
development. The money obtained would have allowed 
development of a new hospital on a nearby site. The 
Inner London Education Authority was involved since 
it wanted part of the New End site to expand an 
adjacent school on a cramped location and to sell a 
block of nearby tenements to allow for school 
expansion. Some of the buildings involved were 
listed and there was resistence from the tenants who 
would have been displaced. A solution had to be found 
which balanced the interests of the tenants, allowed 
the Health Authority to redevelop, allowed the school 
to expand, proved an attractive deal to the 
developers, and preserved Camden's interest in a 
good environment, affordable housing and good public 
facilities. The proposals were the subject of 
considerable public debate, lobbying, negotiation and 
political activity, and illustrated regulation as 
balancing and the achievement of compromise.
British Rail was a major landowner in Camden and like 
the health authorities was seeking to divest itself 
of surplus land at a premium. One of the biggest 
development opportunities in London involved the 
development of land behind King's Cross Station. Land- 
use regulations were ultimately the tool used to 
decide upon the development proposal, although because 
of the scale of the development involved, the 
decision would almost certainly be shifted upwards in 
the system from the local authority to the Secretary 
of State.
Two factors reduced the amount of regulatory activity 
which might have existed between public authorities 
in Camden. In Britain there has been a tradition of 
exempting public authorities from the full range of 
public regulation. The reasoning behind exemption has
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been that public authorities are responsible bodies 
which can be trusted to adhere to high standards 
without the formal procedures appropriate to other 
bodies. Exemption implies a mutuality of interest 
between regulator and regulated in the public sector 
that is absent elsewhere. Examples of such 
exemptions have included Crown immunity from public 
health inspection. Immunity from inspection by local 
environmental health officers was ended for the 
National Health Services premises in 1987 but still 
continues for other public services such as prisons.
Special procedures for public authority regulation 
have also been common, such as those for seeking 
planning permission by government bodies. There is an 
assumption that other public authorities should be 
treated differently and a presumption in favour of 
their proposals.
Exemptions have been criticised as fostering double 
standards. An example of the problem of standards 
arose in Camden in 1987 over residential care for the 
elderly. Local authorities have responsibility for 
registering and monitoring service standards in 
private residential homes. In Camden concern over 
standards in the authority's own homes was voiced by 
Hampstead Health Authority and as a result an 
independent inquiry was set up to investigate. In the 
subsequent report it was stated that,
"In general we have been very disappointed with 
the standards of care offered in the residential 
homes and it is significant that if the homes 
were subject to the Registered Homes Act 1984 it 
is likely that only three out of 10 would be 
registered."
(Halpern/ 1987)
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The general climate in recent years had been 
favourable to de-regulation, particularly where 
regulations were thought to affect business and 
enterprise. For example, various steps had been taken 
to relax land use planning controls which affected 
public landowners as much as private landowners. The 
White Paper, Lifting The Burden (Cabinet Office,1985) 
sets out the government's approach to regulation and 
lists a large number of deregulatory measures already 
taken and an equally extensive range of measures under 
review. They include services operated by local 
authorities, fire and transport authorities.
TASK ENVIRONMENT INTERDEPENDENCE
A central theme of the literature on inter- 
organisational studies is that organisations
operating in connected fields should be viewed as 
part of each other's environment (Thompson & McEwan, 
1958). In the public authority network in Camden the 
closely connected nature of many of the services 
provided meant that the different authorities were 
regularly operating in close proximity to each other. 
Interdependence arose from the way that their actions 
could affect each other's options and their need to 
take notice of the actions of others in developing 
their own strategies and plans.
The nature of the public services provided by the 
network studied in Camden resulted in task 
environment interdependence arising between the local 
authority and other public authorities in two 
different situations. In the first place, within 
Camden, they were all providing services to the same 
group of customers. Furthermore, given the basic 
nature of the services they provided, many customers 
consumed some of the services provided by several
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authorities. Second, interdependence arose where the 
services they provided had a geographical dimension or 
were tied to particular situations or events.
Task environment interdependence is broadly similar to 
Pennings' (1980) category of symbiotic 
interdependence. He describes this relationship as 
one existing between organisations that provide 
complementary services to the same clients. Pennings 
suggests that compared with other forms of 
interdependence symbiotic interdependence has little 
strategic importance for the organisations concerned 
and is unlikely to give rise to lasting or 
significant interaction. In the public authority 
network in Camden task environment interdependence was 
a common form of interdependence and supported much of 
the interaction between the local authority and other 
service-providing authorities in the area.
Serving the Same Customers
There was considerable overlap in the customer/client 
bases of the organisations in the public authority 
network in Camden. The extent of the overlap was 
determined in part by the degree to which the 
boundaries of the authorities coincided (Flynn et al 
1985). It was also determined by geographical 
qualifications placed by authorities on would-be 
consumers of their services. Some services were 
available for consumption by anyone who happened to 
find themselves within the authority's boundary. For 
some authorities, such as the transport operators, 
this pattern of consumption was normal? consumers were 
expected to have no link with the authority's 
geographical area other than to want to purchase or 
consume services there. For other authorities, links 
with geographically defined operating areas were
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critical in defining access* In most cases residence 
was the key factor. There were, therefore, two 
groups which were potential customers/clients of both 
the local authority and other public authorities 
serving Camden. One group comprised those who lived 
in Camden, the other those who had reason to be in 
Camden for part of their time such as commuters, 
shoppers, students and visitors.
Among both groups were sub-groups of people who were 
dependent upon public authorities for a multiplicity 
of services. Prominent among these groups were the 
elderly, the physically and mentally handicapped, 
under-fives, those with low incomes, the homeless, 
children and women at risk and offenders, particularly 
juveniles. Many examples of groups to whom both the 
local authority and the other public authorities in 
the area provided services were cited by respondents. 
For example:
"Benefit recipients are dependent on both the 
DHSS and Camden, on the latter for their housing 
benefit."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Social services and the police are involved with 
juveniles, drugs, domestic violence and homeless 
persons."
(Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Interaction can also arise from the provision of 
health services to groups who are dependent upon 
the local authority and the education authority 
for the provision of special services. This 
includes provision of srvices to the elderly, the 
mentally ill and the mentally and physically 
handicapped."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
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"The police and the local authority are closely 
related but only on a practical level, for 
example they do work with the same families and 
in the same areas.11
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
Customers and clients are served better by authorities 
whose services fit together and complement each other.
"The public should be able to get information 
anywhere and each organisation should have an 
idea of what other public organisations do. The 
main aim in this is to help the public because 
people have multiple problems and it is important 
to sort out problems which prevent people getting 
jobs which are not necessarily job-related."
(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)
However, the sub-groups mentioned above did not have 
a strong consumer voice to demand such co-ordination. 
For example, many consumers of multiple public 
services were ineligible to vote or unregistered. 
Consumer representation in the non-elected public 
authorities was frequently weak.
Co-ordinatidn of service provision was, however, also 
in the interests of the authorities. Although 
authorities provided distinct and separate services 
they often addressed single parts of a complex 
multi-dimensional problem. The effectiveness of one 
authority's services would depend upon the
effectiveness of another authority's provision. One 
respondent described the system of service provision 
as a "jigsaw" where all the parts had to be made to 
fit together in order to serve the public.
"Both [the DHSS and the local authority] are 
working in different ways to the benefit of the 
public. Both are part of a jigsaw."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
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"The health authority and the local authority are 
reliant on each other to produce services."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
"There is no joint input but different inputs to 
make a satisfactory service."
(Administrator, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
Interdependence arose sometimes from the sequencing of 
services. For example, DHSS assessment of a client*s 
eligibility for benefit not only unlocked the door to 
local authority housing benefit;
"Clients should come to the DHSS first before 
they go to other agencies for help."
(Assistant Director, Information, London South, 
DHSS)
but also opened up a range of other services such as 
assistance with the payment of fuel bills. Co­
ordination was needed to ensure that clients moved 
through the system in the right order and received 
the full range of services to which they were 
entitled. Camden had set up its Welfare Rights Unit 
to tackle perceived bottlenecks in the benefit 
system.
"The Welfare Rights Unit exists to sort out 
the breakdowns in the system."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
The DHSS for its part talked about a holistic approach 
to services;
"A whole person concept exists to integrate our 
own benefits and to look at other aspects of 
benefit. The DHSS should be the main/lead
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agency.11
(Assistant Director, Information, London South, 
DHSS)
as well as the need for one authority, the DHSS to 
take a lead role in welfare services.
Public authorities in Camden were responsible for 
meeting different types of need among those dependent 
upon them for services. Some needs are arguably more 
basic than others (Maslow, 1954). For example ILEA 
provided education services in adult training 
centres. The effectiveness of education would have 
been impaired if the local authority and the health 
authority had not acted in such a way as to optimise 
the health and well-being of those attending the 
centres. Authorities recognised difficulties posed 
for them in providing for groups which required a 
multiplicity of services.
'•Services which are particularly difficult to 
offer involve care for groups who need a wide 
range of services, for example the elderly and 
the physically handicapped."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"Bloomsbury cannot provide a comprehensive public 
health service without links... The local 
authority cannot support local services without 
taking into account that of the health
service."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority).
Co-ordination was seen to be necessary to overcome 
the difficulties and provide a coherent and 
complementary package of services.
VRemoving. duplication, developing complementary 
approaches so that the needs of the area are 
fully served by a variety of services are only 
possible by joint co-operative approaches."
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(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
"Under-5s - integration needs to take place with 
the health authority, social services and 
recreation services.”
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
“Liaison groups have been set up on the elderly, 
mental handicap and disabilities, comprising 
members, consumers and officers.”
(Assistant Director Social Services, London 
Borough of Camden)
Interdependence also arose where one authority was 
responsible for alleviating the symptoms of a problem 
but the causes of the problem could be tackled only 
by another authority. For example, health problems 
could be partially caused by poor living conditions, 
and in turn partly caused by low incomes. For example, 
several authorities were involved in the problem of 
truancy. The police were involved in dealing with the 
symptoms while the education authority was closer to 
dealing with the cause. In some cases the education 
authority was dealing with a symptom of problems 
which could more appropriately be tackled by the 
local authority social services department. Co­
ordination was seen to be necessary on a case basis 
by the parties involved and in the above example had 
been set up on a regular basis.
"Non-attendance conferences are held fortnightly 
which are attended by ILEA, the Police and 
Social Services. They discuss truancy and lack 
of attendance on a case by case basis and 
information is pooled upon which decisions on 
action can be taken."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education. Authority)
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A common problem with which most authorities had to 
deal was public ignorance of which authority supplied 
which service. Many thought that the local authority 
provided a much wider range of services than it 
actually did. In other cases clients sought help for 
immediate problems and did not seek help for other 
contributory problems. Authorities, therefore, often 
found themselves presented with problems which did 
not fall under their jurisdiction. Clients and 
customers had to be referred to more appropriate 
authorities. Interdependence arose between referring 
and receiving organisations. Referring authorities 
needed sufficient information about the
responsibilities and structure of other authorities 
to be able to divest themselves successfully of 
clients they could not serve.
"The main business is the proper payment of 
benefits. The office is not concerned with 
welfare except in terms of financial welfare. 
Where wider problems exist the role of the office 
is to refer. Staff are asked to keep an eye 
open for obvious non-financial problems and refer 
them accordingly."
(Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, The Crown 
Estate)
Receiving agencies relied on an efficient inward 
referral process to reach their full client base.
Pennings* model of symbiotic relationships suggests 
that the interdependence arising from serving the 
same customers will give rise to predominantly ad hoc 
and informal relationships and will not be viewed as 
strategic by the authorities concerned. There was, 
as predicted, much contact between authorities on a 
case basis, and professionals handling such cases had 
built up a web' of informal links to facilitate their 
work.
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"Informal links are developed by officers 
involved who have their own working
relationships on a day-to-day basis."
(Assistant Director Social Services, London 
Borough of Camden)
Where there was a continuous need for such liaison, 
regular forums for the discussion of cases had been 
established. However, cases also raised questions at 
a strategic level.
"There is a need to talk about specific problems 
and solutions in a strategic not a day-to-day 
environment."
(Unit General Manager (Elderly), Bloomsbury 
Health Authority)
Tensions existed at a policy level about the 
differing objectives of authorities in providing 
services to groups of clients, which could be only 
partially resolved at the case level.
"The JCPT did a survey of organisations involved 
with the elderly and found that while they had 
the same objectives they differed at the 
implementation level. The same survey found that 
for mental handicap priorities differed."
(Assistant Director Social Services, London 
Borough of Camden)
This area was very sensitive and was usually avoided 
or approached very cautiously by authorities as it 
impinged on the autonomy of the other authorities. 
Where attempts were made to engage in strategic 
debate about the nature of services provided to 
particular groups of clients, it was often 
unsuccessful.
"At a policy level liaison meetings [between 
local authority and the DHSS] are problematic.
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DHSS says it cannot discuss policy changes 
because policy is given from above. It cannot 
discuss nitty gritty issues as policy because 
every case is different. Therefore there is 
frustration because neither policy nor cases can 
be dealt with.”
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
Forming Part of Each Others Operating Environment
By definition all the public authorities in the study 
were providing services in the same geographical 
area. However, the nature of the tasks they performed 
brought certain authorities into even closer 
proximity. Authorities would not only share clients 
but also provide services at the same time and in the 
same place. In some cases the services provided by one 
authority or its service delivery patterns would 
impinge directly upon the services provided by 
another. The dense urban environment of Camden tended 
to increase the impact of authorities' activities 
upon each other. Failure by one authority to take 
account of the impact of its decisions on another 
caused conflict and soured relationships.
"The Police are critical of the actions of 
certain committee chairpeople whose decisions 
have an impact on them. For example, squatters 
using an empty warehouse were granted a street 
closure and music and dancing licence by Camden 
for a party. 40 police were required to control 
the event which was eventually scaled down after 
protest. No reference whatsoever had been made 
to the police before the decisions were taken."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
Emergencies provided an example of where authorities 
including the local authority had to provide services 
together at a location dictated by circumstances.
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Where several authorities were providing services 
simultaneously it was important there were clear 
definitions of their respective roles and a system 
for dealing with operational conflicts and issues 
affecting the task of more than one authority. 
Because emergencies were sudden and unpredictable, 
such relationships needed to be organised in advance. 
Organisation was achieved by planning and laying down 
procedures.
"The aim is to bring order out of chaos. All 
large incidents are chaos. Simple plans 
help to bring order to chaos.”
(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority)
However, plans had their limitations in what could be 
achieved at a major incident.
"Plans work when an incident is straightforward"
(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority)
This point was well illustrated in Camden, shortly 
after the fieldwork for this study was completed, by 
the King's Cross fire. The subsequent report 
criticised among other things the adequacy of the 
co-ordination between London Underground and the 
emergency services despite the existence of "pre-laid 
plans for tube incidents."
Authorities may also share facilities and premises. 
The extent of such sharing was limited in Camden. For 
example, there was no dual use of schools agreed with 
ILEA. There were some examples in leisure services 
where.Camden provided recreational facilities on land 
or in premises owned by other public authorities.
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"Camden delivers services within the area on 
other public agencies' land. It leases [canal] 
towpath for access and maintains it. It leases 
[railway] embankments for ecological reasons."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Camden has its own boats such as the Tarpauley 
which provides day trips and five day trips."
(Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways Board)
Hospital social work was an example of a service 
provided by the local authority not just on the 
premises of another authority but in close 
relationship with the services of the health 
authority. In Camden the provision of hospital social 
workers was a contentious matter because the large 
number of hospitals in the area meant that the local 
authority had a disproportionately large social work 
bill.
"Hospital social work causes a lot of trouble. 
Camden has a lot of hospitals and therefore 
Camden has many more social workers. We have 
been trying to get this recognised so that other 
local authorities share the burden. For example, 
Great Ormond Street is a national and 
international institution but Camden pays. 
Similarly, University College Hospital and the 
Royal Free. Finally, we are getting the DHSS to 
act after threatening to charge the NHS for the 
service. The staff bill is two million pounds."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
The local authority leased property to both the health 
authorities and the family practitioner committee. 
The basis of all these relationships was that of 
landlord and tenant. Where rent or charges were 
involved each party had an interest in negotiating a 
fair and satisfactory level of reimbursement. Such 
relationships were governed by formal legal agreements
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which set out the rights and duties of the parties 
involved.
The services provided by some authorities had a direct 
physical impact on the services provided by others, 
as was clearly illustrated in highways and transport. 
Service delivery by London Buses was particularly 
sensitive to traffic conditions which were influenced 
by, amongst other things,the local authority 
responsible for the condition of many of the roads 
and for traffic management.
"Buses use public highways and their operation is 
highly sensitive to traffic conditions. Prior to 
Abolition the GLC was the leading authority for 
bus lanes and bus priorities as well as general 
traffic control measures such as traffic lights.
Relationships on these matters will now be with 
the Boroughs and the Department of Transport."
(District General Manager, London Buses)
The local authority was responsible for street 
lighting and was obliged to liaise with British Rail 
to ensure that lighting did not affect train
operations.
"There is contact with British Rail on
construction and bridge building and lighting 
near railways, so that it does not affect 
trains, as well as building over tunnels such as 
the new Hampstead Woods site."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
The close physical proximity of infrastructure 
services and their ability to affect each other's 
operations was recognised as reguiring regular
interaction and an approach which prevented services 
disrupting each other rather than one which focused on 
repairing damage after it had occurred. An exception
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to this pattern was the reinstatement of highways 
after works. The universal practice of laying pipes 
and cables under roads and pavements meant that 
public authorities had constantly to interfere with 
the surfaces maintained by the local authority.
"Highways require regular contact with the 
utilities, for example, gas and water who dig up 
the road. They have to liaise with Camden and 
Camden reinstates the road although the utility 
pays. Complex legal problems of liability may 
occur if, for example, problems develop after 
reinstatement. 17,000 holes and trenches are 
opened up each year in the Borough."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
This relationship was a source of constant 
aggravation because of the requirement that the local 
authority reinstate the surface at the expense of the 
authority which disrupted the surface.
"It is a big job getting them to pay for 
damage and reinstatement. The Water Board 
(Thames Water) is the worst, , though they 
are not all as bad as each other."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
Some of the problems stemmed from the unsatisfactory 
legal framework which did not oblige authorities to 
inform the local authority of their actions. Since 
the local authority had ultimately to deal with the 
problem and was the target of public complaints about 
the state of the roads and pavements, it was anxious 
to optimise relations with the relevant service 
authorities to improve communications. It was also 
campaigning along with other local authorities for a 
changfe in the legislative framework.
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GOAL ENVIRONMENT INTERDEPENDENCE
Horizontal interdependence is found among competitors 
either for customers, as in the case of firms trading 
goods and services in the same market, or resources, 
such as the contributions or funds which voluntary 
bodies might vie for from the same public (Pennings, 
1980). One organisation can affect the ability of
another to achieve its goals by changes in factors
such as products, purchasing or price.
The local authority and other public authorities in 
Camden were generally producing non-competing 
services and operated in distinct markets. However 
they did compete for resources and also for power and 
influence. Competition led to interdependence when the 
success or failure of one organisation to obtain
scarce resources or power affected the ability of 
another organisation to fulfil its aims.
Interdependence arose also, not from competition, but 
from common concerns about resources and powers which 
affected the ability of organisations to achieve 
their individual goals.
Competing for Power. Resources and Influence
Competition as a form of organisationsal dependence 
has received considerable attention among theorists 
of interorganisational relations. Many early studies 
were based on research among commercial enterprises 
(Thompson & McEwan, 1958; Assael, 1969) and voluntary 
associations (Levine and White, 1961; Aiken and Hage, 
1968). Theories of interorganisational relationships 
were developed to fit behaviour among organisations 
which competed for customers, clients, market share 
or public fujids. Studies of intergovernmental 
relations in federal systems have also focused on the
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way different levels of government compete for power 
and resources through bargaining and negotiation.
All the authorities in the network in Camden were in 
competition with each other for a diminishing 
allocation of public funds. However, such competition 
took place at a far higher level than that of the 
organisational units serving Camden. Allocation of 
grant and subsidy between service sectors took place 
centrally with key decisions being made at Cabinet 
level.
Within service sectors, allocation was also
centralised though the degree of centralisation 
varied. For example, allocation between local
authorities occurred nationally while allocation 
between district health authorities took place at the 
regional level. Some funding was channelled through 
grant-giving authorities at the regional level such 
as the Sports Council for whose funds local
authorities in an area competed.
As resources became scarcer competition became 
tougher, with two effects. First, authorities tended 
to focus attention more within their sector rather 
than on the wider picture. Second, it made
authorities increasingly defensive. Neither attitude 
seemed particularly conducive to developing
interauthority relationships.
"The DHSS has generated fighting among health 
organisations. Districts fight region. Regions 
fight each other. In a situation of constraint 
and cut backs energy goes into in-fighting."
(General Practitioner, Kentish Town Health 
Centre)
Legislation on competitive tendering forced 
authorities to compete with private contractors for
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the provision of specified services. However, public 
authorities were prohibited from tendering for each 
other's business.
"Camden must compete with outsiders but cannot
take outside business itself, which is unfair "
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of
Camden)
The nearest which authorities came to competitive 
bidding against each other was the annual round of 
bids to principals such as Thames Water and the 
Department of Transport for a share of the funds for 
agency work. Again this competition was intra-sector.
Authorities were anxious to see changes in the 
location of responsibility for a number of services. 
Some proposed changes were mutually agreeable; others 
were contentious. For example, both the local 
authority and the public utilities wanted a change of 
law on the reinstatement of services after works. The 
LFCDA wanted all aspects of fire prevention to be 
concentrated under its authority. In this case 
responsibility had been fragmented by the allocation 
of functions formerly discharged by the GLC.
Proposals to relocate other services were subject to 
considerable opposition. Unlike the previous 
examples which primarily affected London, they were 
national movements by authorities within a policy 
sector campaigning for changes in powers. For 
example, local authorities wanted to regain
responsibility for local sewers, a proposal opposed 
by the water authorities. Camden, in common with a 
number of Labour local authorities, wanted to be 
given powers to determine local economic policy, which 
was fiercely opposed by central government.
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"Camden is looking to draw in resources and to be 
given powers to intervene.”
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
The local authority had adopted a campaigning stance 
on a number of public policy issues that were outside 
the authority's direct line of responsibility. In 
many cases this bid was not for power but for
influence. Camden's campaigning was directed at two 
levels of decision-making. At one level it was 
directed at the policies of individual public 
authorities providing services in the area; at another 
it was directed at central government.
Camden's efforts to influence other authorities and 
change their policies was overtly recognised.
"Camden wants to influence other bodies in how 
they operate and get them to start thinking in 
'our terms'.”
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
The role of money in securing influence in a 
classical.exchange process is further illustrated in 
the leisure area:
"Camden is seeking to encourage other authorities 
to manage their services better - generally they 
take kindly to it especially where they 
themselves have financial problems and Camden may 
be able to assist through a joint approach."
(Director of Recreation Services, London 
Borough of Camden)
Two examples of authorities on which Camden 
particularly targeted its efforts were the 
Metropolitan Police and the health authorities. Camden 
wanted to see changes in both the accountability and
the nature of policing. To this end it had set up its 
Police Unit and Police Committee to monitor and 
challenge police activity as well as to campaign for 
change at a wider level. Relations were largely 
confrontational but tempered by the police*s general 
desire to be seen to be sensitive to the views of 
local communities about the way in which they were 
policed. The local authority had also set up a 
Health Sub-committee to shadow health policy. In 
health, however, the necessity for the local 
authority and the health authorities to work together 
on community care gave Camden Council the opportunity 
to bargain with the health authorities and exert 
influence over policy.
Camden was seen to espouse radical views on certain 
aspects of health care:
"Camden takes a Left Wing Socialist view that you 
do not need medical care for geriatrics and 
psychiatric patients.”
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Camden*s views were seen to have been influential in 
certain ways:
"The Health Service cannot make progress on the 
closure [of Friern mental hospital] without a 
close dialogue with Camden. Camden as a result 
has been able to influence thinking within 
psychiatric services which were previously 
dominated by medical/institutional orienta­
tions.”
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
However, not all those involved in health 
organisations saw Camden's approach as legitimate.
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"Camden have produced a detailed document on 
Camden and its needs looking at health care and 
deprivation but no collaboration has occurred. 
The FPC thinks delivery of health is its remit."
(Planning Officer, Camden and Islington 
Family Planning Committee)
Both those within the local authority and those in 
other public authorities saw Camden's campaigning as 
a strategy for challenging central government 
policies.
"Camden's ultimate aim is to change things on a 
national level."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The main aim of much campaigning is to score 
points off government."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
Such a stance could have been interpreted as a 
response to central government's critical views of 
local authority policies and processes. Challenges to 
local authority power and influence had in the main 
been direct, although the competitive actions of the 
Manpower Services Commission were seen to be part of 
a central government strategy to gain authority in 
training.
s
"Quietly local authorities work with the MSC and 
fight off its take-over bids - because they see 
MSC as an agent of central government control."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
Campaigning does not invariably produce confron­
tational relationships, although this outcome is 
likely when campaigning is directed at issues close 
to an organisation's core concerns or towards a third
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party. Public authorities providing services in 
Camden were constrained by their own professionals as 
well as by central government from going native. 
Campaigning therefore led to a defensiveness in 
relationships.
"Local authority officers cannot sit down and 
work together because they are constrained by 
policies they must work towards - they behave 
inflexibly, defending their autonomy and terms of 
reference rather than seeing what needs doing."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee) 
Shared Aims and Objectives
Amongst public authorities the success of one 
authority is not necessarily achieved at the expense 
of other authorities. Interdependence arose from the 
commonality of aims between the local authority and 
other public authorities providing services in 
Camden.
"Relationships develop via common needs and 
common issues; having common duties imposed by 
central government."
(Chair, Housing Management Committee, London 
Borough of Camden)
Improved public services were at the heart of the 
commonality between authorities and, to a less extent, 
reduced umemployment. Common aims did not exclude 
differences about the appropriateness of particular 
policies and programmes but were seen as an essential 
ingredient for the development of effective inter­
authority relationships.
"The key factor for success is recognising that 
we are all trying to do the same thing"
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
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"It is necessary for structures to be sound and 
regular well-ordered communications to occur and 
be serviced properly. But this is not 
sufficient: there needs to be a common purpose - 
it can be political, or a common purpose can be 
seen in activity.”
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
"Employment is a very difficult area for local 
authorities and government - all want it but no 
one has a clue how to acheive it."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
"There is a day to day consensus with Abbey Buses 
especially on improvement measures. Both are 
working to improve public transport."
(Planning Officer (Transport) London Borough of 
Camden)
Some previous studies have suggested that inter­
dependence may arise among organisations as a result 
of altruism (White et al 1975). Public authorities 
would be concerned to help other authorities because 
of a feeling of solidarity between them, not just in 
the expectation of themselves receiving assistance at 
some time in the future. Altruism is consistent with 
the values of public administration and service. It 
was not a widely expressed sentiment. As will be 
discussed later, relationships with public
authorities were seen to differ from those 
established with the commercial or voluntary sectors.
However, although relationships with other public 
authorities may have been easier, there was little to 
suggest that altruism was at the root of the 
difference.
"Relationships with local authorities are on 
the whole a little better they are generally 
more sympathetic to the LEB."
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(Divisional Manager, London Electricity 
Board)
Sympathy was seen, however, to stem largely from 
familiarity and the common experience of working 
within the system of public accountability.
Organisations which compete with each other may also 
have common interests which affect their individual 
survival. The most important issue of common concern 
was falling central government grants and increased 
expenditure controls. Respondents in most
organisations cited resource constraints as a problem 
for developing relationshps. Many others saw the 
need to find a way round such problems in order to 
pool resources and benefit from additionality. 
However, there was little suggestion that there 
should be common action to try and secure more 
resources. Individual authorities fought battles for 
their own budgets but only the local authority was 
prepared to campaign actively about public
expenditure in general. No other authority was 
prepared to be publicly aligned with this campaign, 
and individual authorities were suspicious of Camden 
Councils's attempts to intervene on their behalf.
"Bloomsbury feels bitter about Conservative
health policy. How do you cope? By fighting for 
more money but doing the best with what you 
have. The Labour councillors [on the district 
health authority] especially <* are absolutely
opposed to cuts and the discussion of cuts. They 
vote against proposals and put out press 
releases which are very unhelpful. It makes good 
discussion impossible."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Authorities' attitudes towards public expenditure
typified attitudes towards other issues that appeared
to affect the interests of most, if not all, the 
organisations in the public authority network. 
Abolition of the GLC directly affected most 
authorities and introduced uncertainty into the 
environment, but only Camden Council became engaged 
publicly in the issues.
CONCLUSIONS
Camden Council and the other public authorities
serving the Borough were connected by a great many 
different types of interdependency. The Principal 
forms of interdependence identified in Camden were:
a. interdependence arising from the sharing of
powers and responsibilities by different 
authorities ?
b. interdependence arising from the supply of goods 
and services by one authority to another;
c. interdependence arising from one authority being 
given powers to instruct another authority to 
act on its behalf?
d. interdependence arising from the ability of one 
authority to sub-contract part of its service 
provision to another authority?
e. interdependence arising from the ability of one
authority to regulate another authority's
activities?
f. interdependence arising from serving the same
customer/client groups;
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g. interdependence arising from operating close to 
other authorities and using each other's land 
and premises;
h. interdependence arising from competing with each 
other for power, resources and influence;
i. interdependence arising from pursuing shared aims 
and objectives.
The incidence of each type of interdependency 
overlapped so that most public authorities were 
linked to the local authority in several ways. For 
example, interdependence between Camden Council and 
Thames Water arose from the supply of water and 
sewerage services by Thames Water, Camden's work as 
an agent for Thames Water for local sewers, public 
health regulation by both authorities, the location 
of water and sewerage pipes, and the mutual 
interests of the two authorities in land-use planning. 
On the other hand, interdependence between Camden 
Council and Bloomsbury Health Authority arose 
principally from providing closely connected services 
to the same group of clients, particularly vulnerable 
and dependent people within the community; joint 
responsibility for developing community care 
projects; the provision of hospital social workers by 
Camden Council; competition for influence over the 
kind of health services provided in the Borough and 
common aims of improving the quality of life enjoyed 
by Camden people. Overlapping was not solely a 
function of the fact that the local authority was a 
multi-service organisation, since patterns of multiple 
interdependencies were observed between other public 
authorities in the network. The total pattern of 
interdependence in the public authority network in 
Camden was complex.
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Different types of interdependence gave rise to 
different patterns of behaviour and provided the 
basis for forming different types of relationships 
between the authorities. For example, relationships 
between Camden Council and the Metropolitan Police 
involved four main forms of interdependence? 
hierarchical relationships, serving the same clients 
and operating in the same physical environment and 
competition for influence over policing. Camden had an 
interest in the level of the precept it was asked to 
collect and the Metropolitan Police responded by 
consultation with local authorities before setting 
its annual rate. Camden and the police both had 
responsibilities towards offenders and for providing 
a safe and acceptable environment for local people. 
The authorities differed in their priorities and 
preferred actions in relation to both groups. 
Interdependence between the authorities had given 
rise to two different and conflicting patterns of 
behaviour. On the one hand, Camden adopted a 
campaigning stance towards the police aimed at 
winning influence over the way policing was carried 
out and ultimately at changing the structure of the 
police. At the same time, the Metropolitan Police was 
seeking to work more closely with other agencies 
including local authorities on a full range of 
policing problems. Beneath was a flow of day-to-day 
problems such as dealing with abandoned cars or 
traffic diversions in which each authority had a 
purely practical interest in handling the task 
effectively.
The example of the Metroplitan Police and Camden 
Council serves to illustrate how different forms of 
interdependence give rise to different interests and 
form the basis for different types of behaviour and 
relationships. It also illustrates how such interests
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may conflict and give rise to behaviour and 
relationships that conflict with each other and cause 
tension between the authorities. Tension was rife 
between the local authority and the police in Camden. 
The police wanted closer relationships with the local 
authority but only on certain terms and issues. The 
local authority wanted to conduct a vigorous campaign 
against police policy but also to deal with certain 
law and order problems effectively by joint action.
The many different forms of interdependence identified 
within the public authority network in Camden suggest 
that the total amount of interdependence between the 
local authority and the other public authorities 
providing services may have been great. Among the 
questions which respondents were asked to consider was 
whether the work of their authority was closely 
connected to that of other public authorities 
operating in Camden. The great majority answering the 
question directly saw their authority very closely 
connected to other public authorities.
"Absolutely inter-1inked.”
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
"The relationship is very close indeed"
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
"LEB is closely connected to every public 
authority."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
"There is little to do that doesn't have a 
relationship to the local authority."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
However, respondents drew an interesting distinction 
between what many called the theory and the practice.
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They suggested that in objective terms the 
authorities were very closely linked together and 
interdependence was extensive but the concrete 
relationships to which this gave rise were much less 
extensive.
”Yes in theory, it should be, but in practice 
not.11
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
"In theory we should have a common goal of 
providing good order and a peaceful and enjoyable 
society."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
"There should be pretty close links between the 
MSC and other public authorities."
(Manpower. Wardour Street Job Centre)
"Not as close as it should be"
(District Planning Officer. Hamstead Health 
Authority)
This theme is explored further in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 LINKAGES
The Network of Linkages among Public Authority 
Formal Linkages at the organisational level
Interlocking Memberships 
Formal Liaison Committees
Formal Linkages at the Task Level
a. joint committees
b . shadow committees
c. joint officer groups
d. joint appointments
e. case conferences
f. designation of lead authorities
g. designation of lead departments 
or staff
Informal Linkages
a. joint training
b. staff flows
c. social events
d. political and professional networks
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 6
LINKAGES
If interdependence is to give rise to interaction 
between organisations, structures and processes must 
be developed through which communication, exchange 
and other forms of organisational interaction can take 
place. The structures and processes may be formal or 
informal and may link together small parts or whole 
organisations. In some cases the mechanisms for 
interaction are spelled out in legislation and 
circulars? in other cases they are developed locally. 
Links between organisations may vary depending on the 
kinds of personnel involved, the balance of 
relationships and their quality and effectiveness.
There is no existing classification of linking 
mechanisms which can be used to discuss the links 
between Camden Council and the other public 
authorities serving the area. The links observed in 
Camden have been divided into three main groups. The 
first group includes those formal mechanisms which 
link together authorities as a whole. The second group 
comprises formal mechanisms which link parts of 
authorities, usually related to specific tasks or 
policies. The distinction was generally clear, 
although in health it was debatable whether the 
formal linking mechanisms should have been seen as 
operating at the organisational or the task level. 
Informal mechanisms are in the third group. These 
links centre on the contacts developed by individuals 
with their opposite numbers in other authorities. 
Such contacts can be actively encouraged, or 
hindered, by structures and processes both within and 
outside organisations.
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This chapter focuses on the links that had been 
developed between Camden Council and other public. To 
begin with, a picture of the wider public authority 
network into which these linkages fitted is presented.
THE NETWORK OF LINKAGES AMONG PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Studies of interorganisational relationships have been 
criticised for regarding the links between 
organisations as mere extensions of the
organisations. The "organisation set" model (Evan, 
1966) which has dominated interorganisational theory 
frequently diminishes the importance of linkages 
(Rhodes, 1981). By taking the "focal organisation" 
and the group or "set" of organisations with which it 
interacts as the basic unit of analysis, researchers 
have often ignored the independent effect of linkages 
upon organisations. The advantage of conceptualising 
the local authority and other public authorities as 
a network is that it focuses attention on the 
linkages between the organisations studied.
Respondents reported a large number of links between 
the various public authorities whose links with the 
local authority were the focus of study. Previous 
research has shown that it is not straightforward to 
describe the network which such linkages create. The 
shape of the network identified is determined by the 
measure of linkages selected (Laumann & Pappi, 1974). 
The Camden study used multiple definitions of 
linkages including all regular or formalised 
interactions between authorities which respondents 
reported. This method should have produced a denser 
pattern of linkages among the authorities studied 
than the use of any single measure.
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Studies of networks have encountered the problem of 
defining boundaries. By limiting the network under 
consideration, arbitrary criteria have to be imposed 
which can result in a misleading pattern being 
presented (Rhodes, 1981). The boundaries of the 
network examined in the Camden study resulted from the 
processes of selecting organisations described in 
Chapter 3.
Respondents were invited to name organisations located 
in the same policy community as themselves. The 
resulting network was then reduced by the imposition 
of a functional perspective which focused the study 
onto public authorities. This method produced a 
smaller network than either the organisational or 
complete public authority networks to which the 
authorities belonged.
Previous research has also developed a number of 
summary measures which can be used to describe 
networks (Harary et al 1965? White et al 1976). 
Mitchell (1969) proposed a number of characteristics 
which could be used to measure and compare their 
morphological characteristics: anchorage, density,
reachability and range. Anchorage equates to the 
notion of a focal organisation. The anchorage point 
for the Camden network was the local authority. 
Reachability measures the preponderance of direct 
links and short indirect links among organisations. 
Density measures the extent to which the links which 
could exist in theory exist in practice. Range 
measures the number of direct links centred on the 
anchorage organisation.
Figure 21 shows the pattern of inter-authority 
relationships among the public authorities in the 
study excluding the local authority. Two features of
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FIGURE 21
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES INTERACTING
WITH CAMDEN COUNCIL
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the way the network has been drawn should be noted. 
First, relationships have been assumed to be 
symmetrical. In reality they are not. For example, 
respondents at the London Fire and Civil Defence 
Authority made a number of points about links with 
the London Ambulance Service but the respondent in 
the latter organisation was preoccupied with 
relationships with other parts of the health service 
and never mentioned links with the other emergency 
services.
"Euston [DHSS Office] is usually on the receiving 
end of demands from other organisation for making 
particular payments to clients; less frequently 
Euston contacts other organisations for 
information.11
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS).
Flows of staff, resources and information may also be 
one-way. Second, the links which consist of 
contractual and trading arrangements or the discharge 
of an organisation's normal duties such as regulation 
have been excluded.
Authorities clustered together in recognisable policy 
communities, such as health, transport, emergency 
services, recreation and poverty. Three authorities 
had a greater range, i.e. more linkages than any 
other authority apart from Camden Council. They were 
the Inner London Education Authority, the police and 
the DHSS. Such pivotal authorities might have been 
able to perform some of the co-ordinating functions 
which it would have been expected that the local 
authority would perform. Some public authorities were 
poorly linked into the network, for example the 
Manpower Services Commission and the nationalised 
industries (British Rail and London Electricity 
Board).
The density of the network was about 20%, i.e. one in 
five of the potential direct links between 
authorities actually existed. Given the multiple 
measures of linkages employed, this figure seems low, 
suggesting that within Camden the network was loosely 
joined. The reachability of the network was 
transformed by the presence of the local authority 
which meant that every authority was only one step 
away from every other and the different policy 
communities were thereby linked together. The role 
of the local authority in the network was tempered by 
the scale of the networks in which the other public 
authorities were enmeshed. Many of these authorities 
straddled the Borough boundaries and operated on a 
far larger geographical scale than Camden. Their 
networks included multiple local authorities, health 
authorities, and semi-autonomous divisions of large 
public authorities. The need to maintain large 
numbers of other relationships placed limits on the 
development of relationships with Camden Council.
The morphology of the public authority network studied 
in Camden had the following features. It was 
structured around a number of distinct policy 
communities which stretched beyond Camden and the 
public sector. The density of linkages was fairly 
low. Some authorities were only tenuously linked into 
the network. The shape of the network was a 
distinctive feature of the organisational environment 
in which the local authority operated in Camden. 
First, the local authority had the opportunity to 
play a unique role in linking public authorities 
which would otherwise have been only loosely and 
indirectly linked together. Second, the ability of 
the local authority to link those authorities 
together depended upon whether the links between 
public authorities reinforced or contradicted
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relationships between those authorities and the local 
authority. The forms which linkages between
authorities took were similar and as varied as their 
linkages with Camden council.
FORMAL LINKAGES AT THE ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL
There are three ways in which organisations may be 
linked together at the level of the whole authority. 
The first is by common ownership, which is widespread 
in the commercial sector and has parallels in the 
public sector. Public sector status could be thought 
of as common ownership? however, a better analogy 
would be reporting to the same government department 
and ministry. This linking structure was not 
recognisable in Camden since no one central 
government department was responsible for the work of 
the local authority. A second way in which 
organisations can be linked together as wholes is 
through inter-locking directorates. The third way is 
through formal liaison committees. Both these forms 
of linkages were observed in Camden.
Interlocking Memberships
Organisations can be linked at the highest level 
through individuals who serve as members of more than 
one controlling board or council. Interlocking in the 
private sector arises where corporations recognise 
a specific need for co-ordination with or control of 
other corporations. It may also arise where there is 
a perceived need for general economic and political 
information and solidarity with other members of the 
business community. (Burt 1980; Pennings, 1980? 
Palmer 1983)
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Interlocking membership among public authorities may 
arise in a number of different ways. An individual 
may decide to stand for election to more than one 
body. An elected member of such an authority may be 
appointed to the board of another public authority in 
his or her own right. Likewise, an individual may be 
asked to sit on the board of more than one public 
authority. Such interlocking depends on the 
motivation of individuals to seek multiple seats and 
the preferences of those making appointments. A 
permanent way of interlocking authorities through 
membership is by nomination to a quota of places on 
a board or council. However, interlocking only occurs 
where the nominee is also a member of the nominating 
authority. An authority may be unable to persuade any 
of its members to take on the additional workload and 
have to nominate sympathetic non-members which weakens 
the interlock.
The significance of interlocking membership as a 
linking mechanism depends upon three things: first, 
the extent of interlocking . and the numbers of 
nominees on a board? second, the role of members on 
the particular authority and the definition of their 
representative role; and third, the extent to which 
those who hold dual office are interested in and 
encouraged by their own organisations to develop a 
linking role.
Interlocking membership is not a strong feature of 
governmental institutions at the local level in 
Britain. Political careers in central and local 
government are sharply differentiated. Local politics 
is a full-time occupation for a minority and the 
burden of multiple offices is unattractive to many. 
Recruitment to local office differs between local 
government, where political and ideological
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commitment is essential, and appointed boards where 
overt political affiliation can reduce chances of 
selection. A further factor serving to limit 
interlocking between local government and other 
public authorities has been the clear ministerial 
preference in recent years for appointees to have 
business rather than political or public-service 
expertise and interests.
Interlocking memberships were observed in the study of 
Camden but were not an exceptionally strong 
characteristic of the network. The three main 
services involved were health, education and fire? 
opportunities for interlocking also existed in 
training and sport. Camden Council nominated two 
members to serve on the two health authorities 
within the Borough and two members to the Camden and 
Islington Family Practitioner Committee. The former 
were filled by Labour councillors; the latter by 
Labour supporters, hence only limited interlocking 
occurred.
Until 1986 Camden nominated a member to serve on the 
Inner London Education Authority alongside the GLC 
members for the Borough. After April 1986 when ILEA 
became a free-standing authority and direct elections 
were held, the interlocking ceased as no Camden 
members stood for dual membership.
The only ILEA member for Camden after 1986 with close 
links with Camden Council had previously been a dual 
member and had held chairs in both authorities. On 
standing down as a Camden councillor he commented,
"In some senses I am pleased because work on two 
authorities is very extensive. The load is 
almost impossible. The link function is very 
valuable to deal with inter-authority issues. I 
am used as a person who can sort things out.
225
Therefore when my role disappears the loss of the 
link will be bad. It will be more a closing of 
communication."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
Interlocking was at the same time established for 
another service, fire, which passed, on Abolition, to 
the LFCDA to which Camden nominated one member.
Local authority nominations were made for two other 
bodies, the Manpower Services Commission Area Board 
and the Regional Sports Council. These nominations 
were for local authority members to represent a 
number of local authorities. Camden members were not 
involved, although some served on the local sports 
council at Borough level.
A common feature of all these services, except for 
sport, is that they have been relocated at some time 
from local authorities to specialised public 
authorities. For instance, in the early 1970's 
responsibility for many aspects of community health 
passed from local government to the National Health 
Service during a major reorganisation of both 
services. The need for a continuing relationship 
between the authorities was recognised in the way 
both services were structured. Circular HRC(73)22 
(Department of Health and Social Security 1973) 
specified that the local authority or authorities 
could nominate four of the normally 15 members of the 
Area Health Authorities and a similar level of 
representation would apply to Regional Health 
Authorities. In 1974 a Labour Secretary of State 
announced a policy of "democratisation" of the health 
service by authorities to one third and making 
parallel changes at the regional level. This policy 
was reversed by the succeeding Conservative government
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which in Circular HC(80)8/LAC(80)3 Department of 
Health and Social Security 1980 announced the 
reduction of local authority representation on the new 
district health authorities to four out of a normal 
membership of 17. Interlocking membership was also 
provided for when the Family Practitioner Committees 
became independent of their health authorities in 
1985.
Interlocking was largely confined to where it was 
required by legislation. There was no identifiable 
pattern of voluntary interlocking either by members 
seeking dual office or by councillors being chosen 
for appointment to other bodies.
The local authority had powers to co-opt non-elected 
members onto council committees. This power was 
generally exercised in favour of voluntary bodies. 
Some members of the boards of public authorities 
serving Camden had local authority experience. 
However, only exceptionally were these links with 
Camden. For example, five of the twelve members of 
Thames Water in 1986 had experience of local 
government as members. Two of these were associated 
with London authorities, one with the Corporation of 
London and one with Redbridge.
In theory the link between the local authority and the 
health authority joined the organisations as wholes 
at the highest level. In practice the link was 
weaker. Nomination was a one-way linking structure. 
Further, the local authority nominees served on health 
authorities in their own right not as representatives 
of the local authority. As will be discussed later, 
this role was difficult for elected members to play. 
In the past .few members had been interested in 
nomination and party supporters had been nominated
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instead. More recently when Camden had adopted a 
campaigning stance towards health policy, nomination 
had attracted members who wanted to use health
authority membership as a platform for public debate 
on health and public expenditure.
"The local authority has given health authority 
membership less emphasis than it should have 
been given. The Local authority attitude is 
perceived to be that health authorities should 
be democratically elected and until then health 
is a second-rate activity to be involved in. 
Membership was for a long time composed of three 
old timers but this changed after the May 
elections. There are now three new members one
of whom is a Parliamentary candidate and is seen 
to be intending to use membership as a political 
platform."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"At one time Camden could not get a majority 
party member to go on Bloomsbury Health 
Authority and they had to go outside to get a 
member of the Labour Party."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
Neither factor fostered a two-way flow of information 
or influence.
Formal Liaison Committees
An alternative means of linking organisations which 
have a broad set of interests in each others1 
activities is through a liaison committee. Under 
Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1985 a Police Consultative Committee was set up in 
Camden. Membership of the Committee included local 
councillors, police officers and representatives of 
a wide range of other interested bodies. The 
Consultative Committee had 42 members - 11
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councillors, 6 police officers, 2 ILEA members and 2 
MPs and the remainder drawn from 13 local groupings 
of community organisations.
Because it was at the Borough level it involved only 
middle-ranking officers from the police. The role of 
the Consultative Committee was to consult interested 
parties about policing rather than to provide a forum 
for both authorities to exchange views on their 
respective policies and programmes. The Commitee had 
no executive powers.
The first meeting of the Consultative Committee took 
place in January 1987 just as the research was 
finished. Strong views had already taken shape about 
its appropriateness and likely success. On the police 
side there was hope and expectation that the Committee 
would serve their interests and improve relationships 
with both the community and the local authority.
"The hope is that the police Consultative 
Committee will be a forum where genuine common 
objectives can be identified and all seek to 
attain them. This must be an evolving process 
because incrementalism is best."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
Camden Council was both suspicious of the Committee 
and critical of its constitution.
"The Police Consultative Committee will have no 
power or accountability but be a talking shop."
(Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of 
Camden)
No other formal liaison committees were prescribed on 
a one-to-one basis between the local authority and 
other public authorities in the network. Some formal
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liaison arrangements were prescribed with other 
public authorities but were based on much larger 
units than Boroughs. For example, Thames Water, 
British Waterways Board and the London Electricity 
Board had consumer consultative bodies upon which 
there was local authority representation.
The Water Act 1983 replaced direct local authority 
representation on the Boards of water authorities with 
representation on Consumer Consultative Committees. 
This completed the separation of the provision of 
water services from local government begun after the 
last war and culminating in the 1973 Water Act. The 
linkage between Thames Water and Camden Council had, 
therefore, moved from interlocking membership to a 
formal liaison committee.
Camden's interests were joined with those of all 
other local authorities in the public authority's 
area. The purpose of liaison committees with the 
Thames Water Consumer Consultative Committee was to 
provide a forum for discussion of Thames Water's 
plans and services by a wide range of organisations 
and consumer groups, not simply the local 
authorities.
Liaison committees between Camden Council and other 
public authorities were not repeated across the 
public authority network. An example of such a 
linking mechanism set up by the local authority was 
the quarterly meeting which took place between Camden 
Council and Abbey Buses, the local bus district of 
London Buses, part of London Regional Transport. It 
was a formal meeting chaired by Camden's chair of 
planning and serviced by Camden. Agendas were drawn 
up jointly and, focused on policy issues. Matters of 
detail were dealt with by joint officer meetings
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between the formal committees. Both organisations 
involved seemed to find the forum helpful.
Although these formal liaison committees involved 
councillors, none of these bodies had decision-making 
powers. All were advisory and served mainly to 
provide a forum for joint discussions.
"Section 106 has been criticised for producing 
talking shops, but it is also felt to be a step 
along the road to greater accountability."
(Superintendent (community liaison) No. 7 Area, 
Metropolitan Police)
Discussions were directed largely at the policies of 
the other public authorities rather than of the local 
authority and made these liaison committees 
asymmetrical.
FORMAL LINKAGES AT THE TASK LEVEL
Most of the formal links between Camden Council and 
the other public authorities serving the area were 
focused on particular tasks or policies. The forms 
which these links took were as varied as the work to 
which they related. Previous discussion has noted the 
variety of contractual arrangements which existed 
between public authorities. In this section discussion 
focuses on special structures and procedures 
established to link the local authority and other 
public authorities serving Camden. The mechanisms 
discussed here were formal, on-going means of linking 
authorities. The principal formal links observed in 
Camden were:
a. j oint committees
b . shadow committees
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c. joint officer groups
d . j oint appointments
e. case conferences
f. designation of lead authorities
g. designation of lead departments/staff
Examples of each of these types of linkage and the 
contexts in which they were developed are discussed 
below.
a. Joint Committees
Under Section 22 of the National Health Act 1977, 
district health authorities and local authorities 
and, after 1984, Family Practitioner Committees were 
required to set up joint consultative committees 
(JCCs) to assist in the planning and operation of 
services of common concern.
It could be argued that the links between the local 
authority and the health authorities through the JCC 
and the JCPT were at organisational rather than task 
level because of the breadth of issues which they 
cover. The legislation required them to advise 
authorities on the performance of their duties and on 
the planning and operation of services in common 
(National Health Service Act 1977 Section 22) . The 
latter requirement rather than the former dominated 
the work of the JCC? hence the linkages have been seen 
as task level rather than organisational level.
Their task was to review existing plans and then to 
develop joint strategies, development plans for major 
client groups and teams to implement their work. To 
assist the development of a joint approach, health 
authorities received a small allocation of money known 
as joint finance in their budgets.
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The amounts involved were small. Hampstead Health 
Authority*s budget in 1985 was 60 million pounds of 
which 6 million related to community care. 300,000 
pounds was designated as joint finance.
A single JCC had been set up for Camden involving both 
Hampstead and Bloomsbury Health authorities. 
Representation was at member level. Voluntary 
associates were also represented on JCC. The Camden 
JCC met three times a year and much of its work was 
delegated to joint officer groups (see below). It was 
accountable to its constituent authorities from whom 
it needed agreement for its proposals. It was seen as 
the linchpin of relationships between the local 
authority and the health authorities, yet, like JCCs 
elsewhere, it came in for criticism because of its 
lack of power compared with the magnitude of the task 
of co-ordinating such different organisations (see 
Wistow and Brooks, 1988).
"The JCC is an important means of liaison. Joint 
planning is very important. However, it is not 
capable of implementation because it cannot 
promote collaborative joint planning because of 
the structural difference between the authorities 
involved.”
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
The JCC was prescribed by legislation following the 
separation of health and social services in the 
1970s. It was not a model adopted widely for 
relationships between public authorities. An example 
of one such committee which had been initiated by 
Camden Council was the Camden Liaison Committee. It 
focused on provision for the single homeless and 
involved Camden councillors, DHSS officials and 
relevant officers from social services and voluntary 
bodies. The Liaison Committee met twice a year. In
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between times meetings took place with local DHSS 
offices.
b . Shadow Committees
Camden Council set up two committees to shadow the 
work of other public authorities: the Police
Committee and the Health Sub-committee. Their aim was 
to give political prominence to policy areas where 
Camden wished to have greater influence. The Police 
Committee was a full committee of the council and was 
supported by the six-person strong Civil Rights Unit. 
Relationships with the police were distant and very 
formal.
"The Civil Rights Unit is a unilateral action. 
The police are not involved. The police are 
willing to talk and want to set up consultation 
machinery. The CRU writes letters; they do not 
phone or visit"
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
The police view of the Committee was largely 
negative, seeing it as a threat and an attempt to 
interfere in their work.
The Health Sub-Committee was supported by the social 
services department. It was seen from outside as a 
body with limited powers.
"The Health Sub-Committee has a low profile and 
contains junior politicians."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
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Members included councillors who were on the health 
authorities within Camden as well as the two District 
Medical Officers and representatives of voluntary 
groups. The role of District Medical Officer is 
intended to be pivotal in linking local authorities
and health authorities. The holder is a medical
adviser to the local authority.
The Sub-committee had developed from a liaison group 
which briefed nominees on health authorities into a 
campaigning body concerned generally with health and 
health policy. The health authorities viewed it 
negatively and felt themselves excluded by its mode of 
operation.
"An implicit policy decision is seen by the 
health authority to have been taken to keep
health authority officers from Hampstead and
Bloomsbury out of the Sub-Committee."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"Bloomsbury representatives who have been sent 
have met with a barrage of criticisms and 
questions."
(Divisional General Manager, (Local and 
Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"The Health Sub-Committee is the least useful 
part of the mechanism because it is the 
campaigning body although it does look at some of 
the real issues."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
c. Joint Officer Groups
Member level committees are normally supported by 
joint officer groups which both prepare and implement 
proposals agreed at committee level. To support the 
work of JCCs local authorities and health authorities 
were required to set up Joint Care Planning Teams. A
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single JCPT was set up for Camden involving the two 
health authorities. Representation on both sides was 
at senior management level. Much of the work of 
developing a joint approach to care was undertaken by 
multi-disciplinary local planning teams for groups 
such as the elderly or the mentally ill.
The main links between the local authority and the 
health authorities were at officer level. Contact was 
much more frequent than at member level. It was a 
more productive arena because it was task-oriented 
and, although officers were constrained by the 
viewpoints of their elected members, their freedom to 
explore alternative strategies was greater.
Officer working groups and liaison meetings were often 
the main level at which formal discussion took place 
between the local authority and other public 
authorities about issues of common concern. In some 
cases these were regular meetings, for example, the 
three times a year meetings between ILEA divisional 
officers and officers from social services, housing 
departments and the health authorities to discuss 
issues of common interest such as housing and social 
conditions. Often, formal meetings would be project 
or issue-related and have a life only as long as the 
project or issue.
d. Joint Appointments
Joint appointments were unusual in Camden. The only 
example observed was where Joint Finance funds had 
been used to finance an officer based in Camden whose 
role was to spearhead plans for care for the mentally 
ill following the rundown of Friern Hospital. A 
jointly managed and staffed hostel had also been 
planned to provide care for former Friern patients.
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Both the health authority and the local authority had 
resisted the proposals, and a compromise had been 
arrived at whereby joint staff were avoided but the 
health authority was involved in their appointment. 
Both examples were from a policy area where there was 
considerable joint machinery, and joint responsibility 
for serving certain client groups was generally 
recognised. The contribution of a joint appointee was 
widely recognised. Nonetheless problems such as 
incompatible salary scales made joint appointments 
difficult.
e. Case Conferences
The focus of multi-service activity at the local level 
was in some cases the individual client. The 
mechanism frequently used to bring together the 
different services required by the client was the 
case conference. This device was used where one or 
more of the public authorities providing services had 
a statutory responsibility for the clients behaviour 
or well-being. For example, regular conferences were 
held on children at risk involving the police, the 
health authority, ILEA and the social services. 
Non-attendance (truancy) conferences were held 
fortnightly, attended by the police, social services 
and ILEA. Case conferences were part of the normal 
pattern of action among the professions concerned, 
and their establishment in Camden was routine.
f. Designation of Lead Authorities
Co-ordination of authorities involved in a single task 
or policy area was in some cases tackled by 
designating one of the authorities as a lead 
authority. This role was performed by Camden Council
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for a number of local authority tasks following the 
Abolition of the GLC.
Authorities for which Camden was the lead after 
Abolition included the London Area Mobility Scheme, 
the London Boroughs* Children's Regional Planning 
Committee, the London Boroughs' Disability Committee, 
the London Boroughs' Nuclear Policy Committee, the 
London Ecology Committee, the London Housing Unit 
Committee, the London Strategic Policy Unit, and the 
North London Waste Authority.
The principal examples of designating a lead 
authority as a linking mechanism came from health. 
Bloomsbury Health Authority took the role of lead 
authority for Camden in mental handicap and Hampstead 
the lead role for mental illness. This arrangement 
was practical because of the lack of co-terminosity 
of health and local authority boundaries.
g. Designation of Lead Departments or Staff
Where regular interaction with other public 
authorities was necessary, organisations often found 
it convenient to channel communications through a 
particular department or member of staff. The staff 
involved were able to build up knowledge and 
expertise about other organisations and provided a 
convenient point of contact from outside.
"There is a problem of communication. British 
Waterway Board does not know who to contact and 
referral takes time. It is important to have one 
main line of communication to other authorities."
(Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways 
Board)
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For example the DHSS Euston Office had a special 
section dealing with clients who had problems with 
paying fuel and water bills to liaise with the 
relevant utilities. The office also had two assistant 
managers responsible for liaison with the local 
authority, one with social services and one with 
housing benefit. Camden planning department had 
officers who were designated as key contacts for other 
authorities such as London Buses or the Family 
Practitioner Committee.
There were numerous other types of links which were 
observed to take place in particular circumstances. 
Although public authorities were obliged to consult 
each other about many proposed actions, they chose to 
consult each other on many more. Consultation was a 
formal process usually carried out by correspondence, 
although meetings and site visits could also be part 
of the process. For instance, London Regional 
Transport was required to consult the local authority 
about any proposals to change services. Camden had 
twenty eight days in which to make a formal response 
to proposals. If the proposal was to move a bus stop 
there was also need for a site meeting, involving not 
only the local authority but also the police.
INFORMAL LINKAGES
Many of the linkages between the local authority and 
other public authorities were instigated by 
individuals. These informal linkages were seen to 
play a vital part in co-ordinating the work of 
different organisations and in dealing with day-to-day 
issues.
Informal linkages avoided some of the rigidities 
associated with formal relationships.
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"Working in committee rooms can push people poles 
apart because they take up formal stances." 
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority).
The weakness of informal linkages which respondents 
identified was their dependence upon benevolent 
individuals.
"Relationships need to be personality-proofed. 
There is also a need to avoid ad hoc 
communications in a crisis situation."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
"Relationships rely too much on goodwill and not 
enough on formality."
(Assistant Education Officer (Further and Higher 
Education) Inner London Education Authority).
In order to develop such relationships, members and 
officers needed contacts in other organisations. 
Involvement in the formal linking mechanisms outlined 
above provided an environment in which contacts could 
be made. The discussion below focuses on some of the 
other means by which the development of contacts in 
other authorities was fostered. Three such enabling 
structures are considered:
a. joint training
b. staff flows
c. social events
a. Joint Training
Joint training was recognised by respondents as a 
means by which contacts could be made that could 
subsequently be exploited to develop or improve 
relationships .between authorities. Joint training 
provided a context in which people could get to know
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their opposite numbers in other organisations and 
develop their understanding of each other*s 
viewpoints.
"The key is people in the same service knowing 
each other as people. This can be facilitated by 
joint training and other initiatives."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
"The biggest change which occurred in the 
relationship between officers in the mental 
health field was when they both went on a Kings 
Fund course and they discovered that they were 
both saying the same things."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Joint training also offered a means of increasing 
technical knowledge about each other's services which 
could foster new or improved operational links.
"The police have invited fire people to watch 
their riot training. The fire service provides 
lecturers on police training courses."
(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and 
Civil Defence Authority)
The extent of joint training appeared to be limited. 
The examples identified were of services where there 
was already a close operational relationship such as 
community care and the emergency services. Respondents 
noted that budget restraints meant that training 
levels were low anyway.
"Cuts have affected health and social services 
more than usual. Neither is putting enough into 
training."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
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Lack of resources reduced the opportunity both for 
joint training and for people to meet people from 
other organisations at external training courses.
b. Staff Flows
Staff flows have been recognised in previous studies 
as a means by which relationships between 
organisations can be fostered.
First, they are a channel for information flow; 
second, they are a means of generating innovation as 
people enter new environments and, third, they lay the 
foundations of a network of personal contacts between 
organisations (Baty et_al, 1971).
In Camden such flows seemed to contribute little to 
the fostering of relationships. Among professional 
staff, job moves tended to be intra-sector. At lower 
levels movement between sectors was more common, 
especially where salary scales differed.
"Euston loses staff to local authorities because 
of any differentials and pressurised work. There 
is a big turnover, training is lost and staff 
levels are under-strength. Efforts are being 
made to combat this by being flexible on 
qualifications but pay is the key problem.”
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
Labour market conditions in many sectors such as 
health and social security had led to very high rates 
of turnover among staff so that continuing 
relationships were difficult to develop.
"Staff turnover at the local level causes a 
problem for consistent relations."
(Director of Nursing Services (Community 
Services Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
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"There is a lack of stability in the health 
authority and the local authority at the senior 
level. The District Medical Officer is the only 
chief officer in the district from 1982. The 
District Planning Officer is the only adminis­
trator from before 1982. There has been an 
enormous change in personnel and style. There is 
no institutional memory on either side to help 
collaboration."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
The only major staff movements which had taken place 
were one-off movements of staff following transfers 
of functions. Changes in the location of housing 
benefit had involved a group of staff moving from the 
DHSS to local authorities. The Abolition of the GLC 
had entailed large numbers of staff moving with their 
tasks to both local authorities and other public 
authorities.
c. Social Events
Some authorities arranged social events to provide 
officers and members with the opportunity to meet 
informally and extend their contacts.
"The LEB periodically holds social evenings to 
which both members and officers of the local 
authority are invited."
(Ambulance Service Divisional Manager, 
London Electricity Board)
"Abbey Buses gives receptions for people they 
have contact with: the police have similar
receptions which build contacts."
(District General Manager, London Buses)
The extent of such social events was unclear and it 
was suggested 'that more opportunities for informal 
social contacts were needed.
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"We need to create at every level a meeting 
place, for example lunch meetings at patch level 
to include social workers, doctors and vicars."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Organised social events appeared to be a practice 
more prevalent in the trading public sector. 
Relationships between senior members of some 
authorities, on the other hand were seen to be so 
antagonistic as to rule out the possibility of social 
contact.
"The Leader of the Council and the Chairman of 
the Health Authority could never have dinner 
together."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
d. Political and Professional Networks
Research on urban areas has demonstrated the 
importance of networks of personal and professional 
contacts in developing and maintaining links between 
organisations (Galaskiewicz and Shatin, 1981). In 
Camden these networks were strong but did not easily 
link Camden Council and other public authorities. 
Party political links served particularly to link 
Camden with other local authorities. Professional 
networks tended to be intra-sector except where a 
particular profession, such as civil engineering, was 
to be found in more than one type of authority.
A different research project would have been needed to 
study the social, political and professional networks 
to which public authority decision-takers belonged.
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CONCLUSIONS
The links that had been established between Camden 
Council and other public authorities serving the area 
took a great variety of forms. They could be divided 
into formal and informal. Informal links were at 
least as important as a means of maintaining 
relationships between authorities as formal links. 
Informal relationships were seen to be a direct and 
effective channel for communication and
problem-solving which avoided the bureaucracy and 
public posturing which could affect formal 
relationships.
However, the functions which informal relationships 
could perform were inevitably limited. They relied 
heavily on the interest and receptiveness of the 
individuals concerned. Informal relationships could 
deal only with matters within the control of the 
individuals concerned, which severely limited their 
scope in most circumstances. Both the local authority 
and the other public authorities recognised the 
importance of informal links and were involved in 
activities which fostered them.
Formal links between Camden and other public 
authorities were numerous but not extensive. At the 
organisational level formal links were few. The 
Council was not interlocked greatly with the 
controlling boards of other public authorities through 
overlapping memberships. There were few liaison 
committees and those that had been set up were seen 
as being limited in scope and effectiveness. The 
majority of formal links were focused on particular 
tasks of common interest to the local authority and 
one or more other public authorities.
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Such links could be formed in a great variety of ways. 
One widespread approach was to create a focal point 
for interaction, either named individuals or 
particular sections of the authorities concerned. 
Case conferences were relatively common. A third form 
of which there were a number was either a joint 
committee or working group.
Linkages between Camden Council and the other public 
authorities serving the area existed at all 
organisational levels from field staff to directors 
and members, and from day-to-day operations to 
strategic planning. However, the range of linkages 
observed was less comprehensive than this statement 
might at first sight imply. The levels at which 
authorities were linked were few because:
a. Member-level contact was limited and was 
primarily focused on interaction with the health 
authorities and ILEA and LFCDA;
b. Member involvement was not necessarily in a 
decision-making context. Except where members 
were nominated to other authorities, most high 
level inter-authority links were advisory;
c. Some member-level links were antagonistic and did 
little to support (if not undermine) links at 
other levels?
d. Most links appeared to have evolved in an ad hoc 
way in response to immediate needs of tasks and 
services, often at the level of particular 
divisions or functions within the authority, and 
were rarely assessed as a whole;
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e. The mismatch in scale and structure between the 
local authority and other public authorities 
often made it difficult to fix an appropriate 
level for interaction above those involved at 
the operational level.
Some interaction between the local authority and other 
public authorities was on an ad hoc basis. Other 
interaction was regular and cyclical. Ad hoc 
interaction triggered by operational needs was the 
commonest link between authorities. The frequency 
depended upon the nature of the issues involved. In 
some cases officers in the local authority would be in 
day-to-day contact with officers in other public 
authorities? in others contact might be needed only 
once or twice a year.
Formal meetings usually occurred on a regular basis. 
Some were relatively infrequent, annual, or 
quarterly? others such as case conferences needed to 
be frequent, and would be held monthly or 
fortnightly. The frequency and regularity of 
interaction were dictated by the nature of the tasks 
the linking mechanisms were required to handle.
The overall pattern of linkages between the local 
authority and other public authorities in Camden was 
patchy. Patchiness reflected the following features 
of the intergovernmental network at the local level:
a. The extent to which linkages are required to be 
established by law was limited. Most links were 
established voluntarily by authorities in 
response to perceived operational needs?
b. Linkages were generally at the operational rather 
than the policy level. Feedback from
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implementation to policy normally occurred 
within the individual authorities rather than 
through a joint mechanism;
c. The number of formal linkages established between 
the local authority and other public authorities 
was limited. Informal linkages played a 
significant role in maintaining relationships 
between the local authority and other public 
authorities ?
d. The number of links operating on a regular basis 
was limited. Most links were activated ad hoc as 
issues arose;
e. Some links involved both the local authority and 
other public authorities to an equal extent. A 
number of links, however, such as the shadow 
committees, appeared to involve only one of the 
two authorities between whom the relationship 
existed to any great degree.
This pattern of patchiness was ameliorated to some 
extent by the direct linkages between the public 
authorities within the local network. : However, the 
density of this network was low and the pattern of 
linkages was uneven.
Overall, therefore, the pattern of linkages between 
the local authority and other public authorities 
serving Camden was less extensive than would have 
been expected from the extent and nature of 
interdependence described in the previous chapter. One 
of the reasons lay in the factors described in 
chapter 4, namely that while the socio-economic 
character of Camden created forces that demanded 
the development of links between authorities
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providing services, organisational and political 
forces made the establishment of such relationships 
difficult.
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CHAPTER 7 STRUCTURAL FACTORS FACILITATING AND
INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-AUTHORITY 
LINKAGES IN CAMDEN
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Previous studies have demonstrated that the 
socio-economic environment of organisations can 
affect the extent and the nature of linkages 
developed between them. Some of the factors which 
have been demonstrated elsewhere to facilitate the 
development of interorganisational links were present 
in the socioeconomic profile of Camden. So, too, were 
a number of features which have been associated with 
a failure to develop relationships.
The features of the socio-economic environment which 
seemed to encourage the development of inter­
organisational links were: -
a. environmental turbulence
b. high levels of demand for services
c. high profile, complex, multi-dimensional
problems
d . personnel shortages
e. financial resources
Features that seemed to discourage the development of 
links were: -
a. land prices
b. heterogeneity
Environmental Turbulence
Some sections of the population and sectors of the 
local economy displayed high levels of turnover and
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instability producing an environment which conformed 
to the description of turbulent. Previous research 
has associated turbulent environments with the 
development of interorganisational linkages (Emery and 
Trist, 1965? Terreberry, 1968). Apart from high 
population turnover, particularly among young adults, 
Camden had sizeable groups of homeless and drifting 
persons, and large inflows of commuters and temporary 
residents, which made the demand for public services 
unpredictable and their delivery difficult. The 
urban environment displayed the complex dynamic 
forces arising from the interaction of organisational 
and non-organisational components typical of so- 
called turbulent fields. The closely inter-related 
nature of social and economic factors in a densely 
developed part of the metropolis, also resulted in 
actions by one authority being swiftly felt by 
others. The significance of uncertainty and the 
importance of reducing it were underlined by 
respondents who looked to information-sharing among 
authorities as a means of alleviating the problems of 
providing services to a shifting population.
"Camden and Islington FPC has an inflation 
problem with 20% more on the Register than in 
the Registrar General's Population Estimates. 
The reason is uncertain but probably involves 
homelessness and drifters; immigrants; name and 
age confusion and high mobility."
(Assistant Registar, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
CIFPC planned to tackle the inflation problem by 
developing information links with the health 
authorities and the local authorities.
^'Currently 400 children are out of school, twice 
the number for last year. Emergency measures 
have been taken. However, to do this quickly
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is very difficult because of the problems of 
planning permission and funds. Such provision 
had to be achieved within three months; if ILEA 
had been warned in advance of the bulge of 
homeless families' children, action could have 
been taken to get classrooms ready in time for 
their arrival."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
"The LEB wants collaboration and co-operation to 
trace the movement of LEB customers,
particularly tenants who move."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
High Levels of Demand for Services
Previous research has suggested that a shortage of 
clients will precipitate the development of links 
between social welfare agencies to ensure their 
mutual survival (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984) . No such 
stimulus to interaction existed in Camden. All the 
public authorities in the Camden study experienced 
high levels of demand for their services; 
furthermore, in practically every case, demand was 
rising. Part of the increased demand was generated by 
population increase. Increasing numbers of the very 
dependent and the existence of significant levels of 
urban stress were increasing pressure on providers of 
personal and welfare-support services. Increased 
commuting into the area, coupled with the wider trend 
towards greater use of public transport, was 
increasing pressure on the transport operators. The 
providers of infrastructure and the utilities were 
under pressure to meet the demands of increased 
consumption and development/redevelopment within the 
Borough.
The problem faced by many authorities was therefore 
of managing excess demand, which was seen as a key
reason for establishing relationships which could 
control or reduce demand.
"More and more the police are not acting alone 
but trying to act in concert with other 
agencies. They use a multi-agency approach and 
a more problem-solving approach because of 
limited resources... Previously the police tried 
to do everything themselves [in problem areas] 
which could have meant harassment, did their 
image harm, and moved the problem on rather than 
finding a long term solution."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
A much less co-operative outcome was for one 
overloaded organisation to attempt to "dump" its 
excess demand on another, for example by redefining 
problems or responsibilities.
"The government in its desire to reduce its own 
spending puts an additional burden on Camden 
which has to pick up the bill for disadvantage. 
The government refuses to recognise the problem 
it has created for example in homelessness. 
Homeless people need assistance from somewhere."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden).
"A man in the National Orthopaedic Hospital costs 
1000 pounds a week. A local authority recently 
refused to pay 150 pounds a week necessary for 
the man to go home. Beds in hospital are being 
blocked. The elderly could go home if support 
were made available."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
High Profile. Complex. Multi-dimensional Problems
The socio-economic profile of Camden gave rise to 
complex multi-dimensional problems which demanded 
action by several authorities. Camden scored high on 
national indicators of urban deprivation. Parts of
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the Borough had above-average levels of unemployment 
and poverty and contained above-average numbers of 
groups dependent upon public authorities for many 
basic services. Camden had problems such as vagrancy 
and large scale redevelopment that stemmed from its 
central metropolitan location. Some of these issues 
already had a high public profile, for example the 
redevelopment of Kings Cross and problems of vice in 
the Southern part of the Borough. Camden Council was 
endeavouring to raise the profile of other issues such 
as racism, unemployment and housing need, which it 
felt were politically important.
Respondents in authorities involved in tackling these 
complex and multi-dimensional problems cited the 
importance of the need for a concerted approach and 
effective links between authorities.
"One body can't do the work [of economic 
development] well because of insufficient 
finance - there has to be a co-operative effort.”
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
"[Camden] is trying to get an inter-agency 
response to [racial attacks] involving housing, 
social services, education and the police. For 
example, attacks often happen between home and 
school. Therefore a system is needed to alert 
other authorities when children are being 
absented from school because of fear of the 
j ourney.”
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Today's health problems are often behavioural or 
environmental. Their solution is very closely 
related to local authority work. For example, 
drugs, AIDS and alcohol abuse all require 
collaboration.”
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
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A high profile was seen to add to the impetus to 
develop effective links to solve problems.
"Issues which catch headlines in the press...
such as child abuse, are done better.”
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)
Personnel Shortages
Many public authorities had difficulty recruiting key 
groups of staff despite the fact that one in seven 
Camden workers was unemployed. This problem was 
accounted for by two factors. First, the mismatch in 
skills and experience between the unemployed and 
groups in short supply, such as computer 
professionals, nurses, accountants and social 
workers. Second, while wage and salary levels were 
above average nationally and for London, so too was 
the cost of living. Public authorities were unable or 
unused to paying premiums for their labour and lost 
out to authorities in cheaper parts of the country or 
to the private sector. In particular the cost and 
scarcity of housing in Camden and surrounding areas 
made it difficult to attract workers into the area.
Many previous studies have demonstrated that resource 
scarcity predisposes organisations to co-operate 
(Gamm et al. 1984) . Personnel is an essential
resource and authorities might have been expected to 
look to joint action to solve shortages. However, it 
did not appear that organisations were particularly 
interested in establishing relationships or acting 
together for these particular reasons. For example, 
Bloomsbury Health Authority noted in a discussion 
paper that,
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"Constraints on changes in services include, 
staff recruitment and retention difficulties. For 
professional groups this problem is primarily 
attributed to national shortages and the high 
cost of living in the London area acting as a 
deterrent to recruitment. The latter is also 
applicable to clerical/secretarial and ancillary 
staff. However, it is considered that the 
principal reason for recruitment and retention 
difficulties with these groups is that wage rates 
are not competitive. It should be noted that 
those staff employed by the Local Authority in 
like work receive higher rates of pay."
(Bloomsbury Health Authority (1986))
Financial Resources
Either because of limited revenue-raising capacity or 
because of government restrictions on public 
expenditure, all the public authorities in the 
network were experiencing budget limits of greater or 
less severity. Resource scarcity has been widely 
demonstrated to predispose organisations to develop 
relationships. Many respondents confirmed this view, 
pointing to the need to pool resources in certain 
areas in order to be able to work effectively.
"The gain Camden seeks from interaction is to 
maximise resources."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
However, as others pointed out, contracting resources 
had an opposite effect on organisations by reducing 
the money available for new initiatives and activities 
outside the one of mandatory service provision.
"As resources in London local authorities have 
been squeezed, the management thrust has been to 
concentrate on managing their own budget and 
therefore there has been little management time 
for other things and peripheral issues."
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(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Resource levels are determined by both socio-economic 
and organisational factors. The socio-economic 
profile of Camden affected the adequacy of public 
authorities' budgets since budgets relied on local 
resources. Two processes were involved here. First, 
was the raising of local revenue through the rates. 
Camden had the second largest rate base in London 
because the tranche of central London offices and 
commercial premises which fell within its boundaries 
was capable of producing a very large rate income. 
The local authority had for many years set a high 
rate, but its ability to exploit its rate base was 
being progressively restricted by central government 
financial controls.
Second, some elements of public authority budgets were 
calculated on the basis of needs among the community 
to be served. Although on this measured need Camden 
scored relatively highly with many indicators, it 
received limited grant in consideration of these 
needs. Because of its failure to meet government 
spending targets Camden Council had lost its Block 
Grant from central government. Health service 
budgets were also being held down in the Camden area 
in order to shift resources nationally and within the 
London region to areas of poorer provision.
Land Prices
Land and building prices in Camden were high because 
of its central and sought-after location. Housing 
expense contributed to the pattern of living outside 
the Borough among many public sector workers and 
managers. The lack of ties with the local community
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inhibited the growth of informal social networks 
amongst key employees.
"Senior staff cannot afford to live in Hampstead 
therefore they do not receive social and 
•cocktail' criticism of their services."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Public authorities were substantial owners of land in 
Camden, and many owned sites which were being 
released for sale and redevelopment. Large profits 
could be made from such sales that were able to 
alleviate budget pressures. The same land market made 
it very expensive for public authorities to buy land 
for their development. In several instances land 
issues set the scene for conflict between public 
authorities which was inimical to the development of 
smooth inter-organisational relationships.
"Property finances service improvement and 
authorities are looking to sell land and realise 
its full commercial value. The [New End] problem 
is financial pressure on the health authority. 
Camden has high land values and large areas of 
vacant land. The focus is on land ownership and 
cash rather than on co-operative aims and 
improving services."
(Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden) 
Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity of Camden, the sharp contrast 
between different neighbourhoods, the differences 
between the north and south of the Borough and the 
ethnic composition of the population, contributed to 
the variety of demands made upon public authorities 
serving the area. Where authorities covered a wider 
geographical area than Camden, the heterogeneity of
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their constituency was increased further. Because of 
the location of Camden near the heart of a capital 
city, public authorities in the area experienced 
local, regional and national demands for their 
services. In many cases the demands were
incompatible. For example, the health authorities 
were under pressure regionally and nationally to 
maintain specialised acute services, while the demand 
locally was for community services. Heterogeneity 
made it more difficult for authorities to establish 
common aims and objectives.
"The work of Bloomsbury and other public 
authorities should be closely connected because 
the aim of public authorities is primarily to 
deliver local services to local people. But 
Bloomsbury is a large complex health authority 
which has supra-regional and national speciali­
ties within it. Health authorities are not 
elected and accountability is basically upwards 
unlike Camden where accountability is downwards 
towards the population. Therefore, there are 
problems, discrepancies and lack of co­
operation. ”
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
To summarise, the socio-economic environment in Camden 
generated pressures which implied that the 
development of closer links between public 
authorities would have been an appropriate strategy 
for service provision. Some elements of the socio­
economic environment have been identified which 
engendered conflict between authorities but they were 
more than offset by the many pressures for co­
operation between authorities. The appropriateness of 
developing linkages with other authorities in 
response to environmental pressures was widely 
recognised by respondents. However, as the next 
section will . demonstrate, there were powerful 
counter-forces which affected the acceptance and
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implementation of inter-organisational relationships 
within the public authority network.
THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
The character of organisations as much as the 
environment in which they operate has been identified 
as a factor affecting the development of linkages 
with other organisations. Previous studies have 
demonstrated the influence on relationships, not only 
of structural and cultural features of individual 
organisations, but also of the extent of difference 
between the organisations in a network. (Redburn, 
1977) .
Camden Council, the local authority, had 
characteristics which have been associated with both 
the facilitation and inhibition of the development of 
easy relationships with other authorities. The main 
features of Camden which were identified as 
contributing to the ease of developing relationships 
were:
a. Diversity of function, giving the organisation 
a wide range of interests and an understanding 
of many aspects of public service provision.
b. High levels of professionalisation which 
fostered links across organisational boundaries 
among members of particular professions.
c. A history of resource availability, allowing 
the costs of developing and maintaining 
relationships with other public authorities to 
be absorbed.
d. An all-encompassing definition of political
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interests and responsibilities which focused 
attention on the totality of public service 
provision in the Borough.
e. An interest in playing a wider role in London 
politics.
The main features of Camden Council which acted in the 
opposite direction, to inhibit the development of 
relationships with other public authorities, were,
f. Strong departmentalism, making it difficult 
for the authority to develop a common or wider 
viewpoint on issues and leading to a lack of 
experience in developing joint approaches 
between different functional areas.,
g. Extensive bureaucracy, which was inimical to 
innovation and slowed response to initiatives by 
other public authorities.
h. Tighter financial controls set by central 
government, making it more difficult to finance 
non-essential services and relationships with 
other public authorities.
i. Decentralisation, which in many circumstances 
facilitates development of relationships, but 
which in Camden, because the local authority was 
already much smaller than most other public 
authorities, made interaction more complicated.
j. An overloaded committee system, which 
stretched members' ability to attend meetings 
and manage affairs and left little room for them
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to develop new interests or dimensions to their 
work.
k. A strong inward-looking policy orientation 
among the new policy units set up by the 
council, which diverted attention away from 
external relationships.
1. A strong, interventionist left-wing policy 
stance, which looked to campaign against rather 
than compromise with other organisations 
espousing different viewpoints.
In Camden the differences between the local authority 
and the other public authorities in the network 
generally exceeded their similarities. The main 
points of difference were:
a. Each authority focused on providing a discrete 
set of services? none, other than the local 
authority, was a multi-service authority. Most 
authorities had a narrow perspective on service 
provision and had limited experiences of action 
in common with each other.
b. Authorities differed greatly in scale in area 
served, size of budget and the proportion of 
their budget spent in Camden. Interaction with 
the local authority could not be one of equal 
terms or symetrical.
c. Lack of co-terminosity. Authorities did not 
have the same territory of interest, and liaison 
arrangements became complex and burdensome.
d. Authorities differed structurally in their 
internal organisation, the degree to which they
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were centralised, their methods of financing and 
their accountability to central government and 
the public. Relationships were difficult, 
cumbersome and slow where structures were out of 
alignment.
e. Authorities differed in their policy
preferences and viewpoints, partly reflecting 
their different constituencies and stakeholders, 
and partly reflecting the different professions 
to which they were allied. Authorities did not 
have common interests in or common viewpoints on 
issues in which they were involved.
f. Authorities differed culturally making it 
more difficult to establish common objectives 
and joint working.
"The will exists to collaborate [with the health 
authority] but there is a clash of cultures 
therefore the will exists in spirit rather than 
in practice."
(Member, London Borough of Camden)
The problems for co-operation and co-ordination 
stemming from incompatible structures were commented 
on widely by respondents in both the local authority 
and other public authorities.
"Some authorities are more difficult to work with 
because of their structure e.g. British Rail - a 
very complex agency where the location of 
responsibility and authority are unclear to 
outsiders."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
"Social Services has a functional management 
structure - day care, field work and residential 
care. To. liaise on ... [mental hospital due for 
closure] requires three people plus someone from 
housing. The newly appointed person dealing with
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... is powerless within the structure. Camden is 
looking at the need to restructure and have 
appointed a mental health co-ordinator."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"It is a nonsense that [within the Camden and 
Westminster Division of ILEA] there are four area 
health authorities, ten police areas and two 
Boroughs where such services should be provided 
on a co-terminal basis with joint funding and 
joint planning."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
Structural difficulties were made worse by the fact 
that all the public authorities were suffering 
resource constraints and were not only under pressure 
to retrench to their core tasks but were unable to 
contemplate initiatives which, though they might 
bring long-term benefits, would bring short-term 
costs.
In summary: while the socio-economic character of
Camden created forces that might have been expected 
to lead to the development of links between 
authorities providing public services, other forces 
stemming from the nature of the authorities 
themselves - were working in the opposite direction. 
The local authority had a number of organisational 
and political features which militated strongly 
against developing easy relationships with other 
public authorities. In addition, there was an almost 
complete lack of structural congruence between 
authorities in the public authority network in 
Camden, which made the establishment of good 
relationships a difficult task.
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CHAPTER 8
PARTICIPANTS1 VIEWS OF INTER-AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS
Previous research has shown that relationships between 
organisations are affected by the values, beliefs and 
attitudes of those involved in them (Schemerhorn 
1975). The research in Camden focused on respon­
dents* perceptions of inter-authority working within 
the public authority network. Three related areas 
were explored. First, respondents were asked to 
compare working with public-sector organisations and 
other organisations in the private and voluntary 
sectors. Second, they were asked to comment on how 
they and their fellow officers or members viewed 
working with either Camden Council or other public 
authorities serving Camden. Third, they were asked 
about the ways in which relationships among public 
authorities were changing.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND OTHER 
ORGANISATIONS
Respondents were asked whether they viewed working 
with public authorities any differently from working 
with other kinds of authorities. A minority felt that 
there was no difference between working with
different types of organisation. A number of
respondents pointed to both similarities and
differences. Most replies, however, focused on
differences between different kinds of organisations.
Those who felt that similarities outweighed the
differences pointed to common organisational
features that obscured distinctions between different 
types, of organisations. Size was one such feature;
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"They are all big organisations and have to be 
approached similarly.”
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No.7 Area, 
Metropolitan Police)
another was the pursuit of self-interest.
"Public authorities are essentially similar to 
other independent agencies. Agencies have 
conflicting aims; each must defend its own 
corner.”
(Asssistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
Political elements were identified not only in the 
local authority but in private sector and voluntary 
organisations.
"Many companies have their headquarters in London 
and all have their own internal politics in the 
same way as local authorities do."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
"Camden is very political and voluntary organisa­
tions in Camden have political elements."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No.7 Area, 
Metropolitan Police)
Those who gave pre-eminence to organisational 
similarities saw different types of organisations as 
equally straightforward or difficult to relate to and 
adopted a broadly similar approach to developing 
relationships whether they were with public, private 
or voluntary bodies.
Similar treatment, however, gave rise to discontent. 
Camden Council complained that it was treated like any 
other organisation by the Customs and Excise. The 
Customs and Excise was not part of the study but the 
quotation has been included to clarify the point. The
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local authority felt that it should have enjoyed a 
greater measure of trust and more favourable 
treatment.
"The local authority is exempt from VAT therefore 
it can claim VAT back. It is a very large sum, 
but a cumbersome procedure to get the money 
back. It is paid monthly on account. Customs and 
Excise should take the figures on trust more as 
one public authority to another public 
authority. Camden is treated like everyone else 
but shouldn1t be."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
Those who felt that differences rather than 
similarities dominated the comparison between types 
of organisations referred both to the commonality 
among public authorities that did not exist with
other organisations and the features of public 
authorities that contrasted most sharply with those of 
commercial and voluntary bodies.
Commonality stemmed from three features: familiarity, 
environmental pressures and public-service values. 
Familiarity was stressed because many public 
authorities had more dealings with each other than 
with other types of organisations.
"The Sports Council deals more with public 
authorities because their equal opportunities 
are better than commercial and voluntary 
organisations."
(Director, Greater London and South East Regional 
Office, Sports Council)
"Relationships are different in quantity because 
of the very considerable interplay with the 
local authority over sewers."
(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)
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Familiarity also stemmed from a shared culture among 
public authorities and their employees.
"A different rapport exists with the other public 
authorities because of cultural similarities."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
"Public servants are all similar animals - they 
have public servant images and thought 
processes."
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
As a result of familiarity, public authorities were 
seen to be easier to work with and relationships 
among them better. Familiarity resulted in comfortable 
relationships:
"Relationships are cosier than with private 
enterprise."
(London Regional Planning Manager, British Rail)
However one Camden member expressed a totally 
opposite view,
"Local authorities find it difficult to get on 
with each other - private sector relations with 
local authorities are easier as they understand 
each other."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
Public authorities shared a common working environment 
which promoted mutual understanding and made the 
development of relationships easier.
"On the whole relationships are a little better 
because people in the local authority are 
working under the same pressures of public 
accountability which is different from working in 
a commercial organisation."
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(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
As well as familiarity and common experiences, a
number of respondents also identified values of
public service management which implied that public 
authorities should treat each other differently from 
non-public authorities. These values were described 
by one respondent as an obligation on public
authorities to collaborate and achieve better 
outcomes for the communities they jointly served.
"An onus lies on Boroughs, LRT, government
departments and other public agencies to work 
together and compromise their own interests in 
the interest of getting the right outcomes for 
London as a whole."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
A respondent within the local authority described 
them as giving priority to relationships with other 
public authorities.
"Camden always tries hard to reach agreement with 
other public agencies - tries harder than with 
the private sector."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
The application of such values led other respondents 
to note that among public authorities they were 
treated as equals, whilst amongst commercial 
organisations in the same field they were not.
"The Crown Estate is not accepted by the property 
world as equal. It is seen as the public 
sector."
(Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, The Crown 
Estate)
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A public authority was thought to be treated better 
by the local authority than a commercial one.
"The local authority is generally felt to be more 
sympathetic to the LEB.”
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
Three main features of public authorities set 
relationships with them apart from those developed 
with other types of organisations. The first feature 
related to the statutory framework within which 
public authorities operated. Public authorities were 
obliged to follow certain rules and procedures and 
were reguired to establish certain relationships.
"Relationships with public authorities are 
different because they are statutory.
Relationships with non-public bodies such as 
voluntary organisations are very different 
because they may be very co-operative but the 
relationship is not binding. Camden, on the 
other hand, is bound to relate but does not want 
to be bound."
(Divisional General Manager, (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
They were also unable to exercise discretion over the 
tasks they performed.
"They need to do all their work and cannot 
select. They have to do everything that they are 
given."
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
These requirements were seen as constraints which 
produced more formal and less flexible relationships 
than could be achieved with other sectors.
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"They are different because they are more 
formal.”
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
"Private/private interaction can work out an ad 
hoc system to get things done - not possible in 
the public sector because rules and procedures 
must be followed."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
Politics was a feature of local authorities which set 
them apart from other public authorities and made 
them different.
"The local authority is different because of 
politics and rates."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
The third feature which set public sector 
organisations in general apart was their bureaucratic 
nature. Relationships with them were seen to be more 
difficult. The causes of this difficulty were 
identified as bureaucracy, rule-bound behaviour and 
slow decision-making.
"There is also the problem of bureaucracy."
(Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)
"Public authorities are still terribly 
bureaucratic. It is difficult to get hold of 
people."
(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)
"Decision-making takes longer in local 
authorities because of the committee cycle. 
Contracts, are slow and longer time has to be 
allowed for finding schemes."
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(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
Comparing relationships with public authorities and 
voluntary bodies, respondents generally stressed the 
voluntaristic, informal and flexible nature of 
relationships with the latter. From the local 
authority point of view in this sector collaboration 
was not only desired but achievable.
"The voluntary sector - there is a growing sense 
of value of collaboration here. The private 
sector - there is considerable hostility to 
collaboration. The health authority - the will 
exists but there is a clash of cultures."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority)
In comparing relationships with the public and private 
sectors stress was again laid on the ability to 
achieve results quickly and flexibly. Examples were 
cited of easier and more fruitful negotiations with 
the private sector than the public sector for 
planning gain.
"It's tougher dealing with public corporations 
than commercial ones because they are more hard 
headed. For example when Sainsburys was built 
Camden got all kinds of goodies from them in 
very constructive negotiations. The British 
Rail/National Freight Corporation Goods Yard was 
forced to a compulsory purchase order because 
Camden was getting nothing from them."
(Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)
However, respondents also pointed out that the 
private sector's concern with profit implied that co­
operative relationships with the public sector were 
only likely to be established where they were 
profitable, not as with relationships with other
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public sector bodies where they were in the public 
interest.
"London Regional Transport has a greater 
involvement in the totality of affairs. Other 
businesses would not have such contacts and 
would regard getting 'market information' about 
plans as a cost."
(District General Manager, London Buses)
"Private sector organisations only concentrate on 
profit at the end of the day. When the 
objectives of the private sector and the police 
meet the private sector is off the mark and have 
the resources? when they don't meet it is 
frustrating. For example in hotels there is much 
crime, particularly theft. Hotels could do more 
via security staff and maintenance but they do 
not because it costs money and the demand for 
rooms exists despite crime."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF INTERAUTHORITY WORKING
Respondents were asked about how they and their 
colleagues viewed working with other, public 
authorities. The responses were varied and differed 
in emphasis between different groups of respondents. 
Officers of the local authority stressed the 
importance they attached to inter-authority working 
while elaborating on the practical difficulties of 
undertaking it. Local authority members described the 
problems they encountered in working with another 
public authority and indicated that inter-authority 
relationships were best left to officials.
Respondents in other public authorities highlighted 
the impact of local politics on relationships between 
their organisations and Camden Council.
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Camden Officials1 Views of Inter-authoritv Working
Only one respondent indicated that inter-authority 
working was viewed entirely positively by officials 
of the department concerned.
"There is a lot of enthusiasm because it is new. 
They welcome it."
(Assistant Director Social Services, London 
Borough of Camden)
In part the attractiveness was the novelty of inter­
authority working. The tone of other responses 
reflected views ranging from caution to hostility to 
working with other public authorities.
Local authority officials did not see working with 
other public authorities as unimportant. On the 
contrary, they considered it something that they
should be engaged in, but generally hedged with 
provisos which implied that it was not central to
Camden*s priorities.
"Officers see it very importantly."
(Director Social Services, London Borough of
Camden)
"Officers feel it is an important part of their 
role but in terms of liaison rather than working 
with other authorities."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
Camden)
"Relationships are often seen as important but 
long term. More time should be spent thinking 
about such issues but there is no time."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
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The lack of enthusiasm for inter-authority working 
expressed by officers in the local authority had its 
roots in difficulties seen to surround such work. The 
main problem concerned the time which working with 
other authorities required. Officers were already busy 
with their local authority work and were reluctant to 
take on more commitments and could not devote the 
time needed to developing relationships.
"Housing and social services workers are very 
busy people and reluctant to become involved in 
welfare rights issues.11
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
"There is a time problem. Camden has very 
generous conditions of service and staffing 
demands are high therefore they cannot always 
spare the time needed for developing relation­
ships."
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
Inter-authority working was seen as time-consuming and 
because officers' time was limited, the time that a 
task took could become the prime concern of 
collaboration.
"Most officers regard any work with public 
authorities as one where they hope to achieve 
the objects of the particular exercise as 
quickly as possible. The problems are time and 
bureaucracy, therefore the main objective is to 
minimise the time involved."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
Time was not the only problem. Working with other 
public authorities was described as "hard work" 
because of a lack of knowledge about other 
authorities, the complexity of some organisation's
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structures and lack of perceived systems for 
communicating with them.
"Officers consider working with other authorities 
very hard work. The system is lacking in clear 
channels of communications. People lack
information about what agencies do and how they 
can help. When you make contact you get shunted 
around. Camden is similar; all public
authorities are similar.”
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Some are more difficult to work with because of 
their structure e.g. British Rail - very complex 
agency where the location of responsibility and 
authority is unclear to outsiders."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
For some officers, working with another authority was 
difficult because of the unfamiliarity of not being 
in charge.
"Unless it is a Camden project and Camden is 
taking the lead, officers feel a bit powerless 
and feel work is a waste of time. They can feel 
positive when taking the lead."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
Activities when Camden officers were not in the lead 
were apt to be dismissed by such officials as a 
"waste of time". Another respondent pointed to the 
difficulties which older members of staff had with 
inter-authority working because of their traditional 
and narrow definition of the service they provided.
"All staff see the benefits but some people find 
it difficult to do. Attitudes vary according to 
personalities. There are ones who enjoy it and 
therefore* get something out of it. New staff 
find it easier. They see libraries no longer as 
a quiet place for bibliographical work. Older
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staff find the interactive positive attitude 
difficult."
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
Officers also expressed views which coloured their 
approach to particular agencies. Sometimes this
attitude was expressed by general comments about the 
varying degrees of co-operativeness to be found among 
public authorities.
"Some agencies are seen as sheer bloody-minded. 
Some are seen as very helpful."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
Others expressed judgements on particular authori­
ties, (the point was made clearly by one respondent in 
relation to two authorities not included in the 
network).
"The Department of the Environment won't listen; 
the GLC is monolithic."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
There was no clear pattern to these judgments as they 
depended upon the individual1s experiences and their 
points of contact with other authorities.
However, despite the problems surrounding inter­
authority working, officers regarded it as something 
which, although difficult and unsatisfactory, had to 
be attempted. One respondent summed up his and his 
colleagues' views of inter-authority working as 
follows:
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"Officers regard working with other authorities 
philosophically. They do the job, as they see it, 
appropriately. It is in the public interest that 
authorities work together. However, officers are 
suspicious and do not always see eye to eye 
because they reflect the attitudes of the 
authorities they work for. But they have no 
option. They try to work together and do not work 
against each other. Relationships are not 
normally competitive, but very open."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
Camden Members1 Views of Interauthoritv Working
Members suggested that their involvement in inter­
authority working was essential to its success, 
particularly in Camden where politicisation was 
widespread and members were active and assertive in 
decision-making.
"The member's role is crucial because of the kind 
of authority Camden is - the role of the member 
is more important. For example an injudicious 
remark by a member can undo weeks of work by 
officers."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority)
However, while councillors who understood the way 
that the public authority network operated were seen 
to be very effective, for most members this 
environment was a difficult one in which to operate.
"A councillor who knows his/her way round the 
system can secure great advantages."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
Members commented on a number of problems which faced 
them in working with other authorities. First, they
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lacked clear equivalents with whom to build 
relationships.
"Members do not find appropriate opposites in 
other bodies they may have relationships with."
(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
Even though other authorities had boards of members, 
they were appointed members whose relationship with 
their organisation was very different from that of 
the elected member. Councillors found themselves in 
unfamiliar organisational settings and unsure of 
themselves without the party framework within which 
they normally operated.
"Members can feel very lost in unfamiliar, inter- 
authority scenarios."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
"It is very different from working in one's own 
authority where one is under the same political 
grouping as those one is working with."
(Chair, Housing Management Committee, London 
Borough of Camden)
They also found that they lacked the status and 
importance to which they were accustomed within their 
own organisation.
"Members who seem very large in their own 
authority seem diminished."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
Such problems were felt most keenly by those under­
taking dual roles. In addition, the representative 
role of the dual member was particularly difficult.
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In some situations it was unclear to those involved 
who or what organisation a member was representing, 
which caused difficulties all round.
"I am on the North London Area Manpower Board via 
ILEA - but not as the Inner London Borough's 
representative which the MSC see me as.1
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
Councillors were the only members of the health 
authorities with an electorate.
"Joint membership is a difficult role as the only 
person on the Health Authority who has a 
constituency and representative status."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
They also found themselves in an environment where 
they were outnumbered by non-political appointees.
"The health authority has token political 
membership. It is heavily weighted to appointed 
experts and the status quo. It can be used for 
raising issues rather than solving problems."
(Chair, Housing Management Committee, London 
Borough of Camden)
"The focus is on individual political issues. Few 
Camden councillors like to work this way"
(Chair, Housing Management Committee, London 
Borough of Camden)
They found themselves having to promote issues as 
individuals and unable to see the issue carried 
through to decision. Such difficulties led to 
relationships being evaluated as poor by councillors.
"The local authority link to health authorities 
is totally unsatisfactory because of these 
weaknesses."
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(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of
Camden)
The slow and often painstaking progress of many 
collaborative efforts frustrated members who liked 
decisive action.
"Members are under great pressure and want to be 
involved in decisions and active."
(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
As a result, it was not easy to get members fully 
involved in inter-authority working. Members saw the 
value of developing relationships but did not have 
the time to carry them through.
"It is easy to get members interested in health 
authorities but many are busy and there is 
pressure of time."
(Chair, Social Services Committe, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)
"There is no dual membership with ILEA and not 
enough liaison because of lack of time."
(Chair, Housing Management Committee, London 
Borough of Camden)
Frustration had led to difficulties in filling 
vacancies on other authorities such as the health 
authorities.
"Camden could not get a majority party member to 
go on Bloomsbury Health Authority - they had to 
go outside to get a member of the Labour Party."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
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Some councillors were seen to regard inter-authority 
working as a side issue; those more interested in 
such work were often the longer-serving members of 
the Council whose services were widely in demand 
within Camden.
"There are two sorts of councillors: those who 
get involved in external relations, typically 
those who have been on the Council a while, and 
those who see it as a diversion."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
Labour party attitudes created ambivalence about 
involvement by majority party members and the Council 
in inter-authority relationships in some areas. The 
party officially criticised the Manpower Services 
Commission, yet condoned involvement by local 
authorities at the local level.
"Labour party policy and ideology says nothing 
very helpful. It lags behind reality and is 
based on a utopian approach. The policy is full 
of contradictions."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
"Policy is Practical. It is very supportive to 
voluntary organisations but unclear in relation 
to statutory organisations and varies according 
to custom and practice."
(Chair, Social Services Committe, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)
Reflecting both the difficulties of member involvement 
and the existing balance of participation in 
interauthority working, members suggested that 
officers should play the key role in relationships.
"There ought to be a better system. It shouldn't 
depend on* members to get things together."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
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Officers could also build relationships more easily 
because they were dealing with fellow professionals.
"Officers may be able to build more constructive 
relationships and may be able to have useful 
discussion meetings.”
(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of 
Camden)
However, in reality, members saw officers' roles 
limited by the political and organisational 
constraints imposed upon them.
"Local authority officers cannot sit down and 
work together because they are constrained by 
policies they must work towards. They behave 
inflexibly, defending their autonomy and terms of 
reference rather than seeing what needs doing."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
The perceived opportunities and problems of inter­
authority relationships were described by one 
councillor as follows:
"Everyone will say collaboration is a good idea 
but joint working is not in the marrow. It 
doesn't actually exist in practice because of 
suspicions between organisations, political 
differences, the fact that health authorities are 
not accountable, political discordance and the 
way the two authorities fail to rub together. 
Collaboration is seen as a shorthand for 
financial transfer and little accountability."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
Views of Respondents in Other Public Authorities on 
Working with the Local Authority
Respondents noted that not only were most 
relationships with the local authority at officer
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level but that such relationships were generally 
satisfactory
"The relationship with Council officers is very 
good.11
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
"Officers play a key role because members are too 
political."
(Divisional General Manager (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
The reason for this positive evaluation was seen to 
be the attitude of officers which was to fulfil the 
obligations of their posts including, where appro­
priate, co-operating with the local authority.
"Officers will always get along if it is part of 
their brief."
(Assistant Education Officer (Further and Higher 
Education) Inner London Education Authority)
However, officer-level relationships also laboured 
under some of the difficulties noted by respondents 
within Camden. Among the most serious was seen to be 
the political framework within which officials had to 
operate.
"Officers know the constraints the other person 
is operating under which lead to cynicism, 
frustration, abandonment and apathy. Potential 
developments do not get off the ground because 
the structure is wrong or because people do not 
understand the framework the other person is 
operating within."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
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Members of other authorities, such as the health 
authorities, encountered some of the same problems as 
Camden members in inter-authority working. Time was 
scarce and members* resources stretched.
**FPC members are voluntary and have limited time, 
therefore they cannot stretch themselves via 
collaboration. Many FPC members are new and lack 
knowledge of procedures."
(Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
"Health authority members are very under­
resourced; they have no staff, no members' room, 
secretariat or facilities."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
The difficulties of inter-authority working produced 
frustration among members as it had among local 
authority councillors.
"The members of the health authority are very 
community conscious and very conscious of the 
lack of a relationship with the local authority. 
It hurts and it is counterproductive."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
Again, the political nature of the local authority 
was one of the main difficulties facing members of 
other authorities in becoming involved in working with 
Camden Council.
Many respondents saw working with senior officials and 
working with members very similarly.
"The officers are similar to the politicians." 
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
"In Camden everyone is political."
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(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)
A number of reasons were put forward for this
convergence. It was noted that a number of senior
officials in Camden were councillors and were 
politically experienced.
"The senior officers are themselves councillors 
elsewhere.11
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority).
Second, officials were bound to reflect the policies 
and expectations of members, and the more senior the 
officials the more they were under pressure to display 
politically oriented behaviour.
"Interaction is usually with the Borough 
officials though this too can involve political 
posturing.”
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
"Officers can forge tortuous links. Officers are 
very fearful of the political consequences of 
this. They are in an unreal world."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
Finally it was pointed out that the large number of 
senior officials who had been replaced in recent 
years meant that in many areas members were of longer 
standing than their officials and were very firmly in 
the lead.
"There is no 'yes minister' because members have 
been together longer than officers. This is true 
of both Camden and the health authority."
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(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)
Most respondents saw working with members of the local 
authority as problematic. Problems stemmed from the 
impact of local politics in general upon
relationships and from the particular effects of 
Camden's socialist politics. The special requirements 
and difficulties of working with a politically 
controlled body coloured most views of working with 
the local authority.
Camden councillors were seen by respondents as high 
quality individuals who were committed to their work.
"Camden has intelligent and articulate 
councillors. Politics are difficult and care is 
needed."
(General Practitioner, Kentish Town Health 
Centre)
"The local authority joint members on the JCC 
seem to take their responsibility seriously."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
However, as local politicians, their approach was not 
always seen as compatible with that of the 
organisations they were dealing with. They were seen 
to have short-term horizons governed by the electoral 
system which did not always match the requirements 
for longer-term thinking in interauthority 
relationships.
"Councillors look to the next election"
(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of 
Camden)
Second, councillors were often primarily concerned
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with local matters and seen to have a parochial 
outlook on issues.
"In Islington MPs and local politicians have been 
involved where floodings have occurred from 
Hampstead Heath and have put pressure on Thames 
Water to take remedial action. As a result part 
of the relief section of drainage has been put in 
place in Islington without the sections at 
either end, at the top or the bottom, being 
done."
(Planning Officer, Thames Water)
Politics as practised in Camden was seen to have a 
much wider impact on the development of
interauthority relationships. Politics in Camden was 
seen to be pervasive and thus to be particularly 
important to the development of relationships with 
other authorities.
"Labour authority members are more involved and 
influential, therefore there is greater concern 
to secure a greater involvement with members at 
ILEA, GLC and similarly Camden."
(Director, Greater London and South East Regional 
Office, Sports Council)
Respondents felt that their organisations were 
regarded by Camden*s members largely in ideological 
terms. The DHSS complained that councillors seemed 
incapable of regarding any action as non-partisan.
"The DHSS feel that others cannot believe that 
they can be impartial and non-partisan."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
The Metropolitan Police complained that they were 
regarded as an instrument of class oppression.
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"Camden is seen to be unwilling to work with the 
police. They are seen to be promoting a 
dictatorship of the proletariat and to view the 
police as the remnants of an oppressive class 
which must be removed."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
Camden councillors were seen as partisan and partial 
in their outlook.
"The police are seen to have a duty to the whole 
community but they see Camden as being 
accountable only to sections of the community 
which elected the majority party."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
"Members are very much Camden spokesmen."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Their objectives in inter-authority relationships 
were seen as the pursuit of political gains.
"[Camden councillors on Bloomsbury Health 
authority] are pursuing political careers."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"Local authority members seem to be out to score 
points off the health authority concerning how 
committed they are to promote good health and a 
good health service."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
These objectives were reflected in the issues which 
they were perceived to be concerned with. For 
example, respondents commented on the tendency of 
councillors to use inter-authority relations to pursue 
national issues.
"The main aim of much campaigning activity is to 
score points off government. The main complaints 
and comments are aimed at government and
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politicians. This is encouraged by a politicised 
local authority. Campaigns to squeeze pennies out 
of the DHSS are seen as being about showing the 
local authority's attitudes to cuts and putting 
pressure on the office to demonstrate the impact 
cuts are having on their ability to spend."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
They were also seen to be engaged in a number of 
struggles for power. One example given was 
ideological, in which councillors were seen to be 
trying to replace medical models of care with 
non-medical ones.
"Camden takes a left-wing socialist view that you 
do not need medical care for geriatrics and 
psychiatric patients which are the main areas of 
collaboration."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Relationships between the Metropolitan Police and 
Camden were seen to be dominated by a struggle for 
power and control.
"At the higher level, the political level, 
politicians and very senior officers see 
everything in political terms and about
control."
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
Councillors were seen to be critical and aggressive in 
their dealings with the police.
The relationship is coloured; councillors are 
critical and appear to give little support 
because they are always making a case to take 
over."
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
"Before the local elections a local councillor 
wrote to the local free newspaper complaining
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about police enforcement of parking restric­
tions. This was seen to be using the police as 
whipping boys and police-bashing by the tone in 
which it was written.”
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
The problems which the majority party faced in 
involving members in inter-authority relations was 
perceived by other organisations negatively rather 
than sympathetically. Respondents in the health 
authority thought that Camden gave relationships with 
the organisation a low priority and were concerned 
more with issues of accountability and control.
"The local authority has given health authority 
membership less emphasis than it should have 
been given. The local authority attitude is 
perceived to be that health authorities should be 
democratically elected and until then health is 
a. second-rate activity to be involved in."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Some respondents felt that councillors lacked 
commitment to inter-authority working.
"Members are seen as passive if they are not too 
political. They just go along to the JCCs, 
presumably because they have to."
(Divisional General Manager (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"To work, relationships need a large concerted 
effort by members to be effective. Members would 
not say anything against collaboration but would 
not push it positively."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
However, the more active councillors who had been 
appointed to the health authority after the 1986 
local government elections were perceived even more
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critically by the organisation because of their 
political activism.
"Relationships have been worse since the last
election. The left has strengthened its 
position. They are only interested in a
political forum."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)
"Membership was for a long time composed of three 
old timers but this changed after the May 1986 
elections. There are now three new members, one 
of whom is a Parliamentary candidate and is seen 
to be intending to use membership as a political 
platform."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)
The only relationship with Camden which involved two 
sets of elected members was the local authority and 
ILEA. At the time of the research this relationship 
was very new. While in theory it should have been an 
easier relationship to establish, respondents
commented on the difficulties caused by a lack of 
existing structures in establishing a pattern of 
meetings between the two sets of councillors.
"Camden ILEA councillors have been trying to meet 
Camden councillors since they were elected - 
finally succeed at the third attempt. The party 
is not a linking forum? it has no facilities for 
this."
(Member, Inner London Education Authority)
"Contact is ad hoc. Local government is not well 
organised and depends on individual members. A 
member forum needs to be created."
(Member, Inner London Education Authority)
Perceptions of the political dimension of Camden 
Council were tied to respondents1 opinions about
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working with the local authority. Relationships were 
described negatively.
"At the member level there is a combative 
relationship."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
"Camden is the most difficult local authority I 
have ever worked with because of its political 
complexion. The ruling Labour group is very 
difficult or impossible to work with."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
"Local authority representation on the health 
authority works very badly."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Politics was seen to create a barrier between the
local authority and other public authorities, 
preventing dialogue developing or joint working.
"The political dimension prevents the Borough 
from getting closer to the health authority. 
Because the local authority is politically led 
and the health authority is not, it is difficult 
to set joint priorities."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"There is little dialogue because of political 
differences."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
The contrasting left and right wing values of the 
chairs of the local authority and Hampstead health 
authority were cited as an example of the inability 
of the two organisations to establish the necessary 
personal contacts needed at the topmost level for 
successful relationships.
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"The Health authority has a right-wing chairman, 
an estate agent. A Conservative appointment. He 
takes a business approach to the need for an 
acute facility and excellence in the hospital. 
He doesn't appreciate deprivation. He doesn't 
feel comfortable with political developments on 
Camden Council. There is great conflict at the 
personal level which is the beginning of problems 
with collaboration. The leader of the council and 
the chairman of the health authority could never 
have dinner together.11
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"I haven't met the leader of the council. The 
Chairman has power under Griffiths(1) and needs 
a personal relationship with the chairman of the 
local authority to get things done. Elsewhere 
such relations are possible but they are not a 
possibility in Camden."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
Politics was also blamed for the local authority 
being unable to deliver what was demanded from 
relationships by other authorities.
"Local authority officers and councillors have 
other constraints so that they cannot always 
deliver what the police want."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area, 
Metropolitan Police)
Although senior level involvement in relationships was 
recognised as important, some respondents indicated 
that relationships were better when Camden
councillors were not involved.
1. In 1983 Sir Roy Griffiths was appointed to
examine management in the NHS. His subsequent 
report led to the apoointment of general managers 
in the Health Service and to strenthening of the 
role of the Chairman of the health authority.
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"It works better when councillors are not there 
because they introduce a political flavour. 
They are not the right people to pursue points 
with but local councillors take up cases."
(Regional Information Officer, London North, 
DHSS)
"Relationships are easier when they are 
non-political. Relationships with ILEA are 
better because there is no member contact? all 
officer. ILEA has a nominated representative but 
not a member."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
As a result, authorities sought to side-step bodies 
in which members were involved.
"People use public meetings to make political 
speeches. Meetings go on for ever and get 
nothing done. Members are now being by-passed by 
the use of working groups."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
PERCEPTIONS OF THE WAYS IN WHICH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
CAMDEN AND OTHER PUBLIC AUTHORITIES WERE CHANGING
Respondents were asked for their views on whether the 
relationship between the local authority and other 
public authorities was changing over time. None saw 
the relationship as static, though one respondent saw 
relationships as stable despite changes taking place 
round about.
"Relationships are probably stable, at least 
there is nothing visible and easily noted that 
is changing."
(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)
The respondent then went on to discuss the environ­
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mental changes resulting fom the Abolition of the 
GLC.
There were many views on the way in which 
relationships were changing. Such relationships were 
seen to be constantly changing and to reflect long­
term trends in the organisations concerned and their 
environment.
"The pattern always changes."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
"There was a change in the early to mid-70s in 
traditional services. There was a change in the 
nature of the service to a willingness to link 
with related organisations in the community. Any 
change from now on is a development from this 
basic shift."
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
However, some viewed the changes occurring recently as 
different in order or nature from those occurring 
previously.
"Relationships have changed all the time over the 
last 20 years but there has been no clear 
direction until recently."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
One respondent suggested that relationships changed 
only when change was initiated deliberately by one of 
the organisations involved.
"Change does not occur unless Camden initiates 
it."
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(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of
Camden)
However, the changes in relationships reported by 
most respondents were not so calculated. The sources 
of change mentioned were fourfold. Some features of 
the inter-authority network were seen themselves to 
promote change. Second, change stemmed from the 
issues public authorities had to deal with? third, 
from the organisations themselves and fourth, from the 
environment in which the network operated.
The dependence of relationships in the public 
authority network on individual personalities left 
relationships vulnerable to staff changes.
"Relationships change not because of the agencies 
themselves but because of the changing 
personalities. It is not a rigid framework but 
all about people, therefore if people change 
relationships change."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
Individuals determined not only the quality of 
relationships but also their content and development.
"Much depends on the personalities of the 
officers involved. Changes in leadership can 
result in changes in relationships. For example, 
with Camden informal lunchtime meetings took 
place regularly with the previous director of 
social services; such meetings do not take place 
with the present director and the present 
director rarely comes to meetings with ILEA. In 
contrast, the reverse happened in Westminster 
where relationships have improved considerably 
since the present director took up his post. As 
a result more joint initiatives have taken place 
with Westminster and the fund of joint 
initiatives with Camden is beginning to dry up."
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(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
Education Authority)
Relationships were also seen to go through cycles. 
Interaction would be built up and might enjoy a 
"honeymoon" period before coming up against more 
difficult problems and even stagnating.
"Relationships are changing for the worse. Camden 
feels it gets less out of its contacts than 
previously. In the early days of liaison there 
was a novelty factor and certain pressures could 
be made to work? over time this wears off and the 
DHSS has hardened to such approaches. However, 
less satisfactory approaches will not go on for 
ever but are a stage."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
Inter-authority relationships were directly or 
indirectly linked to the provision of services. 
Changes in the demand for services requiring input 
from both the local authority and other public 
authorities gave rise to changes in their 
relationship. Increasing incidence of complex multi­
dimensional problems could outstrip the capacity of 
agencies to tackle them in an ordered way and 
engender relationships based on crisis management.
"The nature of needs and demand is changing; 
homelessness and drug abuse, unemployment, 
altered family structure and break up are 
increasing. As they become more critical, co­
operation is built round crisis management, 
rather than forward planning, which was done in 
the mid to late 70s through integrated 
provision."
(Assistant Education Officer, (Community 
Education & Careers) Inner London Education 
Authority)
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In other cases it was not so much the issues which 
had changed but rather the ways in which they were 
perceived by the authorities concerned that affected 
relationships. Camden's decision to adopt a
campaigning approach on certain issues brought it into 
a new relationship with other organisations.
Relationships between authorities changed in response 
to changes within the organisations concerned. 
Respondents cited a number of examples of such 
changes. In Bloomsbury Health Authority the creation 
of a division responsible for many of the services 
involving other authorities, together with a new 
management style, was seen to have led to closer 
relationships with the local authority.
"Changes are occurring. Bloomsbury is becoming 
more proactive in relationships because the 
Local and Community Services Division did not 
exist before and there was no clear centre for 
such issues. There is more collaboration at lower 
levels because of new direction which is coming 
from the top. The key change is organisational? 
someone is now managing the service which was not 
the case before."
(Divisional General Manager (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Relationships were also affected by the decision of 
an organisation to centralise or decentralise. Camden 
Council had pursued a policy of decentralisation? 
other organisations with which it had relationships 
a policy of centralisation. The resulting mismatch 
had required changes in the way the organisations 
related.
"There is a mismatch between the increasing 
decentralisation of the local authority and 
recent centralisation in the LEB. It is 
difficult to get a central answer from a 
decentralised local authority? each of the
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neighbourhood offices will gradually begin to 
behave differently and have different policies”
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
"Internally at Thames there has been change, with 
centralisation at Reading.”
(Planning Officer, Thames Water)
Structural change was affecting relationships between 
the local authority and the police in contrasting 
ways. Camden's decision to set up its Civil Rights 
Unit and Police Committee had altered the framework 
within which relationships now had to take place. The 
Police, on the other hand, had undergone considerable 
internal changes affecting amongst other things the 
profile of its staff and styles of working with other 
authorities.
"The police force is changing in composition. It 
is becoming more graduate, less working class 
and there are more women. The new staff bring 
their own attitude into the organisation. 
Policing is now more flexible and relaxed and it 
is recognised that there are often several 
options in any one situation."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area, 
Metropolitan Police).
Relationships also changed as attitudes within the 
organistions involved changed. Respondents commented 
on both changed attitudes within their own 
organisations and changes they perceived in the 
organisations with which they interacted. Camden's 
attitude to the Manpower Services Commission which it 
had opposed was seen to be softening and leading to 
fuller and more constructive relationships.
"Camden and the MSC never got to grips with the 
earlier training initiatives and there are few 
schemes. Camden is now thinking of a YTS scheme
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though it is not saying so and it is still 
currently blocked."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
"On the YTS side there is more working together 
in Camden. This is possible because aims are 
more clearly defined. Both sides are more aware 
of the need to be cost effective and therefore 
become more interested in working together
rather than running separate schemes."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
Other attitude changes were less convergent. The 
police saw local authority attitudes towards them 
becoming increasingly aggressive.
"Things are changing in local authorities: there 
are more aggressive attitudes from local 
councils. At one point the police were told not 
to enter council buildings unless they were 
invited as if they were private buildings. 
Things are more aggressive and hostile than ever 
before."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
Changes in the wider environment were seen to have an 
important impact on relationships. Reorganisation had 
a direct impact on relationships. Political ties 
between Camden Council and ILEA had been weakened by 
the move to direct elections.
"Well developed member linkages in the past seem 
to have fallen away. As a result a number of 
local authorities have set up their own education 
officer, perhaps in a campaigning role and to 
improve communications."
(Assistant Education Officer, (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
"Borough council links with the new ILEA are less 
than previously. The real link is now not with 
the local authority but via the political 
parties."
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(Minority (Conservative) Party header, Inner
London Education Authority)
The transformation of LTE to LRT had caused shifts of 
power to occur in the public authority network: a 
shift made more pronounced by the abolition of the 
GLC.
The impact of the loss of the GLC was, however, seen 
by most respondents to be limited and to affect 
specific aspects of their work. Abolition had 
affected the funding of voluntary bodies and the 
complementary funding of some local authority 
initiatives. It was also seen to have increased the 
burden of work on councillors. Abolition was seen to 
have had a direct impact on relationships within the 
public authority network, though few of them involved 
the local authority.
"The result of the abolition of the GLC has been 
an improvement in relationships. Previously ILEA 
had to buy services such as supplies, legal 
advice, architecture, now they are able to 
provide for themselves. As a result ILEA has a 
greater say in such areas and can include them 
in its consultation with other authorities. For 
example, involving local authorities of communi­
ties in the design of schools. Such direct links 
are felt to be more fruitful.”
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
The main impact on relationships involving local 
authorities was to focus on the need for rela­
tionships with other local authorities.
"There is a feeling that authorities should co­
operate more with their neighbours when the GLC 
goes."
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(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
Camden)
Changes in legislation and government policy were 
identified as important sources of change in rela­
tionships. An example of the former was the Water Act 
1983 which enhanced the ability of water authorities 
to control those undertaking agency work, usually 
local authorities. The relationship between the local 
authority and the police had been changed by 
legislation requiring the setting up of police 
consultative committees. An example of the impact of 
policy was community care which demanded close 
working between the local authority and the health 
authorities.
"Relationships have changed as of neccessity, for 
example, relations between health and social 
sevices have changed and need to change further. 
The Health Service decision to close Friern 
Hospital, making community provision necessary 
means that they cannot progress closure without 
close dialogue with Camden."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
The general policy framework provided by central 
government was seen by many respondents to have made 
relationships more difficult. The nature of policies 
such as those being pursued in social security were 
seen to make constructive relationships between the 
local authority and the DHSS more difficult.
"Most interaction concerns casework and during 
the next year pressure groups and welfare 
organisations will be testing out the new rules. 
The new social fund creates boundless 
possibilities for local monitoring."
(Manager, - Euston Benefit Office DHSS)
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Frequent changes in government policy had also made 
relationships less stable.
"Government changes the rules every year and 
others don't stand still e.g. NHS reorganisation 
and abolition."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
Resource availability had declined and this decline 
had affected relationships. Rate-capping had left the 
local authority with fewer resources for tasks 
outside the core, and the pressure on public 
authorities to maximise their income had led to 
difficult relationships with the planning department 
over land.
"Boroughs are rate-capped, making co-operation 
more difficult."
(Assistant Education Officer (Community Education 
and Careers), Inner London Education Authority)
"There is pressure on health authorities to make 
money. The environment of decision-making has 
changed. For example with the Property Services 
Agency there was the same amount of conflict 
under a previous government but the basis of 
conflict has changed from conflict about land."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
Privatisation, although in its early stages in the 
industries concerned, was also perceived to be 
affecting relationships.
"The present government policy of privatisation 
is affecting relationships, for example Thames 
Water is trying to minimise expenditure on new 
services with a view to privatisation."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
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"Privatisation is bringing closer relationships 
with the property companies. Relations with 
other public authorities are becoming more 
formal and distant."
(Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, The Crown 
Estate)
Respondents identified changes in the political 
climate of Camden which had had an impact on 
interauthority relationships. Respondents pointed to 
a polarisation of political views which had taken 
place and to the increasingly difficult nature of 
London politics for the non-political organisation to 
deal with.
"It is a politically difficult time in central 
London; services must adapt and change their 
role."
(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority)
"Things are becoming more difficult because of 
the political pattern in London."
(Regional Information Offier, London North, DHSS)
Respondents differed in their assessment of the 
changing quality of relationships reflecting the 
particular linkages in which they were involved. 
Respondents suggested that relationships were 
increasing rather than decreasing.
"The quantity of dialogue has changed."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Liaison didn't previously happen."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
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Some saw relationships deteriorating in quality.
"Since government circulars brought community 
care onto the scene there has been more
conflict. Local authorities were seen to have 
latched onto this as a way to get additional 
funds. Health authorities, on the other hand, 
were suspicious of handing funds to
organisations in which they had little confidence 
in their ability to provide care and who could 
stop the service. Cash causes conflicts.”
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Rather more of those who commented on the changing 
quality of relationships saw them improving as a 
result of closer working with other organisations and 
greater familiarity with the way they worked.
"Relations with the Boroughs are improving 
slowly."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
"Improving, but slowly. Since 1974 the 
authorities have been getting to know each other 
better."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"Changes involve talking more to other 
organisations, getting to know them better and 
becoming more positive about their role."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area, 
Metropolitan Police)
CONCLUSIONS
Respondents identified much common ground between 
public-sector organisations which should have 
provided a more fertile environment for developing 
relationships than with other types of organisation. 
Familiarity, shared cultures and working environments
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were all features which have been identified by other 
researchers as contributing positively to the develop­
ment of inter-authority relationships (Schemerhorn, 
1975). However, other features of public authorities 
which set them apart from other organisations, such 
as formality, bureaucracy and party politics, were 
features that have been identified as inhibiting 
successful cross-organisational linkages (Halpert, 
1982). Hence relations with other public authorities 
were seen to lack the informality and flexibility 
possible with the voluntary sector or the 
effectiveness of some links with the private sector.
The problems of working with other public authorities 
stemming from their structure, culture and working 
environment dominated the views of both officials and 
members of inter-authority working in Camden. 
Officials within the local authority generally found 
inter-authority working to be time-consuming and 
frustrating activity. Councillors found it 
uncomfortable to operate outside their familiar party 
and political frameworks and also lacked the time 
necessary for developing interauthority relationships. 
Those in other public authorities encountered similar 
problems and found Camden Council's socialist politics 
uncompromising to work with.
However, while structural factors were working against 
the development of links between the local authority 
and other public authorities in Camden, underlying 
values of public administration were working for their 
development. First, collaboration and co-operation 
were seen as ideas in good currency within the public 
sector network. Second, respondents articulated a 
stronger view that there was an obligation for public 
authorities to compromise with each other and pursue 
collaborative aims in the interests of the public
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they jointly served. Third, as public servants, 
officials were obliged to apply these values and 
engage in inter-authority working despite the 
difficulties and frustrations. There was, however, no 
strong ideological commitment to inter-authority 
working articulated by the members of the majority 
party in Camden.
Forces for change were seen by respondents to be 
pulling relationships within the public authority 
network in two different directions. The changing 
pattern of needs and demands for public services and 
government requirements for collaboration
necessitated closer relationships between Camden
Council and other public authorities. In addition 
there was a general view that over the long term 
relationships were increasing in quantity and
improving in quality. On the other hand, the political 
and organisational environment in which relationships 
were developed was seen widely to be becoming more 
difficult.
The abolition of the GLC implied a major change in the 
public authority network serving Camden. Although the 
impact of its loss was noted for specific tasks and 
linkages, abolition was not perceived by respondents 
to have had a major effect on relationships between 
Camden Council and the remaining public authorities 
in the network.
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CHAPTER 9
THE GOALS OF INTERAUTHORITY ACTIVITY AND THEIR 
ACHIEVEMENT
Respondents were asked about their views on the goals 
of inter-authority activities and the means by which 
such goals were being pursued. Their replies revealed 
that relationships between the local authority and 
other public authorities were being used to pursue a 
wide variety of goals by an equally varied set of 
strategies and tactics. Few of the goals or strategies 
were jointly determined. The majority were determined 
by individual organisations in pursuit of their own 
organisational goals. However, viable inter-authority 
relationships depended upon the development by the 
authorities concerned of mutually compatible goals 
and strategies.
THE GOALS OP INTERAUTHORITY ACTIVITY
The discussion of goals within inter-organisational 
studies has focused on the goals of organisations as 
wholes. Organisations are seen to be dependent upon 
each other for resources. The goals which they set 
determine the resources they need from other 
organisations and must be set in relation to the 
policies and preferences of those organisations upon 
which they are dependent. In this model of inter- 
organisational behaviour the exchange of scarce 
resources, is determined by goal setting at the top 
of the organisation (Rhodes, 1981).
Benson (1975) adopts a systems view in which 
organisational actors see their purpose as the 
acquisition of adequate resources to maintain and 
expand the existing organisation.
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Critics of this model have pointed to the problems of 
reconciling behaviour with formal goals and the 
re^/ification which accompanies the assumption that an 
organisation as a whole can determine and pursue 
goals (Rhodes 1981). In the discussion that follows 
these problems have been avoided by focusing on the 
goals of inter-authority activity as seen by those 
involved in that activity. The goals discussed here 
are those which respondents ascribe to inter­
authority relationships and may not necessarily be 
shared by others or reflected in achievement.
A different critique of models which include the goals 
and strategies of organisational behaviour is that 
they are too purposive and ascribe purpose to 
behaviour which is routine or apathetic (Stewart et 
al. 1984) . It might well be that when questioned about 
inter-authority activity respondents ascribed goals t;o 
it which in reality had no influence on behaviour. 
Although there may have been instances of ascription, 
three factors would have reduced the incidence of 
purposeless inter-authority behaviour. First, most of 
the interaction was voluntary rather than mandatory 
and therefore open to regular reassessment; second, 
inter-authority activity was generally described as 
problematic and unlikely, therefore, to be sustained 
without purpose? third, in the climate of financial 
stringency authorities were being pressed to examine 
the importance and effectiveness of all their 
activities, and purposeless activity could have been 
a prime candidate for removal.
The goals ascribed by respondents to inter-organisa- 
tional behaviour in Camden related to a variety of 
levels of activity. At the most general level they 
referred to broad, mission-like statements of the 
authority as a whole such as the promotion of general
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well-being. For example, respondents ascribed goals 
relating to Camden Council's campaign for change in 
the governmental system to inter-authority
relationships. At the second level were goals which 
concerned the nature and quality of specific services 
provided by the public authority network. Beneath was 
a set of goals directed at changing and improving 
systems of service-delivery. At the base level were 
goals directed at improving the environment in which 
authorities operated and increasing the opportunities 
for constructive interaction with other authorities.
Joint and Common Goals
The goals of inter-authority relationships and 
activity may be developed and held jointly or may be 
an extension of the goals of individual authorities. 
In Camden the latter type was more common than the 
first. There was very limited machinery for joint 
policy making between the local authority and the 
other public authorities in the network which could 
be used for joint goal-setting. Respondents referred 
to common aims rather than joint aims. The goals of 
inter-authority activity were seen as the development 
of means by which those with aims in common could 
work together.
"On the adult training side MSC seeks 
co-operation with Camden. Both have the same 
aims."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
"Our aims are the same but the means of getting 
there are different."
(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
It was also suggested that a goal of inter-authority
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relationships was the creation of shared aims where 
they did not exist.
"The second stage in developing planning with the 
local authority after information exchange is 
developing strategies for shared aims. Finally 
comes developing operational proposals."
(Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
However, the incompatibility of organisational goals 
placed limits on such processes.
"The priorities of the health authority are the 
teaching hospital and sorting out the mental 
illness problem. The Council's priorities are 
housing, racial equality and under-5s. Therefore 
in the discussion of priorities there is no 
meeting place."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Inter-authority relations were generally used by the 
local authority and other public authorities to 
pursue their own organisational goals. British 
Waterways Board saw its agreements with Camden 
Council and others as a means of fulfilling its duty 
to provide and maintain the waterway and towpath of 
the Regent's Canal. As a regulatory rather than a 
proactive body in land-use planning Camden Council 
could realise its development plans only through the 
activities of other public and private organisations. 
The Sports Council had only pump-priming funds 
available and relied on developing partnerships with 
other authorities to achieve its goals.
"The Sports Council has to work through other 
agencies. It is not big enough to achieve things 
itself. It can only pump-prime and must 
influence-the local authority to get its policies 
across. It aims to achieve its objectives for 
sport by working with local authorities,
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voluntary bodies and commercial organisations."
(Director, Greater London and South East Regional 
Office, Sports Council)
Goal fulfilment was often mutual: the incentive to 
enter activities fulfilling another authority's goals 
being the fulfilment of the first organisations1s 
goals.
"YTS and Camden are working to fulfil each 
other's aims."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
Corporate Goals
Respondents in both the local authority and the other 
public authorities in Camden identified a number of 
very broad goals which were being pursued through 
inter-authority relationships. They fell into two 
distinctive categories. The first group of goals was 
directed towards the people and communities of Camden. 
The second was directed towards the governmental 
system.
Inter-authority relationships were viewed as being 
used to promote the well-being of the community in 
general. Goals to which inter-authority activity 
could be directed included improvement in the quality 
of life of Camden residents, greater public 
satisfaction with public services in general and the 
promotion of the interests of the area at large.
"Our goal is to improve the quality of life of 
people in the Borough."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
"The ultimate objective is keeping the public
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happy and keeping the complaints file down."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
"Promoting the interests of the area."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
Goals of well-being were identified in both the local 
authority and other public authorities serving the 
area.
Inter-authority relationships were seen within Camden 
Council, but not within other authorities, as a means 
of changing the system of government. The public 
authority network at the local level was seen by 
Camden Council as a channel of communication and 
influence from local to central government. Within 
the local authority it was suggested that 
relationships with other public authorities were a 
means of seeking new powers, freedom from government 
restraint and changes in national policy.
"Looking to be given powers to intervene."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
"In relation to government, freedom to do what 
Camden wants. Camden sees itself as an 
independently elected body, therefore it should 
be able to run services as it wants."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The ultimate aim is to change things on a 
national level."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
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However, another authority, the DHSS, saw the same 
interaction with Camden Council differently. Rather 
than serving as a channel for influencing government, 
it saw the relationship purely as a means of allowing 
the expression of differing viewpoints.
"The purpose of meetings is voicing a viewpoint? 
because of civil service rules the DHSS cannot 
get involved in policy discussions."
(Regional Information Offier, London North DHSS)
Inter-authority activity was also seen as a means by 
which the way that the governmental network 
functioned could be changed. In particular it was 
seen as a means of increasing public accountability 
by the involvement of the democratically elected 
local authority in issues which were the 
responsibility of appointed public authorities.
Service Goals
Many of the goals pursued by authorities through 
inter-authority activity in Camden were phrased as 
improvements to service provision. Sometimes they 
were couched generally.
"In the first place, a better service for 
patients."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"A better service to the public we both serve."
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
A variety of specific changes in the nature of 
services were also being sought by both the local
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authority and the other public authorities in the 
network.
In seeking better services authorities were addressing 
issues of both quality and effectiveness.
"First, to improve the quality of education.
Therefore, anything which enhances the quality 
of education is to the good of ILEA.”
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
Education Authority)
"Joint approaches can be more effective."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
They were pursued through a variety of goals. One
goal was the use of links to create a comprehensive
service,
"Provision of a more comprehensive public health 
service than is possible without links."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Integration was also the theme of goals related to 
welfare provision and the treatment of clients 
requiring .more than one service.
"The whole-person concept, integrating DHSS 
benefit and looking at other aspects."
(Assistant Director, Information, London South, 
DHSS)
Responsiveness was seen to make a contribution to 
improving service quality and effectiveness. The local 
authority was seen by larger authorities to be 
closer to the population of Camden and relationships 
with the local authority were seen as a means of
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improving the tailoring of services to local needs.
"Getting the right 'community feel1 and 
responding locally."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
A final dimension of the search for better services 
was access. Through the network of public
authorities, the clients of one authority were able 
to obtain access to a wider range of services and 
facilities.
"Access to localities and groups of people via 
channels of other public services."
(Assistant Education Officer (Community Education 
and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)
"To give the public easier access to vacancies 
and to information."
(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)
This improved access was facilitated by referral and 
interauthority agreements on the use of resources.
"Job Centres also now provide more information 
for the public than they did in the past. This 
has been started under the 'gateway approach' 
whereby anybody can come into a j ob centre and 
ask any question which job centre staff may not 
be able to answer, but can provide a contact 
where answers can be obtained."
(Regional Information Officer, London North, 
DHSS)
Service-Deliverv Goals
Both the local authority and other public authorities 
saw inter-authority activity as a means of improving 
services by changing the ways in which services were
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organised and delivered. Goals related to the 
improvement of services from both the client's 
(consumer) and the authorities'(producer) viewpoint. 
These twin concerns were reflected in goals which 
pursued both efficiency and effectiveness in the 
organisation and delivery of services.
Co-ordination was central to the goals of improved 
service delivery. Co-ordination included fostering 
complementarity between the services provided by 
different authorities.
"Developing complementary approaches, so that the 
needs of the area are fully served by a variety 
of services is only possible by joint 
co-operative approaches."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
Complementarity implied relating and realigning 
services divided by organisational boundaries.
"The benefits of being able to relate public 
education to other public services which in the 
view of the local resident should not be 
separated by bureaucratic lines."
(Assistant Education Officer (Community Education 
and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)
"Short-term, improvements, even minor ones, in 
the system on a day-to-day basis. Long-term, to 
influence other bodies in how they operate and 
get them to start thinking in 'our terms'."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The aim is persuasion, to influence the 
activities of the local authority in the 
direction of the Sports Council remit."
(Director, Greater London and South East Regional 
Office, Sports Council)
The pursuit of complementarity involved not only
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persuading other authorities to change but was also 
aimed at recognising the way that different 
authorities* services impinged upon each other. Such 
recognition was the pre-requisite for negotiation and 
achieving a mutual adjustment of services and service 
provision.
"LRT wants Boroughs to take account of public 
transport issues in planning and redevelopment 
e.g. putting offices over railway stations."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
A second set of goals related to the development of 
joint activities. The Metropolitan Police had 
developed a policy known as the "multi-agency 
approach" particularly over crime prevention, but not 
confined to that aspect of policing. The police saw 
relationships with the local authority as a means of 
extending that approach.
"The Metropolitan Police are very much into the 
multi-agency approach to problems. With such 
issues it is seen to be fanciful to think that 
one organisation in isolation can solve the 
problem. It is necessary to seek the co­
operation of other agencies and try to adopt a 
common policy."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
Law and order was not the only policy area where a 
joint approach was being sought: in the provision of 
health and social services goals identified by both 
the local authority and the health authorities 
included the development of joint service provision 
and joint management of services.
"Combining in provision."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)
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"Hampstead seeks genuine joint management, though 
it realises that this is probably not achievable 
in real terms."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
A third approach to improving service-delivery was 
through planning. Respondents distinguished between 
short-term adjustment of services and long-term 
alignment and development. Inter-authority services 
were being used to pursue the goal of better 
planning. Planning could ensure that services 
developed in a co-ordinated and complementary fashion 
and that future problems of incompatibility of 
services were forestalled.
"Working together with the statutory undertakings 
ensures that services are installed in such a 
way as to minimise future problems."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
Both Camden Council and the other public authorities 
in the network set goals for inter-authority activity 
of achieving a better and more efficient use of 
resources. A prime target was the removal of overlap 
and duplication of services.
"Removing duplication."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
"No duplication."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)
"Prevents duplication and overlap."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
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Such goals were aimed at improvement of service- 
delivery from the producer's point of view without 
necessarily generating direct benefit for the 
consumer. It is usually argued that the consumer 
benefits from the financial savings made? however, in 
some cases the effect may be to remove choice or 
reduce access.
A fifth group of goals directed towards improved 
organisation and delivery of services concerned 
communications. Of particular concern was the desire 
to enhance referral. Public ignorance of service 
responsibilities and problems of access as well as the 
multi-faceted nature of client/customer needs meant 
that the authority contacted initially was not 
necessarily the most appropriate agency to meet some 
or all of those needs. A goal of interauthority 
activity was to ensure that clients/customers were 
passed efficiently to the right authority.
"Camden employees can feel more competent and 
confident because they can pass people on via 
the network."
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
"To see that work which is properly the 
responsibility of other authorities is directed 
their way - the police are available 24 hours a 
day via 999, therefore they get many problems 
which are not their responsibility."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
Improving communications involved not simply
increasing the amount of communication between 
authorities but also changing patterns of
communication. In particular the need to foster multi­
lateral as opposed to bi-lateral relations was
singled out.
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"Our aim is proper networking."
(Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
A sixth goal of inter-authority activity directed at 
improved organisation and delivery of services was 
localisation. For example, Thames Water saw a goal of 
relationships with local authorities as the 
application of local knowledge and skills to the task 
of providing water and sewerage services to a large 
part of South East England.
"Maximum benefit from close contact with the 
functions of local authorities and the benefits 
of local knowledge and operations."
(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water) 
Contributory Goals
Much inter-authority activity was directed at 
developing the climate in which service delivery 
could be improved. Contributory goals were seen as 
necessary to maintain existing levels of inter­
authority activity and as pre-requisites for 
developing further links.
A primary goal of inter-authority activity was to 
increase understanding at a number of different 
levels. At one level people in one organisation 
wanted to know more about the structure and operation 
of other authorities.
"Getting an understanding of departments and the 
way they operate."
(Regional Information Officer, London North, 
DHSS)
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At a deeper level authorities wanted not only to know 
how an authority operated but also to understand the 
organisation^ policies and viewpoints.
"A better understanding of other organisations* 
problems and more awareness.11
(Assistant Director, Information, London South, 
DHSS)
"The Boroughs and LRT have to co-exist therefore 
LRT will try to learn their views on the needs 
of the area and seek to demonstrate how they are 
meeting those needs."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
This level of understanding was necessary in order to 
develop constructive relationships based on 
negotiation and compromise. The goals pursued were 
those of mutual understanding as it was as important 
to an organisation to be understood as to understand. 
The Metropolitan Police felt themselves to be a 
regular target of criticism by the local authority and 
wanted to achieve both understanding by and political 
support from the local authority to smooth the path 
of operational co-operation.
"Co-operation at a basic level and support at a 
political level as well as criticism from the 
local authority especially from politicians. For 
example in housing, the police may want to use 
a flat to observe. This can be done quickly if 
relations are good."
(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
Interauthority action was also seen as a means of 
general development and broadening and a source of 
new ideas.
"Broadening of our knowledge and experience by 
recognising that teaching and learning take 
place in all sorts of contexts."
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(Director of Libraries and Arts, London)
An example of the effects of developing relationships 
with different sorts of organisations was also given:
"All libraries need the informal approach of 
voluntary bodies which rubs off on the library 
service through relationships."
(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough 
of Camden)
The impact of such learning on the further 
development of inter-authority linkages was by 
fostering an environment of innovativeness which has 
been shown elsewhere to correlate positively with 
relationships between organisations (Aiken and Hage, 
1968).
Both Camden Council and the other public authorities 
used inter-authority relationships to acquire 
information relevant to their tasks. The information 
was of two main sorts. On the one hand information 
was sought about plans and proposals which might have 
a bearing on the activities of the first organisation.
"The future: indications of what is planned."
(District General Manager, London Buses)
"Intelligence for the planning system."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
The second type of information concerned data and 
intelligence acquired by one organisation in the 
course of its normal activities which was of value to 
another organisation in planning and executing its 
tasks.
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"To help in knowing where jobs are and where 
specific recruitment difficulties exist, for 
example hard-to-fill vacancies."
(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)
"Camden provides useful information about local 
firms which helps in giving grants to employers 
to train."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
A third contributory goal was to acquire resources, 
both monetary and non-monetary. As noted above, all 
the authorities serving Camden were under financial 
pressure to a greater or less extent. Studies of 
interorganisational behaviour have stressed resource 
acquisition as the prime motivation for establishing 
relationships among organisations (Benson, 1975). 
However, resource acquisition did not figure 
prominently among the goals identified by respondents 
within the Camden network. Resource acquisition was 
identified more often as a goal by those within the 
local authority than by respondents in other 
authorities.
"The gain Camden seeks from interaction is to 
maximise resources."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
The most extensive comments on resource goals were 
made by a member of the Economic Development Unit of 
Camden Council. This unit had a high political 
profile but limited funds which came largely from 
Section 137 allocations(1)? the funds were very
(1) Section 137 of the Local Government Act 1972 
allowed local authorities to spend up to the 
product of a 2p rate on items of benefit to local 
residents.
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limited compared with the scale of the task it 
aspired to undertake.
"Camden hasn't the resources to do things alone 
therefore it is involved in joint-funded and 
joint-run initiatives with both public and 
private sectors. Goals include looking to draw in 
resources and looking for co-operation in 
non-monetary resource terms e.g. expertise, 
assistance in managing projects and exchange of 
information."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
Many authorities saw inter-authority activity as a 
means of solving problems. Where the problem had 
arisen between the local authority and another public 
authority, relationships had to be used to agree a 
settlement of the dispute.
"Sorting out arguments."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)
Where a particular authority was experiencing a 
problem of its own, in some cases inter-authority 
relationships were seen as a means of acquiring help 
to resolve them.
"Here and now: can you help us, we've got a
problem."
(District General Manager, London Buses)
THE STRATEGIES AND TACTICS EMPLOYED TO REALISE THE 
GOALS OF INTER-AUTHORITY ACTIVITY
Previous studies of inter-organisational relationships 
have looked upon strategies as a means by which 
organisations cope with interdependence and by which 
they can exert power over the exchange process and
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change the network in their own favour.
Benson (1975) identified a number of strategic options 
for changing network relationships open to inter­
dependent organisations, such as co-operation and 
disruption. Rhodes (1981) defines strategy in the 
context of central - local relations as:
"the means employed by either a central 
department or a local authority for imposing upon 
the other level of government its preferences 
concerning the time of, the conditions for, and 
the extent of the exchange of resources." (pl06)
Neither meaning is appropriate here. Respondents in 
the Camden study were asked to identify the 
strategies they were adopting to achieve the goals 
which they had ascribed to inter-authority activity.
The responses fell into three broad groups. The first 
group, which is not discussed further here, centred 
upon the continued use of inter-authority links to 
achieve the aims set for them. The second group 
focused on ways of orienting the organisation to 
foster goal achievement through inter-authority 
activity. The third group focused on inter-organisa­
tional processes.
Orienting the Organisation
Presentation was seen to be important for achieving 
inter-authority goals. Visibility was seen as a way of 
maintaining relationships and keeping the
organisation's goals and priorities to the fore.
"Showing your face and waving the flag."
(Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
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The image of the authority as an effective provider
of services with which other authorities might
successfully collaborate was also seen as important.
"Promoting of Bloomsbury"s own high quality 
services and doing our side of the job."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
A second approach was to search for opportunities to 
develop inter-authority relationships. Development 
could occur by finding ways to fit in with the work 
being done by other authorities.
"The approach to local authorities is to look at 
what services they provide and see how they 
impact on the FPC and find room for 
collaboration in how the system works, how 
services are planned, their location and so on."
(Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
Identifying problems amenable to a multi-disciplinary 
and multi-agency solution as well as adopting 
approaches which allowed other authorities to play a 
role in solving problems were also seen as means to 
pursue goals through inter-authority relations.
"Trying to act in concert with other agencies 
trying to identify problems which can be solved 
in conjunction with other authorities at a local 
level."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
The strategies described above were essentially co­
operation through consent and compromise. By contrast 
it was also suggested that to pursue goals through 
inter-authority relationships demanded the use of 
power to impose new and effective solutions. Such
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strategies, however, were open only to large and 
powerful authorities.
"Being a big, strong, dominant organisation gives 
the power to get things done and be experi­
mental and take risks.”
(Assistant Education Officer (Community Education 
and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)
Finally, authorities recognised the need to change 
attitudes inside the organisation towards
relationships outside the organisation. Change 
involved encouraging staff to engage in inter­
authority activity and making that activity official 
and legitimate.
"Encouraging contact with local authorities at 
all levels from operational staff to chief 
officers. The divisional manager sees it as 
part of his job to promote smooth relationships."
(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
It also involved education to equip staff with the 
skills and knowledge to work with other authorities.
"Making all officers aware of the multi-agency 
and problems-solving approach."
(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station) 
Inter-organisational Processes
It is difficult to separate goals and strategies. Many 
respondents in Camden identified as strategies for 
achieving the goals of inter-authority activity 
processes which in other authorities were the goals of 
inter-authority relationships. They were contributory 
or service delivery goals which in some authorities
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were seen as means to achieving higher-order service 
and corporate goals.
Three processes were identified. The first was 
communications. Communications involved approaches 
such as exchanges and visits, attending meetings as 
a link person, building personal relationships, and 
developing institutional links.
"Exchange visits and giving the local authority 
the internal phone book.”
(Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
"Developing communications which are backed up by 
the corporate philosophy."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area 
Metropolitan Police)
Second, was the use of consultation, which involved 
inviting comment and making information available, 
often beyond the requirements of legislation.
"LRT aims to get good consultation. Everything 
that is done in public is available to the 
Boroughs."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
Third, was planning.
"Through the planning process."
(Administrative Officer, London Ambulance 
Service)
"Planning and consultation by and with the local 
authority on all planning matters."
(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)
333
CONCLUSIONS
Where formal links existed between the local authority 
and other public authorities, most respondents were 
able to identify goals which were being pursued 
through such links and particular strategies for 
achieving them. Often where links were informal, and 
at the task level, respondents did not identify 
particular goals and strategies but referred to the 
specific problems they wished to solve and the 
contacts they had made or others they were trying to 
influence.
The goals of inter-authority activity were many and 
varied. They could be seen to form a hierarchy. At 
the most general level authorities were pursuing goals 
directed at improving the general well-being of the 
community in Camden. At the lower level were goals 
directed towards improved services and beneath them, 
goals that focused on improving the organisation and 
delivery of services. At the lowest level were goals 
directed towards changing the environment in which 
authorities operated in order to foster the 
development of inter-authority links and the pursuit 
of higher-level goals. Because goals were at 
different levels of generality there was an overlap 
between the means and ends of inter-authority 
activity. For example, communications were in some 
circumstances seen as the goal of inter-authority 
activity. In others they were seen as a means by 
which goals such as the integration of services could 
be achieved. More inter-authority activity was 
identified with the pursuit of lower rather than 
higher-level goals.
The goals of inter-authority activity were generally 
extensions of the goals of the inter-acting 
authorities rather than jointly determined.
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Interaction was sustained where mutual goal fulfilment 
was developed. Authorities were able to pursue 
different goals at different levels through inter­
authority activity. Mutual goal fulfilment rather 
than resource exchange was the prime motivating force 
behind inter-authority relationships. This finding 
differs from the processes identified in most studies 
of intergovernmental relationships such as Rhodes 
(1981). Inter-authority relationships in both the 
local authority and other public authorities in the 
network were seen as a means of exploiting common and 
compatible goals.
Resources did not figure prominently among the goals 
of inter-authority activity. All the authorities 
serving Camden were facing financial restraints to a 
greater or less degree. All resources, monetary and 
non-monetary, were in short supply and their 
availability for deployment through inter-authority 
activity was limited. Second, many authorities faced 
legal or central government policy restraints on the 
expenditure of resources on activities outside their 
core organisational responsibilities.
Many inter-authority activities such as the liaison 
between Camden Council and the DHSS were funded from 
Section 137 monies which were limited. Many 
respondents in health commented on the relative tiny 
amounts of funding available as joint finance for 
health authority/local authority projects.
Camden Council was also pursuing a particular set of 
goals very different from any being pursued by other 
authorities in the network. These goals were directed 
towards changing the governmental system itself, its 
organisation, structure and priorities. They were the 
goals of campaigning which Camden sought to pursue 
through inter-authority activity. In this way Camden
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was pursuing goals similar to the strategic options 
for changing network relationships described by Benson 
(1975).
Camden's campaigning stance did not match exactly any 
one of Benson's strategies. The nearest is the 
concept of a disruptive strategy which Benson sees as 
employing domain violations, fund diversion or 
programme circumvention. The local authority sought 
to influence factors under the control of the 
authority which was the target of the campaign. 
However, the local authority was not acting in a 
directly predatory fashion but was often seeking to 
influence a third party, central government. The 
responses of other authorities, which were the targets 
of such campaigning, were tempered by the notion that 
others, not themselves, were the true targets of the 
campaigns. While not welcoming Camden's attitudes, 
authorities such as the Metropolitan Police and the 
DHSS sought to emphasise the co-operative rather than 
the confrontational potential of relationships with 
the local authority.
The means by which authorities in the network sdught 
to achieve their goals through inter-authority 
activity were many and varied. They focused on using 
the links which existed within the network to achieve 
their particular goals and orienting their 
organisations towards interauthority activity.
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CHAPTER 10
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY NETWORK IN 
HANDLING ISSUES THAT CROSSED ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES
Almost every respondent expressed a view on the 
effectiveness of the public authority network in 
Camden in handling issues which crossed
organisational boundaries. However, respondents also 
pointed out it was difficult in many circumstances to 
arrive at judgments about the effectiveness of the 
network in handling the issues they were themselves 
involved in. For example respondents, all of whom 
were senior managers, were not always aware of the 
quality of relationships at the field level:
"It is difficult to know how well established 
links are from the centre."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
Effectiveness was also a difficult concept for 
respondents to measure where they were not directly 
involved in the provision of services:
"Effectiveness is difficult to judge if not a 
front line agency because aims are very broad."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
Despite such difficulties judgments were freely made 
about the effectiveness of the public authority 
network. A minority focussed on its effectiveness and 
a few judged the operation of the network to be very 
effective. Many respondents pointed to the network*s 
mixed record of effectiveness, pointing to 
effectivenss at one level or on a particular issue, 
but ineffectiveness in others. A large number of 
respondents commented only on the ineffectiveness of
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the public authority network, citing a wide range of 
reasons why it was poor at handling issues that 
crossed organisational boundaries.
Respondents were not offered a definition of 
effectiveness and their replies it shou/d \ 
effectiveness was a varied concept. Two rather 
different notions of effectiveness seemed to be held 
by respondents. One idea was that in an effective 
system there was an absence of conflict and complaint; 
an ineffective network was thus one where there was 
dissent and overt disatisfaction.
"Measurement of such relations tends to be in 
negative terms, i.e. the objective is that no one 
talks about you any more. Currently there are no 
pervasive or enduring comments about the 
transport system which is good."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
"Judged by the volume of complaints it is an 
average service."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
The other idea of effectiveness concerned problem 
solving capacity. An effective system provided a 
profile of services which met customer/client 
expectations, met objectives and solved or 
alleviated problems.
"When you look at issues it doesn't do well at 
all. For example homelessness in the Southern 
part of the Borough. The approach is inadequate, 
piecemeal, patronising, awful, cheap. The advice 
agencies' work is totally inadequate. Various 
projects are useless to tackle the problem."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
"Relationships are primitive. Appallingly little 
progress has been made in creating a seamless 
service from the consumer's point of view."
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(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
It was implied that an effective approach would be 
adequate, comprehensive, coordinated and
client-centred.
The most enthusiastic view of the public authority 
network came from a manager within London Regional 
Transport:
"It handles issues very effectively; the success 
criteria are in the interests of the public. It 
works very successfully, more than it gets credit 
for." - *
(District General Manager, London Buses)
Others, though less fulsome in their praise, were 
satisfied with the network's operation:
"The system is currently effective for passing 
information and allowing action to be taken on 
local plans."
(Planning Officer, Thames Water)
"The local authority system works well for the 
MSC at the moment."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
"It does work well, all authorities respect each 
other."
(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority)
However, such responses were few. Respondents coupled 
their comments on effectiveness with comments on the 
ineffectiveness of other parts of the system. Many 
saw the operation of the public authority network as,
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••Too diverse for a single judgment.”
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
Effectiveness at one level was seen to be matched by 
ineffectiveness at another level:
•'It depends on the level. It is quite effective 
at the ground level - incidents, people or 
problems are where there is good cooperation. At 
a higher level it doesn't work because of the 
bureacracy involved.”
(Chief Superintendent Hampstead Police Station)
Two main reasons for variation were structure and 
finance:
'•It works well and it doesn't work well. 
Effectiveness ultimately depends on the 
organisational structure of the local authority 
and on resources."
(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)
The structure of the links between authorities played 
a role in determining the pattern of effectiveness:
"Some issues are handled reasonably. Where 
mechanisms exist, issues can be resolved and a 
way found out of situations of conflict. Where an 
appeal procedure exists this is helpful. Where 
there is no appeal, for example in relations with 
London Regional Transport, the network works less 
well."
(Director of Recreation, London Borough of 
Camden)
Resources affected the willingness of authorities 
within the network to cooperate effectively:
. "It depends on the issue. Agencies are
obstructive if they feel they will be lumbered 
with the costs."
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(Acting Director of Wworks, London Borough of
Camden)
Other pressures, such as publicity, could force 
authorities to put more effort into co-operation:
"Effectiveness varies between issues. Issues 
which catch headlines in the press and require 
statutory liaison such as child abuse are done 
much better than issues that require voluntary 
joint planning such as services for the elderly."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
The view that the public authority network was 
ineffective in tackling issues that crossed 
organisational boundaries was expressed frequently 
and strongly. Some respondents put the point baldly:
"There are no examples of success."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"It doesn*t handle such issues at all - there is 
no system."
(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
The reasons respondents cited for the widely reported 
ineffectiveness of the public authority network fell 
into three categories. Ineffectiveness arose from the 
structure of the public authority network and the 
authorities within it; from the way the public 
authorities chose to behave and pursue their 
interests within the network; and from the 
environment in which the network operated at the time 
of the research.
A number of aspects of structure were seen to inhibit 
the effectiveness of the network. Respondents saw the
network of public authorities providing services in 
Camden as too complex to be fully effective:
"The system is a plethora of different agencies 
and people funding it. It works as well as it can 
do. ”
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The broader network is very ineffective. The 
system is very complex."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
Complexity was seen to produce a sytem which was 
difficult for the public to understand and hence to 
use:
"There is confusion about responsibilities in the 
public's mind with social services and housing."
(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
It was seen as fragmented, lacking coherence and 
direction.
"It is a fragmented system. The best can only be 
got out of a transport system if is each element 
is allowed to do what it does best to the full. 
This cannot happen fully in a fragmented system."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
On some issues, respondents reported a lack of a focal 
point or policy framework which could overcome the 
fragmented structure of organisational
responsibilities:
"The system handles some issues more effectively 
than others. On homelessness there is no central 
co-ordination or direction, no government policy 
and no clear local authority policy. There is 
much ad hocery."
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(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
Education Authority)
Fragmentation was seen to be reinforced by central 
government's policy of privatisation which was seen 
to reduce the coverage of the public authority 
network and thereby contribute to its 
ineffectiveness;
"The system has changed in recent years by moves 
towards the privatisation of income maintenance, 
transferring responsibility away from public 
bodies. An example is homes for the elderly."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
The comment was made that the public authority network 
could not by itself tackle many issues effectively:
"The network is not effective by itself. It needs 
voluntary organisations to dovetail in."
(Assistant Education Officer (Community Education 
and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)
Co-ordination was seen to be hampered by the lack of 
a strategic authority in London:
"It is not effective....London needs a strategic 
authority for policing, planning, transport and 
strategic housing supply. Bodies are missing."
(Chair, Housing Management Committee, London 
Borough of Camden)
A second main theme in respondents' comments on the 
ineffectivness of the public authority network was the 
lack of formality within the system.
"Relationships aren't effective. They rely too 
much on goodwill and not enough on form."
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(Assistant Education Officer(Further and Higher
Education) Inner London Education Authority)
The network was seen to lack full effectivness because 
it operated in an ad hoc way. Many respondents 
commented on the dependence of the network on 
individuals. Dependence was seen as a weakness 
because it relied on personal commitment of the 
individuals, usually officers, and their ability to 
bring authorities together to solve cross 
organisation problems.
"The present system operates despite procedures 
and legislation and relies on the individual 
commitment of officers that are involved. In 
general the present system of public authorities 
handles cross organisational issues very poorly."
(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"The effectivenss of the system comes down to the 
ability of officers to make it work. In general 
as a system it is not very effective."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
Respondents noted that communications were poor within 
the system:
"While much is effective it is also piecemeal. 
There is a lack of information on families and 
their needs, children are often out of school for 
months at a time and it is difficult to 
anticipate changes in the homeless population."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
"There is a problem of communication. BWB does 
not know who to contact and referral takes time."
(Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways Board)
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Lack of communication prevented the system acting 
effectively as a whole:
"It doesn't handle issues. There is no 
interconnection or cross referencing."
(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)
Two other features of the public authority network 
were mentioned by respondents as contributing to its 
ineffectiveness. One was the structural mismatch 
between the authorities in the network which 
inhibited the development of effective linkages:
"Structurally it makes it hard for the DHA's 
(appointed) and the Council (politically 
oriented, elected) to meet. There are different 
levels of accountability and management 
differences."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority)
The second was the lack of powers which particular 
authorities possessed in certain areas:
"No, it is not effective. It does not provide a 
service to the homeless unless in certain guises 
for example the under 17's."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The police do run up against difficulties. For 
example certain authorities only have certain 
powers to do certain things, they therefore have 
successes and failures."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area 
Metropolitan Police)
Ineffectiveness was seen to result not only from the 
structure of the public authority network but also 
from the way in which authorities chose to behave 
within it. In the first place, authorities were seen 
to be pursuing their own particular goals:
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"Different bodies pursue different policy 
obj ectives."
(Planning Officer (Transport) London Borough of 
Camden)
"There is no community of interest. Each has its 
own obj ectives."
(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)
The pursuit of self interest before common interests 
led among other things to an inability to pursue 
common standards:
"There are differences between Thames and the 
Boroughs on the services provided and it is 
difficult to operate a common standard."
(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)
"It is the system we have to work with. There is 
no uniform approach."
(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
Ineffectiveness arose from the duplication of effort 
which resulted from each organisation pursuing its 
own interests.
"There can be potential confusion of mechanisms. 
For example there are several working parties on 
the elderly which cut across getting agreement. 
The system has potential but requires good will, 
support and similarity of objectives."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
Another theme which ran through respondents' comments 
on the ineffectiveness of the public authority in 
tackling cross-organisational issues was the lack of 
commitment to interorganisational working on the part 
of individual authorities. One respondent expressed 
a conspiracy view of the difficulties of inter­
authority working:
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"There are problems with many groups. Some groups 
want to demonstrate that the system doesn't work. 
They want to make things difficult to demonstrate 
this.”
(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS) 
This view was idiosyncratic.
Working with other authorities was seen as a low 
priority:
"There is inertia not outright hostility." 
(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)
Lack of priority mainfested itself in many ways. 
Inter-authority working was often left to junior 
staff:
"You have to have people responsible for 
collaboration at a high enough level to have the 
capacity and will to make good personal 
relationships. There is insufficient seniority."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
Inter-authority working was not defined as part of 
officers' core responsibilities and perhaps as a 
consequence tasks which crossed organisational 
boundaries were shuttled from one authority to 
another.
"Relationships are tagged on responsibilities 
which are the first to go under pressure."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
"The system does not handle issues very well. 
There is buck- passing in grey areas. This is 
typical of public concerns because they have too 
much work. Maybe it is caused by bureaucracy. 
There is a tendency to think of reasons why one 
shouldn't do something rather than get on with 
the task."
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(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
It was suggested that inattention to cross-boundary 
issues was built into the system by professional 
training which reduced its capacity to act 
effectively.
"Social workers are not trained in income 
maintenance and do not look at problems as a 
whole. Therefore income maintenance is not seen 
as an integral part of dealing with other 
problems.”
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
The low priority accorded to inter-authority 
relationships was seen in the lack of objectives 
defined for such work:
"Relationships are averagely effective. They are 
very cumbersome and preoccupied with developing 
relationships as an end in themselves at the cost 
of developing the service. No rigorous 
time-tabled plannning has been developed."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
The environment in which the public authority network 
operated was seen to be a cause of ineffectiveness in 
handling issues which crossed organisational 
boundaries. Resources played an important role in 
allowing the network to function effectively:
"It is not effective. Capital planning through 
the Department of the Environment is a joke."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
"Effectiveness varies. There are good examples of 
joint planning. However, much has been frozen in 
the last eighteen months."
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(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools)
Inner London Education Authority)
Resources were particularly difficult where demand was 
rising.
"It is not effective. The volume of demand is 
great and resources are stretched."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
Lack of resources made authorities act cautiously 
towards each other within the network:
"Links are adequate for the resources available. 
There is reluctance to set up elaborate 
mechanisms if they can't deliver the goods."
(Administrator, Camden and Islington Family 
Practitioner Committee)
Authorities were also seen to be operating under 
constraints, some of them imposed by central
government, which inhibited effective
cross-organisational working.
"Relations with the NHS are not very effective 
but getting better. Constraints on different 
authorities make it difficult."
(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough 
of Camden)
"Current circulars on collaboration are fine 
where they are coterminous authorities but they 
are hopeless in central London. As a result, 
authorities are running round like headless 
chickens concerning reporting relationships. 
Current government advice is trying to make 
relationships too narrow. JCPTs on the other hand 
are trying to break out in order to achieve 
things."
(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
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CHANGES NEEDED IN THE NETWORK OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Respondents were asked whether there were any changes 
they would have liked to have seen in the 
relationships among public authorities. None
suggested that changes were unnecessary or
undesirable, although some sounded notes of caution 
about making changes that went too deep too quickly. 
The changes respondents wanted were varied in nature 
and level. They ranged from a widespread desire to 
see more and better interaction between public 
authorities to specific changes in powers and 
procedures.
The most widely desired change was for closer working 
among public authorities.
"Authorities should work closely together to 
create a service to people who cross over 
boundaries in a rational, concerted and positive 
way."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority))
"The LEB would like to strengthen its links with 
local authorities"
(Ambulance Service, Divisional Manager, London 
Electricity Board)
"One would like to see agencies talking and 
consulting with each other more, even though each 
one has a specific role to play in providing 
services."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area 
Metropolitan Police)
Respondents suggested a number of means by which 
better liaison could be achieved. Structural 
innovation was needed:
"Links are needed to create a better service and 
prevent duplication and gaps."
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(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"One would like to see more links."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
More and better communications were seen to be 
necessary:
"Improve information flows and communication 
flows where this is productive."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
"More information is needed to help staff in the 
front line."
(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)
A reform suggested by one respondent was staff 
exchanges.
"Staff exchanges would assist. For example 
library people would find it helpful to sit in on 
a CAB interview. Other local agencies have poor 
information systems and could benefit from seeing 
libraries at work."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
Improved planning, both more joint working and new 
approaches, was seen as desirable.
"We need to plan parts of services together."
(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough 
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority))
"Locality-type planning ideas would help.
Planning is now fairly rigid, for example 
all-Camden, all-Bloomsbury."
(Director of Nursing Services (Community Services
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Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
Common objectives and the adoption of common policies 
were seen as a means to attain closer relationships.
"The hope is that the police consultative 
committee will be a forum where genuine common 
objectives can be identified and all seek to 
attain them."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
Respondents wanted to see a move towards greater joint 
working:
"Unless people are very exceptional they find it 
difficult to work in isolation on theories of 
what needs to be done. The best they can do is 
respond to particular pressures."
(Community Information Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
For a number of respondents joint working implied 
taking steps towards shared control:
"On health more joint control is needed. The 
health service is accountable to the District 
Health Authority? social services is accountable 
to the social services committee? the Joint Care 
Planning Team is accountable to both bodies which 
may have different priorities."
(Director, Social Services, London Borough of 
Camden)
‘"In the long run a London commuter railway is 
needed with all systems under the same policy and 
financial control allowed for in the 1984 Act. 
British Rail would act as operator/contractor for 
railways as in other metropolitan areas."
(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
A second theme, apart from the need for more and 
better relations, was the desire to see changes in 
the attitudes adopted by authorities to each other.
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For example, the Metropolitan Police wanted Camden 
Council to change its attitude towards the police:
f,A reduction of suspicion on the part of 
politicians."
(Chief Superintendent Hampstead Police Station)
"There is a need to improve hugely on dialogue. 
Kentish Town is not reluctant to talk and has 
taken initiatives but the response from Camden is 
negative, equivocal or there is no reply at all."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
A similar concern was voiced by a health authority 
respondent.
"Bloomsbury would like easier relationships with 
Camden and relationships which were as good as 
those with Westminster. Access to Westminster is 
easier because of the attitude of the Director of 
Social Services which does not occur in Camden. 
A more flexible and innovative approach by Camden 
to some of the suggestions made by Bloomsbury is 
also needed."
(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
The LEB on the other hand wanted to be considered in 
a privileged way by the local authority over land use 
planning.
"The LEB would like to get special treatment and 
consultations with respect to local authority
planning."
(Ambulance Service, Divisional Manager, London
Electricity Board)
In the DHSS scope for changed attitudes was
recognised by both the Department and the Council. 
Respondents in the local authority wanted the DHSS to 
respond more positively to approaches from the 
Council:
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"One would like the DHSS to take Camden more 
seriously. Would like the DHSS to be more 
imaginative. Camden is happy to feed ideas into 
the DHSS but wants them to respond more actively 
and take initiatives to get things changed. 
Currently the DHSS sees things as inevitable. A 
more positive attitude is needed."
(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The DHSS should be more responsive. Letters are 
sent on a monthly basis but there are no replies, 
they are never acknowedged."
(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)
Respondents in the DHSS wanted more understanding by 
the local authority and other organisations of the 
limits within which the Departments response could 
be made:
"Little change needs to take place. But local 
authorities need to realise that chasing us every 
day isn't effective because it causes a logjam. 
A better understanding of DHSS work and roles is 
needed."
(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
"Take-up campaigns are viewed positively if 
targetted properly but the DHSS wants them 
coordinated and wants an input."
(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
Respondents not only wanted other authorities to 
change their attitudes towards their own organisation 
and inter-authority working but also to make changes 
in their internal organisation. Respondents
highlighted aspects of authorities' structures and 
procedures which seemed to inhibit the development of 
successful linkages. Local authority procedures were 
seen to be slow and in need of change by some 
respondents:
"The committee structure of local authaorities is
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a nuisance because it takes a very long time."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services
Commission)
Further delegation and decentralisation of decision 
making within the local authority was felt to be 
needed:
"It would be easier for the Manpower Services 
Commission if individual sections in Camden had 
more autonomy."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services
Commission)
Respondents recognised the need for change within
their own organisations to facilitate the development 
of links.
"The divisional structure of Bloomsbury is also 
a problem."
(Director of Nursing Services (Community Services 
Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"Administration is cumbersome because of the 
masses of files not computerised. The system is 
Dickensian."
(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
However, for one respondent concern with the 
structures and processes involved in inter-authority 
working was pitching the need for change at the wrong 
level.
"There is a need to shift the preoccupation with 
interorganisational relations to relations based 
on what clients need. Organisational relations 
would take care of themselves. There should be a 
shift from process to discipline by focussing on 
purpose."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead 
Health Authority nominee)
A third theme among the changes desired by respondents
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was the need for more resources.
"Yes, it would be nice to be given the resources 
to do the j ob."
(Director of Nursing Services (Community Services 
Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
"No money means no growth and no initiatives so 
organisations can't do joint schemes."
(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) 
Inner London Education Authority)
"The DHSS is limited by resources in providing 
information therefore the local authority is 
taking the initiative. One would like to see a 
service-to-the-public initiative by the DHSS as 
well."
(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)
Local authorities in particular wanted a reduction of 
restriction on spending in general and an increase in 
Section 137 budgets.
"Camden has problems with Section 137 money 
because budgets are very tight."
(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services 
Commission)
"If the present administration see rate-capping 
as its role, why not give local authorities more 
discretion on how they spend their money. Section 
137 is an anachronism. There should be a reversal 
of trends in grant-making. Rate-capping means 
authorities not only lack powers but also 
resources."
(Community Information Officer, London Borough of 
Camden)
The fourth and final theme among respondents' concerns 
was structural change. New structures were needed to 
bring the authorities involved in particular policy 
areas together.
"A more meaningful forum for employment is 
required."
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(Community Information Officer, London Borough of
Camden)
"Some structural change is needed to bring health 
and local authorities closer together. A possible 
model is that of Northern Ireland."
(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
"There should be a more structured approach to 
inner city planning and more partnership and 
joint funding, for example for multi-ethnic 
needs, homelessness, under-fives and community 
centres jointly run and jointly funded. There 
should be a more formalised link between the 
separate agencies which would require an Act of 
Parliament. Authorities should be duty bound to 
./provide a joint approach to some problems. Such 
a movement could be based upon community centres 
and joint management of them."
(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London 
Education Authority)
A number of respondents wanted to see a successor body 
to the Greater London Council exercising a co­
ordinating and strategic planning role within London.
"There should be a strategic authority with wider 
powers, for example over planning and canals. It 
should not be a sports strategic authority."
(Director, Greater London and South East Regional 
Office, Sports Council)
A reunification of boroughs under a single local 
authority association was seen as desirable.
"One would like to see a revivial of a single 
local authority association for London which 
could provide the force for collaboration between 
Boroughs and joint bodies."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
Some respondents were anxious to see a rearrangement 
of responsibilities for service delivery and
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transfers of powers between authorities in order to 
clarify and rationalise service provision.
"One would like to see sewerage change and local 
sewers go to the Boroughs.”
(Acting Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
"The system could be more effective if education 
moved to the Boroughs. It is bad because of 
separate political masters."
(Assistant Education Officer(Further and Higher 
Education) Inner London Education Authority)
"One would want to see wider powers in some 
areas, for example risk in properties outside the 
Fire Precautions Act. Many powers are currently 
split up."
(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority)
"The Public Utilities Street Works Act (1964) 
needs sorting out - the utilities can dig up 
roads without the necessity to inform the highway 
authority. It should be mandatory to inform the 
local authority within 48 hours and write into 
this when the hole is likely to be filled and 
ready for inspection."
(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of 
Camden)
Respondents expressed a desire to see new forms of 
accountability within parts of the public authority 
network.
"The London Ambulance Service should be a special 
health authority with members from regional 
health authorities. The Regional Health Authority 
is a strategic planning/finance body. It is not 
easy to manage an operational service. Response 
is slow."
(Administrative Officer, London Ambulance 
Service)
J'One would like to see greater accountability 
such as consultative groups with greater powers 
within the safeguard of the rule of law."
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(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)
"One would like to see a police authority for 
London similar to police committees elsewhere, 
excluding the absolute power of politicians."
(Chief Superintendent Hampstead Police Station)
Finally the comment was made that less central 
government intervention would be beneficial to the 
public authority network.
"Bloomsbury would like to be left alone by the 
DHSS and would welcome less control and less 
interference in relationships."
(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community 
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
In making suggestions for change a number of
respondents sounded notes of caution. Change that was 
too fast was considered unwise.
"Development, growing together is more
appropriate than change."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of
Camden)
"This must be an evolving process 
incrementalism is best."
(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
The implications of change which led to increased 
tasks and responsibilities was seen as a requirement 
for caution:
"One would like to see more links, but this means 
more work."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of
Camden)
"Yes, but changes involving getting closer 
together mean more meetings."
(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
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Caution was needed to handle politically-difficult 
issues and to prevent the incorporation of individual 
authorities into an amorphous public sector with the 
loss of valued specialisation and expertise.
"There is a need to tread warily in such areas 
because of sensitivities."
(Director of Engineering, London Borough of 
Camden)
"While advocating closer cooperation it is 
important to remember that each agency has a role 
to play and there is a danger of cooperation 
going too far because it is necessary for an 
organisation to maintain its own identity."
(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area 
Metropolitan Police)
Caution gave way to doubt as respondents qualified 
their comments with statements about the feasibility 
of change.
"A single local authority association for London 
is needed ...but this is unlikely to happen."
(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of 
Camden)
"One would like improved relationships but cannot 
be optimistic that this is possible."
(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health 
Authority)
CONCLUSIONS
Respondents saw an effective public authority network 
as possessing problem-solving capacity which crossed 
organisational boundaries and operated in a consensual 
manner. Although performance varied according to the 
particular parts of organisations involved in issues, 
it was judged overall by respondents to be poor. 
Ineffectiveness arose from the structure of the public
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authority network, organisational attitudes towards 
inter-authority working and the environment in which 
the network operated.
The structural mismatch between authorities and their 
formal bureaucratic structures which inhibited the 
development of links between authorities was cited as 
prime causes of the ineffectiveness of the network. 
These difficulties were exacerbated on the one hand 
by resource problems and changing government policies 
and on the other hand low priority given to 
relationships with other public authorities. 
Relationships were developed on an ad hoc basis and 
relied much on the efforts of individuals that took an 
interest in them. Authorities
were reluctant to commit resources where they did not 
retain full control.
The critical views expressed by the majority of 
respondents were matched by a desire for change in the 
public authority network. Changes were needed in four 
different aspects of the public-authority network. 
First, more and better inter-action was needed between 
public authorities. However respondents recognised 
that to achieve closer relationships, changes were 
needed elsewhere. Second, therefore, was the desire 
to see changes in the public authorities themselves. 
Internal structures and procedures needed to be 
adjusted to make them more compatible with those of 
other public authorities with whom interaction was 
required. For improved relationships to develop 
authorities needed to change their attitude towards 
each other focussing upon areas of common interest and 
displaying greater openness. A third change required 
was the easier availibility of resources to fund the 
costs of interauthority working and reserve the 
pattern of retreat to a core of mandatory services.
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Fourth, structural change in the network as a whole 
was needed, including some reorganisation of 
responsibilities between authorities. Structures had 
to be created as a focus for leadership within the 
network for tasks which spanned several authorities.
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS
Two kinds of conclusions can be drawn from the 
research undertaken in Camden. The first kind are 
about the role of Camden Council in the Borough's 
public — authority network and the nature and 
determinants of relationships between the Council and 
other public authorities. The second kind are more 
general inferences about inter-governmental relations 
at the local level. Because the research was based on 
a single case study, the latter conclusions are more 
tentative
The concluding sections at the ends of Chapters 4-10 
have presented detailed summaries of the results of 
the research by topic. In the succeeding pages the 
separate strands of evidence are drawn together to 
give an overall picture of inter-governmental 
relations within Camden.
THE CAMDEN CASE STUDY
Fragmented Service Provision
The provision of public services in Camden was highly 
functionally fragmented. A large number of public 
authorities, twenty one of which were included in the 
study, were responsible for providing public services 
within the Borough. With the exception of the local 
authority, they were all single-purpose authorities. 
The local authority was characterised by strong 
departmentalism which added to the fragmented profile 
of service provision within Camden. Fragmentation 
created both the need and the opportunity for 
relationships between the local authority and other 
public authorities.
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Structural changes were taking place within the local 
government system which reinforced the pattern of 
fragmentation. The abolition of the Greater London 
Council meant that some services were transferred to 
the Boroughs and other public authorities, in theory 
at least, improving integration. However, not all the 
former Greater London Council services were dis­
tributed in this way. A number of new, single­
purpose authorities were set up as well. Other 
structural changes served to reinforce divisions 
between authorities. For example, the political link 
between the Borough and the Inner London Education 
Authority was severed when the latter became directly 
elected. Privatisation was reducing public 
authorities' monopoly or domination of services, such 
as public transport or care for the elderly, 
increasing the number of service providers.
High Levels of Interdependence among Authorities
There were high levels of interdependence in general 
between the authorities in the public authority 
network and in particular between Camden Council and 
other public authorities. Interdependence was often 
complex and multi-dimensional. Interdependence arose 
from the way responsibilities were distributed 
amongst authorities, from the common environment in 
which they operated and the objectives they chose to 
pursue. Respondents recognised the extent of 
interdependence and saw the local authority and other 
authorities in the network as closely connected.
The nature of services provided gave rise to 
interdependence. Fragmentation of the network arose 
because each authority possessed a distinct set of 
powers and responsibilties, while the location of 
authorities in adjacent stages of the production
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process gave rise to interdependence. For example, a 
process might be begun by one authority and completed 
by another. The basic nature of many public services, 
such as power supply, refuse collection, or fire 
fighting, meant that they were readily consumed 
directly or indirectly by other public authorities. 
Powers of regulation, exercised particularly by the 
local authority, were also applied to other public 
authorities in the network.
The nature of the services provided by the public 
authority network in Camden was also such that they 
could not be provided effectively or efficiently in 
isolation from each other. Camden Council and other 
public authorities shared a common customer/consumer 
base which generated complex problems and needs to 
which the public authority network had to respond. The 
particular services provided by each authority were 
often only a part of a much wider response required 
by individuals or occasioned by issues of public 
conern. Where a response was partial or unco­
ordinated it was generally seen to be ineffective.
Interdependence also arose from authorities*
organisational objectives. Seldom were authorities in 
competition with each other for the provision of 
services. However, they were in competition for 
resources, for powers to act and for influence within 
the public authority network. Interdependence also 
arose from the recognition of common causes amongst 
the authorities in the network, such as attempting to 
convince central government of the need for more
resources.
Ad Hoc Linkages among Authorities
The relationships and linkages developed among
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authorities in the network were limited when compared 
with the extent of interdependence. Formal links 
between Camden Council and other public authorities 
were not extensive. Relationships were more often 
dependent upon the informal links developed by 
individuals. Both formal and informal links
concentrated at the level of officials with limited 
member involvement. Links generally focused on 
specific tasks and issues and rarely concerned the 
alignment of organisations as wholes. Links between 
Camden Council and the other public authorities had 
generally evolved in an ad hoc fashion in response to 
operational needs. The exception to this patttern 
were those areas where there was a statutory 
requirement to establish relationships such as JCCs. 
Mandatory relationships, however, were few.
Leadership within the Network
The overall density of the public authority network 
was low. Because of its multi-service nature, Camden 
Council had more links with other authorities than 
any other organisation in the network. However, the 
extent to which it played a leadership role within 
the network was questionable. The development of 
external relationships leading to co-operation 
through concrete linkages was not a priority for the 
local authority. Camden Council had adopted a 
campaigning stance which was directed both at the 
policies of a number of other public authorities 
serving the area, and, through them, at the policies 
of central government. Campaigning led to unease in 
the relations between the Council and other public 
authorities and occasionally to outright conflict.
Camden Council had developed its leadership role more 
extensively in relation to other local authorities in
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the London area. The Council performed a servicing 
and co-ordinating role for some of the joint bodies 
which suceeded the Greater London Council and was 
similarly active in groupings of Labour authorities.
Mutual Goal Fulfilment
Relationships between Camden Council and other public 
authorities were being used to pursue a hierarchy of 
overlapping goals. At the most general level, 
relationships were seen as a means of increasing the 
general well-being of those living and working in 
Camden. Relationships were also seen to be a means of 
improving specific services. At the lowest level, 
relationships were seen to be a way of changing the 
operating environment of the organisations concerned. 
These goals were not jointly determined by the 
authorities but were extensions of their particular 
organisation's goals. The process of interaction was 
one of mutual goal fulfilment.
Ineffectiveness
Few of those involved in the public authority network 
thought it operated effectively in tackling issues 
which crossed organisational boundaries. Its record 
of success was seen to be patchy, and the 
ineffectiveness of the network was a common theme 
among those interviewed. The majority of those 
interviewed wanted to see changes in the relationship 
between the local authority and the other public 
authorities. The direction of desired change was 
towards more and better interaction, and factors that 
would facilitate interaction, such as more positive 
attitudes among those involved, more resources and 
improvements in the structural framework within which 
relationships were developed. However, a number of
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respondents sounded notes of caution about the 
desirability of speedy or extensive changes.
The Influence of the Environment
The socio-economic profile of Camden gave rise to a 
high level of complex multi-dimensional demands and 
issues. Some of them concerned individuals and had a 
social welfare basis, such as care for the elderly or 
provision for the homeless. Some concerned the urban 
fabric. Transport issues were interactive. Social 
problems, such as crime, child abuse, and drug abuse 
required a response from many authorities.
The socio-economic environment of Camden was conducive 
to the development of linkages among the public 
authorities serving the area. Critical factors 
included the high levels of demand for services, 
high-profile and complex multi-dimensional problems, 
population instability, resource scarcity and 
shortages of personnel. Few socio-economic factors 
were working in the opposite direction to inhibit 
links, specifically the heterogeneity of the 
environment and high land prices.
A number of features of the wider environment, 
however, were not conducive to the development of 
linkages. Resource constraints, while making any 
savings which joint action could produce attractive, 
made the funding of new initiatives difficult and 
required authorities to concentrate upon their core 
activities. The policy framework provided by central 
government within which authorities operated was seen 
to be unhelpful in many areas, particularly where 
central government specified in detail the way links 
should be developed. The political climate, with its
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sharp polarisation between Left and Right was seen to 
make relationships difficult to develop and sustain.
The Influence of Structure
Structural factors were generally not conducive to the 
development of linkages. The organisation and culture 
of the local authority constituted a factor that 
inhibited the development of links with other public 
authorities. Camden Council was a diversified 
organisation which held a very wide definition of its 
interests? it was also a professionalised body which 
until very recently had had ample resources with which 
to pursue its interests. However, while these 
features of the local authority encouraged the 
development of links with other authorities, many 
other characterstics worked in the opposite direction. 
Camden Council exhibited strong departmentalism and 
a well-entrenched bureacratic culture. The thrust of 
its strong Left-wing political stance was for the 
large part directed inwards, focusing on council 
structures and procedures, and where it was directed 
outwards, it focused upon campaigning for changes in 
wider government policy.
Those working within the network of public authorities 
identified factors which made working with each other 
easier than working with other kinds of
organisations. These included familiarity, a shared 
public sector culture and a shared working 
environment. On the other hand characteristics such 
as bureaucracy, formality and party political 
sensitivities which were identified in the local 
authority were seen to imbue all public authorities 
and create difficulties for the development of 
linkages between them. However, within the limits of 
structural and cultural similarity which
371
characterised public authorities in general, on many 
dimensions there were considerable differences between 
the local authority and the other organisations 
within the network. These differences in scale, 
coverage, organisation, finance, culture and policy 
preferences made the establishment of points of 
contact and the agreement on areas of common interest 
very difficult.
The Influence of Attitudes and Values
Values and attitudes among those involved in the 
public —  authority network reflected a mixture of 
recognition of the desirability of working with other 
authorities and establishing linkages and frustration 
at the problems encountered in attempting to do so. 
The work of Camden Council and of other public 
authorities was widely seen to be closely connected, 
and more extensive linkages than those in existence 
were seen to be desirable. Public sector values were 
seen by those working within the system to favour 
collaboration between public authorities and to oblige 
such authorities to regard each other co-operatively. 
However, the structure, culture and working 
environment of the public sector were felt to 
militate against building on such values. Both 
officials and members experienced difficulties working 
outside their normal organisational
environment.Respondents in a number of authorities 
experienced difficulty in working with Camden Council 
because of its strong Left-wing political line and its 
political style.
Change and Stability
The picture captured of inter-governmental relations 
in Camden related to the period 1986/7. A major
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change was occurring in the public authority network 
with the abolition of the Greater London Council. 
With the exception of one or two particular services, 
Abolition seemed to be having very little impact on 
relationships between Camden and other authorities. 
Other forces, however, were seen to be pulling 
authorities in two opposing directions. On the one 
hand demands for services which spanned organisational 
boundaries were increasing. On the other hand, changes 
in the political environment, in the structure of the 
system of governance and within the organisations 
themselves were seen to be making collaboration more 
difficult. There was a long-term optimism that 
relationships would improve and become more effective 
as the result of the efforts of those within the 
system. In the short term, however, the prospects for 
change in the quality or quantity of relationships 
between Camden Council and other public authorities 
were seen to be small.
DISCUSSION
The case study of Camden suggests that a number of 
revisions may need to'be made in the accepted views of 
local government and administration. The case also 
suggests that some aspects of both interorganisational 
theory and intergovernmental relations theory may need 
modification in order to apply to public authorities. 
Thirdly, the case suggests that policy makers should 
review some of the assumptions upon which policies 
involving input from two or more public authorities are 
based.
A Network View of Local Service Provision
The Camden case study supports the view of local 
government which encompasses a multiplicity of service-
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providing public authorities rather than just local 
authorities. An example of this wider view is to be 
found in Rhodes (1988) in which he replaces local 
authorities with sub-central government as the local 
focus of central-local relations. Such a view 
contrasts with the tendency noted in Chapter 3 for 
studies to focus within a particular sector of public 
service provision or to discuss a single policy area.
The case study emphasised the structural differences 
between the local authority and the other public 
authorities which have underlain the rationale for 
equating local authorities with local government in 
institutionally-focused studies. However, if 
attention is turned instead to the output of the 
public authority network (services and their 
collective consumption) the rationale for
distinguishing between one authority and another on 
the basis of structure is much less.
The case study showed that although the local 
authority was the single largest provider of public 
services in money terms in the Borough, it accounted 
for less than half the money spent by public 
authorities operating within Camden. Secondly, 
although the links between the local authority and 
the other public authorities were only partially 
developed, the work of the local authority could not 
be isolated. It operated within a network that 
stretched beyond the Borough boundaries. Thirdly, 
those within the local authority and the other public 
authorities saw themselves as having much in common 
and subscribed to a set of values and beliefs which 
emphasised the connectedness and mutual obligations 
of public organisations providing services in a 
single geographical area.
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The Nature of Interdependence among Public Authorities
The Camden study indicates that the pattern of 
interdependence among public authorities is more 
varied and complex than previous studies have 
suggested. Interdependence which is not mandatory has 
usually been generalised as resource dependence which 
fails to capture the very different relationships 
which link local authorities to other public 
authorities. In Camden, although most relationships 
were voluntary, there was little evidence of 
relationships built upon resource dependence.
The most useful characterisation of the 
interdependence found in the case study came from the 
commerical world (Pennings, 1980), based upon the 
location of organisations in the production process. 
However, whereas in the commercial world vertical 
interdependence (with customers and suppliers) and 
horizontal interdependence (with competitors) have 
the greatest strategic significance, symbiotic 
relationships (with others undertaking complementary 
activities) are particularly important for the public 
service network.
There has been little appreciation of the complexity 
of the relationships among organisations which are 
part commerical, part non-commerical, part voluntary 
and part mandatory. Brooke (1989) captures some of 
this complexity. He uses an eight-fold categorisation 
of relationships based largely on ownership and 
control. However, since Brooke*s purpose is to discuss 
the means by which local authorities can use leverage 
over other authorities, he does not discuss in detail 
the ways in which interdependence arises from the 
task environment.
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The Processes Involved in Interauthoritv Relationships
There was little evidence of exchange between the 
local authority and other public authorities in the 
case study. Where relationships were mandatory there 
was some evidence that relationships were played as 
a game and that decision-makers adopted strategies 
which took account of other decision-makers in a form 
of partisan mutual adjustment.
Where interaction was voluntary, the best description 
of it was mutual goal fulfilment. Authorities were 
prepared to involve themselves in relationships which 
they saw as contributory to one or more of their own 
organisational goals. Frequently a further 
prerequisite was that the activity would contribute to 
the personal goals of either the individual taking 
the initiative or the person required to put the 
effort into developing the relationship. 
Relationships seldom arose as an imperative from those 
at the top of authorities but generally at the 
instigation of officials directly concerned with 
tasks that were recognisably interdependent.
The Uniqueness of the Political Dimension in 
Interauthoritv Relationships
Inter-organisational studies have focused largely on 
relationships among voluntary and non-elected 
statutory bodies. The political dimension has been 
absent from such studies. Inter-governmental
relations studies, on the other hand, have focused 
exclusively on the relationships among elected bodies 
and highlighted the goals and strategies of elected 
politicians and high-level officials. Neither body of 
theory by itself can explain the pattern of 
relationships found in the case study.
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A key feature of the public authority network 
identified in the case study was the presence of both 
elected and non-elected bodies. In Camden the 
political dimension was crucial to understanding the 
relationship between the local authority and the 
other public authorities. The stance which the local 
authority adopted towards the other public authorities 
was highly ideological and influenced by electoral 
considerations. The position of those in control of 
the other public bodies ranged from the left of 
centre to the far right. The non-elected public 
authorities found a Left-wing campaigning authority 
particularly difficult to deal with. The public 
position adopted by most of them was neutral. 
Non-elected bodies rarely engaged in overt political 
activity.
Part of the difficulty experienced by those involved 
in inter-authority relationships were the different 
perspectives with which they approached the 
relationships. Some saw everything through political 
spectacles which led them to believe that they were 
engaging with others in a game of political strategy. 
Others saw the network through organisational 
spectacles which led them to believe that they were 
involved in a rational search for optimum service 
provision. No one was clear who was playing which 
game. For example, many local authority officials were 
thought to be playing the political strategy game 
simply because they worked for Camden. Many of these 
same officials probably underestimated the extent to 
which those at the top of some other public 
authorities were playing political games.
Public Authorities as a Distributed Network
The local authority is generally portrayed as the
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central focus of relationships within the public 
authority network. This cartwheel-like model can be 
found in the analysis of local government in the 
Redcliffe Maud report (Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England, 1969) and in the prescription 
of writers such as Stewart (1974) and Brooke (1989) .
However, while acknowledging the different character 
of the local authority, those within the public 
authority do not regard it as having a central or 
unique role to play in the network. In the case 
study, the local council was not seen to have the 
dominant share of the resources and skills necessary 
for a central coordinating role. More importantly, it 
was seen to have neither the legitimacy nor the will 
to exercise such a role. The highly partisan position 
adopted by the local authority was seen by others to 
disqualify it from speaking and acting on behalf of 
others. Furthermore, the leadership within Camden was 
not particularly interested in playing such a role, 
preferring to pursue other political and
organisational goals.
Even if the local authority had been more interested 
in a leadership role within the network, it is 
doubtful whether the model of a cartwheel would have 
fitted the network as well as the model of a 
distributed network. In the distributed model there is 
no central node, but a number of local nodes which 
coincide with particular issues, inter-related tasks 
or groups of clients and consumers. Several of these 
nodes cluster near the local authority because of its 
multi-service nature. Others only involve the local 
authority tenuously.
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The Assumptions Made about the Wav the Network 
Operates
Central government policy makers make two assumptions 
about the way the public authority network operates 
which were not borne out by the case study. First 
authorities are thought to behave in a broadly co­
operative way. Second, accountability is presumed to 
be achieved through service-specific organisations.
Current government policy is to encourage spontaneous 
rather than imposed co-ordination. The case study 
suggests that given the structural and political 
heterogeneity of the public authority network, what 
will result is a form of minimalist co-ordination. 
Authorities will generally adjust to accommodate each 
other and some ad-hoc initiatives will be taken to 
develop more substantial co-operation.
Minimalist co-operation allows each authority to 
undertake its task with minimal interference and 
constraint by other authorities. In this sense it is 
inherently good for the authority. However, 
minimalist co-operation is an inadequate basis for 
policy initiatives such as community care which assume 
active co-operation (Audit Commission 1986). As 
service provision becomes more fragmented and 
organisations become more heterogeneous through the 
enhancement of the commercial dimension of public 
authorities, the likelihood of more than minimalist 
co-operation being achieved spontaneously diminishes.
The second assumption that government makes is that by 
bearing heavily on individual authorities they will 
ensure effectiveness and efficiency on behalf of the 
client/consumer from the network as a whole. This 
outcome is not so because the pattern of service-
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requirements does not match the structure of service- 
provision. The service requirements of a modern urban 
community are greater than the sum of its individual 
parts, therefore even if each individual authority 
operates effectively, the network as a whole may be 
very ineffective. Neither accountability nor control 
generally extends to the meeting of needs which rely 
on the active co-operation of two or more public 
authorities.
A New Role for Local Authorities
Local authorities never developed the wider corporate 
role which many prescribed for them in the seventies. 
Many reasons could be cited: structural differences, 
internal preoccupations, and lack of political will. 
As local authorities have seen their powers and roles 
trimmed, the nineties have seen the emergence of a new 
prescription for them, that of the enabling authority.
What light does the Camden case study shed on the 
feasibility of an enabling role? Camden may have 
been at the far end of a spectrum of relationships 
between the local authority and other public 
authorities providing public services in the same 
geographical area. The local council professed to 
care greatly about its citizens and the public 
services they received, yet it was at times 
practically at war with other service providers.
The concept of an enabling authority assumes the 
presence of three things which were missing in 
Camden. First, it assumes a political will in the 
local authority to pursue service goals before either 
ideology or short-term political advantage. Second, 
it assumes that the local authority has the means by 
which it can exercise sufficient leverage (through
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resources, powers and skills) to impact on the 
network as a whole. Third, it assumes that the 
structural and political basis exists in the network 
as a whole for co-operation in those areas where the 
local authority does not have leverage.
Many authorities will fulfil these requirements to a 
greater extent than Camden. However, the case 
suggests there will be a large number of authorities 
which find the development of an enabling role as 
difficult and as unattractive as the wider corporate 
role was for many councils.
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APPENDIX 1
List of persons interviewed
This list omits individuals* names and shows the main 
capacity in which they were selected for interview. 
Many individuals hold other positions in the public 
authority network - a phenomenon discussed in the main 
text.
Bloomsbury Health Authority
Divisional General Manager,
(Local and Community Services)
Bloomsbury Health Authority.
Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority
Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority
Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority
Unit General Manager (Elderly),
Bloomsbury Health Authority
Director of Nursing Services 
(Community Services Unit)
Bloomsbury Health Authority
Vice-Provost (Medical) University 
College, London
British Rail
London Regional Planning Manager,
British Rail
British Waterways Board
Area Leisure Officer, British 28.7.86
Waterways Board
Camden & Islington Family Practitioner Committee
15.7.86
27.1.87
20.2.87
20.3.87
26.3.87
7.4.87
3.3.87
31.1.86
Administrator, Camden and Islington 14.5.86
Family Practitioner Committee
Planning Officer, Camden and Islington 14.5.86
Family Practitioner Committee
Assistant Registrar, Camden and 14.5.86
Islington Family Practitioner Committee
Finance Officer, Camden and Islington 14.5.86
Family Practitioner Committee
394
General Practitioner, Kentish Town 16.1.87
Health Centre
Crown Estate
Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, 11.2.87
The Crown Estate
Department of Health & Social Security
Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS 29.7.86
Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit 29.7.86
Office, DHSS
Regional Information Officer, 4.2.87
London North, DHSS
Assistant Director, Information, 13.3.87
London South, DHSS
Hampstead Health Authority
District Planning Officer, Hampstead 10.7.86
Health Authority
District Medical Officer, Hampstead 3.9.86
Health Authority
Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority 12.2.87
Inner London Education Authority
Divisional Education Officer, Inner 13.8.86
London Education Authority
Assistant Education Officer 11.2.87
(Community Education and Careers)
Inner London Education Authority
Assistant Education Officer 6.3.87
(Further and Higher Education)
Inner London Education Authority
Assistant Education Officer 17.3.87
(Primary Schools) Inner London 
Education Authority
Member, Inner London Education 4.3.87
Authority. Hampstead
Member, Inner London Education 12.3.87
Authority. Hampstead
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Minority Leader, Inner London 25.2
Education Authority. Member,
Westminster City Council
London Ambulance Service
Administrative Officer, London 5.2
Ambulance Service
London Electricity Board
Divisional Manager, London 7 A
Electricity Board
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
Assistant Chief Officer, London 25.:
Fire and Civil Defence Authority
«
Senior Divisional Officer, London 25.:
Fire and Civil Defence Authority
London Regional Transport
Director of Planning, London Regional 8.]
Transport
District General Manager, London 21.]
Buses
London Residuary Body
Chairman, London Residuary Body 2.2
Manpower Services Commission
Adult Training Manager, Manpower 12.i
Services Commission
Adult Training Manager, Manpower 12.1
Services Commission
YTS Manager, Manpower Services 12.£
Commission
Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre 28 A
Metropolitan Police
Chief Inspector, Kentish Town 17.'
Police Station
Superintendent, Holborn Police 7.]
Station
.87
.87
.86
.87
.87
.86
.86
.87
.86
.86
.86
.86
.86
.87
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Chief Superintendent, Hampstead 12.1.87
Police Station
Superintendent (community liaison) 21.1.87
No 7 Area, Metropolitan Police
Thames Water
Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames 15.7.86
Water
Planning Officer, Thames Water 7.10.86
Sports Council
Director, Greater London and South 14.8.86
East Regional Office, Sports Council
London Borough of Camden
Welfare Rights Adviser, London 4.11.86
Borough of Camden
Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London 9.12.85
Borough of Camden
Director, Social Services, London 19.11.85
Borough of Camden
Assistant Director of Works, 18.11.85
London Borough of Camden
Acting Director of Works, London 18.11.85
Borough of Camden
Director of Engineering, London 15.11.85
Borough of Camden
Director of Libraries and Arts 15.11.85
London Borough of Camden
Community Information Officer, 15.11.85
London Borough of Camden
Employment Information Officer 15.11.85
London Borough of Camden
Economic Development Officer 7.11.85
London Borough of Camden
Director of Recreation, London 5.11.85
Borough of Camden
Assistant Director of Planning 4.11.85
London Borough of Camden
397
Assistant Director of Finance 26.11.85
London Borough of Camden
Deputy Chief Executive, London 22.1.86
Borough of Camden 14.10.86
Planning Officer (transport) 29.4.86
London Borough of Camden
Assistant Director Social Services 2.3.87
London Borough of Camden
Director of Housing, London Borough 16.2.87
of Camden
Director of Planning, London 16.3.87
Borough of Camden
Member, London Borough Of Camden/ 19.11.85
ILEA nominee, Sub-Committee Chair
Chair, Women1s Committee, London 7.1.86
Borough of Camden
Member, London Borough of Camden/ 21.1.86
Hampstead Health Authority nominee
Chair, Social Services Committee, 22.1.87
London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury 
Health Authority nominee
Chair, Housing Management Committee 17.2.87
London Borough of Camden
Westminster Citv Council
Deputy Director Social Services, 11.3.87
Westminster City Council
Assistant Director, Planning and 10.3.87
Transport, Westminster City Council
Director of Leisure, Westminster 11.3.87
City Council
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APPENDIX 2
Example of Questionnaire used with Officers
Discussion with ILEA
Questions Carol Vielba would like to raise
A How closely related do you see the work of ILEA and other public
authorities operating in the same geographical area?
B What interaction, if any, is there between ILEA and other public
authorities?
C What role do officers play in the interaction between the ILEA and 
other public authorities?
D How do members regard working with other public authorities?
E What does ILEA seek to gain from relationships with other public
authorities?
F How does ILEA pursue these aims?
G Are ILEA relationships with other public authorities any different 
from relationships with other organisations?
H How effectively does the present system of public authorities handle 
issues which cross organisational boundaries?
I Is the relationship between ILEA and other public authorities 
changing?
J What changes would you like to see in the relationships between ILEA 
and other public authorities?
K What else is important in understanding the relationship between public 
authorities?
NOTE
In A and B respondents were encouraged to discuss 
relationships with all other public authorities 
providing services in their area of territorial 
responsibility.
In C-K respondents in other public authorities were 
encouraged to concentrate upon relationships with the 
London Borough of Camden.
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Example of Questionnaire used with Elected Members
Questions Carol vielba would like to raise
1. How closely connected do you see the work of Camden and
the work of other public agencies operating in the area?
2. What issues are of common concern to Camden and other
public agencies at'the present time?
3. How much of your time is taken up with such issues?
4. Do you, as a committee chairperson, play a particular 
role in relationships between Camden and other public 
agencies?
5. Are you, or have you been, a member of another public 
agency? How well do you think that the system of joint 
membership links public bodies?
6. How effectively do you feel that the network of public 
agencies operating in the Camden area handles issues 
which cut across agency boundaries?
7. What if anything does Camden seek to gain from
relationships with other public agencies?
8. Does Labour Party policy and ideology have anything to 
say about relationships between local authorities and 
other public agencies?
9. Would you like to see any changes in the relationship 
between Camden and other public agencies?
10. Is the relationship between Camden and other Public 
agencies changing over time?
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APPENDIX 3
Outline of the Research Given to Interviewees
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
The aims of the research
1. To identify areas of common interest and activity among public
agencies in an urban area.
2. To identify the way in which urban public agencies define their
interests in relation to each other.
3. To identify the ways in which urban public agencies pursue their
interests in relation to each other.
Areas of study
1. The division of responsibility for public services between agencies.
2. The issues which are of mutual concern to two cr more agencies
3. Professional and political interest in issues which involve more 
than one agency.
4. Mechanisms which have been established for interaction between 
agencies.
5. The strategies and tactics employed by public agencies with respect 
to each other.
6. The results of interaction between agencies.
Method of study
The main tool of data collection will be informal interviews with officers
and members in a range of public agencies operating in a oarticular urban
area.
Interviewing is planned to fall into two phases:
Phase 1
(i) Interviews with key officers in the centre and the main functional
departments of agencies in order to identify issues, interests 
and strategies.
(ii) Interviews with key members in order to identify members' views
of interests and strategies.
Phase 2
(i) Interviews with officers closely involved in collaborative arrangements.
(ii) Interviews with members who are members of more than one agency.
(iii) Second interviews with a limited number of key officers to ascertain 
the impact of abolition on inter-agency arrangements.
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